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ABSTRACT 
   
At the interface of developmental biology and evolutionary biology, the very 
criteria of scientific knowledge are up for grabs. A central issue is the status of 
evolutionary genetics models, which some argue cannot coherently be used with complex 
gene regulatory network (GRN) models to explain the same evolutionary phenomena. 
Despite those claims, many researchers use evolutionary genetics models jointly with 
GRN models to study evolutionary phenomena.  
How do those researchers deploy those two kinds of models so that they are 
consistent and compatible with each other? To address that question, this dissertation 
closely examines, dissects, and compares two recent research projects in which 
researchers jointly use the two kinds of models. To identify, select, reconstruct, describe, 
and compare those cases, I use methods from the empirical social sciences, such as digital 
corpus analysis, content analysis, and structured case analysis.  
From those analyses, I infer three primary conclusions about projects of the kind 
studied. First, they employ an implicit concept of gene that enables the joint use of both 
kinds of models. Second, they pursue more epistemic aims besides mechanistic 
explanation of phenomena. Third, they don’t work to create and export broad synthesized 
theories. Rather, they focus on phenomena too complex to be understood by a common 
general theory, they distinguish parts of the phenomena, and they apply models from 
different theories to the different parts. For such projects, seemingly incompatible models 
are synthesized largely through mediated representations of complex phenomena.  
 ii 
The dissertation closes by proposing how developmental evolution, a field 
traditionally focused on macroevolution, might fruitfully expand its research agenda to 
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 This dissertation is about the problem of knowledge at the interface of 
developmental biology and evolutionary biology. In this chapter, I review the notion of 
problem of knowledge, then I show how it is relevant to the interface between 
developmental biology and evolutionary biology. Next I list the questions that drive this 
dissertation, and I conclude with a list of questions about meta-scientific methodology, 
questions that must be addressed as preliminaries to the driving questions. Throughout, I 
preview the later chapters of this dissertation.  
 
 
1.1- Problem of Knowledge 
 The phrase “problem of knowledge” refers to a set of questions that we ask about 
knowledge itself, especially scientific knowledge in its specialized domains, fields, or 
disciplines.1 The questions are related to each other, but exhibit no hierarchy of 
importance in relation to each other. For a given discipline or field, the set of questions 
traditionally includes at least:   
 What questions do those in the discipline ask?  
 How do they address those questions?  
 By what criteria do they evaluate the quality of responses to questions?  
                                                
1 See the introduction to (Cassirer 1950) for a succinct introduction to the idea of the problem of 
knowledge, as well as a summary of the transition, at the turn of the 20th century, from the application of 
general philosophical systems to specific domains of science, to the piecemeal study of different domains 
to elucidate their unique theories of knowledge.  
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 What counts as knowledge in this discipline?  
 What form does that knowledge have?  
 What are the tasks or functions of such knowledge? 
 What methods do people employ to generate that knowledge and re-deploy it?  
  
Like others who address those and related questions, I assume that disciplines and 
subdisciplines of science needn’t be led or evaluated by some most general system or 
theory of knowledge. Rather, in asking those questions, we assume that researchers in 
different fields construct often distinct and specific theories of knowledge to help them 
understand the abundance of phenomena in the universe.2 
At their best, studies about the problem of knowledge serve several ends. They 
help us describe and learn about the epistemological workings of disciplines. They help 
us compare such workings across disciplines, enabling us to get a synoptic view of the 
sciences, though not necessarily a unified one. These studies also help us describe the 
history of knowledge and explain its evolution. In some cases, these studies can help 
practitioners in their fields to develop those fields.   
In this dissertation, I describe some aspects of an epistemology now being 
developed at the interface of the fields of evolutionary biology and developmental 
biology. I also use my description for a further task: to indicate the prospects for the 
further development of that field.  
 
                                                
2 This position is consistent with, but doesn’t entail, claims that the world is metaphysically un-unifiable 
(Dupré 1995). I am agnostic about such claims.  
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1.2- Evolution and Development 
  For at least the last 35 years, and with deeper historical roots, researchers have 
been trying to combine developmental biology with evolutionary biology (Laubichler and 
Maienschein 2007). This interface is nebulous. Some argue that novel theories are being 
developed at this interface. Others argue that a new theory of knowledge about evolution 
is being developed. Others argue that the interface is a nebula only in appearance, and 
that little of theoretical or epistemological interest is happening there.  
For this dissertation, I focus on one region of that nebula, the interface between 
evolutionary genetics and developmental genetics. I focus on this region for several 
reasons. There are good arguments to think that this region is a likely area to develop a 
novel theory of knowledge for evolutionary phenomena. Furthermore, few have studied 
this region of the nebula, especially since about 2005. Finally, any insights about the 
aspects of a nascent theory of knowledge have the potential to influence the course of 
theorizing and research about evolution. I discuss each of those points below, and I use 
them to motivate the questions that drive this dissertation.  
In 2003, Scott Gilbert argued that, in syntheses of evolutionary biology and 
developmental biology, the most important integrations were between models of 
evolutionary genetics (population genetics and quantitative genetics) and models of 
developmental genetics.  
But more importantly, not all parts of developmental biology and not all parts of 
evolutionary biology are involved in these new unions. What is happening, I believe, is 
a series of interactions occurring between population genetic models of evolution and 
developmental genetic models of evolution. Both of these models emphasize genes. 
But in one case, evolution depends upon the frequency of gene variants within a 
population. In the other case, evolution depends on variations of gene expression 
between populations (Gilbert 2003, 348; Gilbert’s emphasis).  
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Later commentators, however, focused less and less on evolutionary genetic models as 
tools to be integrated with developmental genetic models.  
Much of that shift in focus was due to Ron Amundson. Amundson argued that the 
two kinds of models are constructed and deployed in distinct investigative programs 
(Amundson 2005). For the adaptationist program, biologists use evolutionary genetic 
models to show how selection causes the evolution of species and of population-level 
phenomena (like gene frequencies). For the structuralist program, biologists use 
developmental mechanisms to show how developmental types like the quadruped limb or 
the avian feather evolved. Amundson noted that that models used to explain the evolution 
of population phenomena couldn’t be used to explain the evolution of developmental 
types. The deep problem was that the logic of population concepts differed too much 
from the logic of developmental type concepts. He concluded that no evolutionary theory 
could synthesize the two programs.  
Amundson’s conclusions had a large impact. First, after Amundson most 
commentators increasingly ignored evolutionary genetics as it related to developmental 
biology. Instead, they discussed how researchers could use developmental mechanisms to 
study a wide range of macroevolutionary phenomena related to developmental types. 
They focused on issues of morphology, novelty, modularity, homology, and evolvability, 
all related to developmental types. Insofar as anyone discussed the role of evolutionary 
genetics, they mostly (re)asserted its importance without addressing Amundson’s 
arguments (Hoekstra and Coyne 2007; Lynch 2007; Wray et al. 2014).  
Second, though Amundson discussed models of developmental mechanisms 
generally, his conclusion also applied to gene regulatory network models (GRNs). GRN 
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models are a subclass of developmental genetic models, which are a subclass of 
developmental mechanism models. So if no developmental model could be integrated 
with any evolutionary genetic model, then more specifically, neither could any GRN 
model. Few commentators have discussed relations between GRN models and 
evolutionary genetics models.3 
But while Amundson argued that the adaptationist and structuralist programs were 
incompatible, he tempered his conclusion.  
History has a marvelous way of making philosophical and methodological difficulties 
disappear (poof!) in the face of scientific success…If both evo-devo [representing the 
structuralist program and developmental mechanisms –SE] and population genetics 
continue to be successful, a way will somehow be found to see them as consistent 
(Amundson 2005, 257).  
 
This dissertation begins with the conditional at the end of Amundson’s passage. 
It’s been ten years since Amundson published his book, and the structuralist program and 
the adaptationist programs continue to be successful, at least by metrics applicable to 
both. Each continues to draw students, develop research projects, secure funding, publish 
thousands of papers, address research questions according to the best criteria of their 
programs, and to export theories, data, and results throughout their disciplines.  
How, then, do practicing biologists see the two programs as consistent? In the 
decade since Amundson’s discussion, no one has systematically addressed this question. 
How might it even be addressed? Amundson’s arguments show that the issues between 
the two programs are partly epistemological. As a result, the few people who have 
                                                
3 But see (Wagner 2000; Laubichler 2010; and Davidson 2011) for some such discussion, most of which 
echoes Amundson’s more general conclusion.  
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addressed it have used purely philosophical methods, exploring the conceptual relations 
between the most abstract formulations of the programs.4  
I pursue a different strategy here. I study projects in which researchers directly 
face Amundson’s challenge of incompatible models. In such a project, a research team 
uses both evolutionary genetic models and developmental mechanism models, more 
specifically GRN models, to understand a phenomenon. Such projects provide perhaps 
the best source of data to see how researchers make those two kinds of models consistent 
with each other.  
I also work to infer aspects of a common epistemology between those kinds of 
projects. Amundson’s conditional indicates that any rapprochement between evolutionary 
genetics and developmental genetics will require a theory of knowledge that differs from 
the ones employed in their separate domains. I can’t hope to detail all, or even many, 
aspects of a developing theory of knowledge common across those fields. But I can 
address a few.  
To study the theory of knowledge shared among these projects, I focus on one 
question from the problem of knowledge. What is the task of knowledge created in these 
projects? I treat knowledge partly as the theories, models, and other empirically 
supported representations that researcher create, use, and export from their research 
projects. I treat the task of such representations as their epistemic functions. Such 
functions include to represent phenomena, predict it, or explain it. In Chapter 3, I develop 
this account of epistemic functions/aims. Given those explications, one question pursued 
                                                




in this dissertation is: For projects that use evolutionary genetic models and GRN models, 
what are the epistemic aims of those projects? 
I focus on that question because most everyone whose publishes about the 
interface of developmental biology and evolutionary biology agrees it is important. 
Richard Burian, one of the earliest commentators on the nebula, stressed that integrations 
of programs and of models should be evaluated in how well they achieve their objectives 
(Burian 1986). Most who have proposed integrative fields, from evo-devo to the extended 
evolutionary synthesis to devo-evo and beyond, have fought about the most important 
objectives to pursue.  
Besides the objectives that commentators think ought to be pursued, there are 
those actually pursued. Amundson convincingly argued that evolutionary genetic models 
can’t be used to understand the evolution of developmental types. From that he concluded 
that the evolutionary genetic approach and the structuralist approach were incompatible. 
This dissertation shows that his conclusion was too broad. Some practicing biologists use 
GRN models, important tools in the structuralist approach, to understand the evolution of 
populations, phenomena from the evolutionary genetic approach. The two approaches are 




1.3- Driving Questions 
A few questions drive this project. The overarching questions stems from 
Amundson’s conditional: 
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1. How do biologists see evolutionary genetics as consistent with developmental 
genetics?  
 
To address it, I closely study and compare two cases of research projects in which 
the teams who conduct the projects use evolutionary genetic models with GRN models to 
understand the evolution of complex phenomena. The first project was conducted by 
Norman Johnson, Adam Porter, and Alexander Tulchinky at the University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst, from 1998 to 2014. They studied simulated populations. The 
second project was conducted by Greg Wray, David Garfield, Daniel Runcie, and a few 
more colleagues at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, between 2008 and 2013. 
They studied wild-caught purple sea urchins, which they bred in their laboratory.  
Two further questions drive my analyses of those projects.  
2. What models of evolutionary genetics do those projects use? What GRN 
models do they use?  
3. What are the epistemic aims of the projects that use those models?  
 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I develop methods to address those questions. In Chapter 4 I 
frame those questions against several prominent debates in philosophy of science about 
models, mechanisms, and explanation. I also preview the structure of the next two 
chapters. In Chapters 5 and 6, I provide detailed case descriptions to answer those 
questions.  
With those descriptions, I have tools with which to systematically compare the 
cases to address, in Chapter 7, the final two driving questions. 
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4. How do the researcher teams relate the GRN models to the evolutionary 
genetic models in such a way that they are consistent with each other? 
5. What are the prospects for similar projects, and for the field of developmental 
evolution more broadly?  
 
For brief preview, my answers to the above questions are as follows. For question 
2, the teams construct custom evolutionary genetic models that enable them to treat gene 
expression, rather than adult traits or behaviors, as the relevant phenotype. For question 
3, the projects largely aim to describe the phenomena they study, while the Johnson team 
also aims to predict its phenomena, and the Wray team also aims to discover new 
phenomena. For question 4, the teams use a shared and implicit gene concept to link their 
GRN models to their evolutionary genetic models. Furthermore, the models link to each 
other, or are integrated, only with respect to complex phenomena implicit in the teams’ 
research systems. The models are not integrated at the level of abstract theory. 
For question 5, there are reasons to be optimistic, and there are reasons to be 
pessimistic, about the projects and their kin. But it’s still too early to tell their long-term 
fate. As for the field of developmental evolution, I conclude that its prospects are most 
bright in comparison to evo-devo and to traditionally evolutionary theory insofar is its 
proponents conceptualize it as a field in which research use models of developmental 
mechanisms, regardless of the kind of model, to understand, regardless of the kind of 
understanding, evolutionary phenomena, regardless of the taxonomic index of such 
phenomena (macro or micro evolution).  
The chapters that follow detail and justify those answers.  
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1.4- Meta-scientific Methodology 
 In addition to the above driving questions, issues about methodology also color 
this dissertation. Scientific research projects exist in space and time, and as such should 
be described with empirical methods. Much of this dissertation provides a strategy for 
studying research projects with methods commonly used in the social sciences, but rarely 
(if ever) applied to the problem of knowledge.  
This dissertation is part of the tradition in which people use historical analysis, 
either of the history of ideas or of case studies of scientific research, to address the 
problem of knowledge for specific scientific disciplines. I conceptualize theories, models, 
research projects, methods, etc. as historical objects or processes, just as biologists 
similarly conceptualize organisms, populations, genotypes, phenotypes, developmental 
types, etc.5 As historical objects, we can collect evidence about when, where, how, and 
by whom those objects were created, developed, redeployed, etc.  
 But I also go beyond the historiographic methods deployed in that tradition. 
While many in the 20th century ably used those methods to study the theories of 
knowledge in scientific disciplines, other noted flaws, sometimes trenchant, in those 
methods, and of the research that resulted from them.  
To forestall some of those critiques, I deploy methods from the empirical social 
sciences, especially those aided by computers. While some have begun to apply those 
methods to study science; especially citation networks, research topics (Evans and Foster 
2011), and collaborations (Leahey 2016; Wuchty et al. 2007); we’re just now at the edge 
                                                
5 I’m most influenced by (Hull 1986) on this front, though I remain agnostic about his account of 
evolutionary epistemology.  
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of using those methods to describe theories of knowledge in scientific disciplines, that is, 
to address the problem of knowledge.  
 While the questions listed in the previous section drive the overall dissertation, 
the ones below influence the strategy by which I address the driving questions. My 
proposals aren’t the ideal or only possible ones. They are just the ones I could manage. 
Ultimately, this dissertation is a step, albeit a small and cautious one, towards more 
robust empirical studies and characterizations of the problems of knowledge pursued in 
scientific disciplines. In terms of methodology, I’d be happy to find it soon replaced by 
stronger methods. 
 
How do you identify and isolate a domain, area, or developing field of science? 
Theorists, historians, and philosophers often talk about scientific fields, but often provide 
only a fuzzy idea about the scope of those fields. That shortcoming is potentially acute 
for this dissertation, which talks about the nebular region between the fields of 
evolutionary biology and developmental biology, and focuses still further on the interface 
of evolutionary genetics and developmental genetics. This nascent field, if it can be 
called that, lacks unique textbooks, manuals, and organizing as reference points to help 
readers see it as a developing region of science. To show that it exists, and to indicate its 
scope, I represent the field as a set of research papers that share common themes. In 




How do you conceptualize scientific research so that you can isolate cases for 
comparison? Many theorists and philosophers address this issue by focusing on theories 
and models abstracted from their real-world construction and use. On the other hand, 
many historians and sociologists focus on those products in their social contexts, focusing 
on large social units like paradigms, traditions, or programmes, or on smaller units like 
laboratories. The first approach alone can’t help me address my driving question, and the 
socio-epistemic units in the second approach are too broad to provide much help when 
talking about nascent fields. In Chapter 2, I propose a new socio-epistemic unit that I call 
research projects. Such projects share a general local epistemology that I call rationales. 
For this dissertation, I use those concepts to help historicize actual scientific theories and 
models. As those who study science, we can compare research projects to each other, and 
we can compare rationales to each other.  
 
How do you select cases for study and structure their descriptions without cherry-
picking or biasing your cases? Those who study the epistemology of science often 
appeal to case studies to support or discredit claims about that epistemology. But many 
argue that the use of such cases exhibit bias by the person using them, either in how she 
describes or represents the cases, in how she selects the cases to begin with, or in the 
scope of her inferences from those cases. In this dissertation, I aim to forestall or at least 
to lessen those worries as they relate to my use of case studies. To do so, I construct an 
explicit population of actual research projects from the population of research papers. 
That population of projects provides the scope for inferencea I make from my cross-case 
analyses. Furthermore, I study and compare more than one case, a practice that enables 
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me to compare cases and suggest generalizations. Next, and to limit bias in case 
selection, I follow a protocol for partitioning the population of projects, and for selecting 
cases from the partitions such that they are independent of each other, and are relevant to 
the driving questions of this dissertation. I do all those tasks in Chapter 2. Finally, to limit 
bias in case descriptions, I use a common structure for those descriptions, which I 
introduce in Chapter 4. Finally, I approach the driving questions with no preconceived 
ideas about what their answers should be, nor with a particular axe to grind.   
 
How do you explicate the notion of “the task of knowledge”? Among philosophers of 
science, there’s a growing movement to study not just the structures of theories, models, 
and concepts, but also their functions (Brigandt 2012; Woodward 20014; Woody 2015; 
Lloyd 2016). Few have developed systems of such functions. In the context of research 
projects, I argue that theories and models function to address questions, ameliorate 
problems, meet epistemic aims, and satisfy values. Each of those general functions is a 
task of knowledge. I address the first two in (Elliott 2016). In Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation, I provide an account of the third. I propose a concept of epistemic 
aims/functions, and a taxonomy of such aims/functions. I also operationalize it for use 
with content analysis methods.  
 
How do you collect data about the aspects of research projects and of rationales? 
For those who study science, one primary source of information is the scholarly articles 
published by scientists. Such articles aren’t perfect sources of information, and they are 
systematically constructed to obscure details about the history of the research described 
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in them. But they are useful. The articles provide some information about the epistemic 
aims of research projects and the epistemic functions of theories, models, etc. They also 
carry much implicit information, and I argue some of that information is about epistemic 
aims/functions. Those who study science often just read the articles, summarize their 
models or results, and move on to other tasks. That method won’t work to reveal the 
implicit information of the articles. To uncover implicit information from those articles, 
and to tie my inferences about epistemic aims/functions to bits of text from the articles, I 
use formal content analysis (Krippendorff 2013). In Chapter 3, I develop the framework 
for using content analysis on scientific articles, and I tabulate the results of those analyses 
in the case descriptions of Chapters 5 and 6. Content analysis methods provide a tool by 
which others can check the quality of my claims about the kinds of epistemic aims 
pursued by the two research teams I study.  
 
How do you ensure the reliability of your methods, and the reproducibility of your 
results? Even though I use methods like corpus analysis, content analysis, and cross case 
analysis, the mere use of those methods doesn’t ensure the strength of the inferences I 
draw from them. At the very least, I should also show that the methods are reliable, that if 
I use them repeatedly, they return the same data. Similarly, I should show that my 
inferences are replicable, that other can study the same phenomena and infer the same 
conclusions. To ensure that my corpus analysis methods are reliable and yield replicable 
results, I operationalize my concept of research projects so that it applies to the 
population of research papers, I create and use protocols to infer the presence of research 
projects, and I use computer programs to conduct nearly every step. Most of those topics 
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are discussed in Chapter 2. To ensure that my content analysis methods are reliable and 
return replicable results, I operationalize my taxonomy of epistemic aims/functions, use 
an explicit content analysis design, create and use explicit data collection protocols, and 
use computer programs to collect the data. Most of those topics are discussed in Chapter 
3. To ensure that my case analysis methods are reliable and return replicable results, I 
create and use a protocol to construct case descriptions, and I construct the case 
descriptions not as narratives, but as reports in relation to the dissertation’s driving 
questions. Most of those topics are discussed in Chapter 4. Finally, I include all of the 







HOW TO CONCEPTUALIZE AND STUDY SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROJECTS 
 
2.1- Introduction 
This chapter proposes a concept of research project, an account of project 
rationales, and it provides protocols to delimit populations of research projects and to 
select instances from those populations for case study analyses. It ends with an example, 
drawn from research projects in evolutionary biology, of how to use those protocols. 
Those tools don’t exhaust the tools needed to study research projects. But the tools 
described here enable those who study scientific projects with cases to specify both 
populations of projects related by a common feature, and the projects drawn from those 
populations as cases for focused study.1 
Researchers have proposed many kinds of socio-epistemic units with which to 
study the products of science. Such units include paradigms (Kuhn 1962), research 
programmes (Lakatos 1970), fields (Darden and Maull 1977), research traditions (Laudan 
1977), laboratories (Latour and Woolgar 1978, Latour 1987), scientific practices (Kitcher 
1984), styles of thought or research (Fleck 1935; Hacking 1992; Harwood 1993; Crombie 
1994), disciplines (Lenoir 1997; Becher and Trowler 2001), movements (Frickel and 
Gross 2005), and repertoires (Leonelli and Ankeny 2015), to list just a few.  
 Such units have important uses. Researchers proposed the above kinds of units to 
help them study and explain science as scientists conduct it, and not merely as the sum of 
abstract theories, hypotheses, or other lexical phenomena. To that end, researchers have 																																																								
1 Thanks to Jane Maienschein for helping me to see the importance of this topic.   
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used the units above to reveal much about actual science. And while some of the units 
capture similar phenomena, they also foreground different aspects of those phenomena, 
yielding surprisingly little theoretical competition between the units themselves.  
But the units indicated above also face serious issues. Those units are rarely 
specified with concepts that aren’t ambiguous or vague. Their authors rarely show how to 
precisely isolate an instance of one kind of unit from another instance of that kind, nor do 
they provide protocols to study those instances, nor do they explain how to relate the 
above units to each other. As a result, not only do studies that employ such concepts face 
issues of construct and external validity and replicability, they also provide other 
researchers tools that are sketchy at best. 
In this chapter, I propose a concept of research project. That concept enables 
research into science as it is actually conducted, just as the above units do. But the 
concept of research project is comparatively precise and operationalizable, so that we can 
test the validity and reproducibility of studies that employ it. I don’t argue that the 
concept replaces or is superior to the concepts for the units listed above. On the contrary, 
I think that we can use the concept of research project to make precise the concepts listed 
above, though I don’t pursue that project here.   
I also provide a protocol for studying research projects. It enables me to construct 
reliably a population of research projects, to distinguish among research projects, and to 
check that a supposed research project is in fact a research project. I also indicate how to 




Strategy for the Rest of the Chapter 
 To accomplish the above goals, I follow the following strategy in the rest of this 
chapter. In the next section, I contextualize this paper in debates about how to use case 
studies to investigate science. I distill two problems that confront those who wish use 
case studies to investigate science, and I use them to motivate the construction of the 
tools provided in later sections. There are five primary tools: a concept of research 
project, a map of epistemic relations for research projects, an operationalization of the 
concept, and two protocols to delimit projects. I also provide an example of how to use 
the concept and protocols in relation to the driving questions of this dissertation.  
Section three details a concept of research project, a map of epistemic relations 
that applies to those projects, and it provides one way to operationalize that concept so as 
to establish the existence of such projects, and populations of similar projects, from 
collections of research articles. 
Section four describes a general protocol to collect that evidence, and it includes 
tests for reliability of methods, external validity of results, and construct validity of the 
operationalized concept. Section four also and it provides a strategy for selecting a small 
sample of projects for case study analysis. Section four concludes with an example of 
how to use the protocols to identify a population of similar research projects. The 
example is about research projects at the interface of evolutionary biology and 
developmental biology. This chapter concludes in section five, in which I review some 




2.2- A Context of Case Studies 
Background 
 The tools I describe in later sections can help ameliorate issues about how 
philosophers, historians, and social scientists use case study analyses to investigate 
science. That said, the tools aren’t specific to case study analyses, and they could be used 
profitably in other research frameworks. But case studies provide a particularly useful 
context in which to see the potency of the tools.  
Philosophers, historians, and social scientists of science use case studies 
ubiquitously. If we open a journal from any of the common science study disciplines, we 
see many articles that claim to employ case study methods, or to describe cases of some 
more general phenomena. Furthermore, in their instructions to authors, the editors of 
those journals often indicate how much case study content they seek in submitted 
articles.2  
A quick analysis reveals the ubiquity of case studies in those journals. I did a 
quick analysis of case studies in the Web of Science database of scholarly articles. I 
focused on the ten-year period between and including the years 2005 and 2014, and I 
collected all of the articles from the following journals: British Journal for the History of 
Science, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Isis, Perspectives on Science, 
Philosophy of Science, Social Studies of Science, and Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Science. Excluding all but research articles and conference proceedings, there were 
2,372 articles in the set. Of those, 439 articles, or 18.5% of the total, explicitly invoked or 
used the terminology of cases in their titles or abstracts. Of those, 95 articles, or 4.0% of 																																																								
2 For a good example, look to this official blog post by Steven French, editor of the British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science. http://thebjps.typepad.com/my-blog/2015/01/deskrejectionfrench.html  
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the total, explicitly discussed or mentioned in their titles or abstracts the use of case study 
methods.3   
Those who study science use case studies for many functions. Among other 
functions, researchers use cases as heuristics or examples by which to elucidate some 
abstract claim about science, they use them to provide some evidential support for or 
against some claim about science, and they use them as exemplars with which to engineer 
new concepts and to show others how to deploy those concepts (Currie 2015). In the 
majority of science studies articles, researchers construct and deploy cases for at least one 
of those myriad functions.   
But those who study science, especially philosophers, have developed several 
discussions about case studies as a style of science. In one such discussion, they study 
how researchers use case studies in general (Forrester 1996; Ruzzene 2011; Morgan 
2012; Morgan 2014). In a second discussion, they study how other researchers use case 
studies in specific fields, such as psychoanalysis (Grunbaum 1988), applied ecology 
(Schrader-Frechette and Mccoy 1994), political science (Crasnow 2011; Crasnow 2012), 
developmental biology (Ankeny 2012), or medicine (Ankeny 2014). 
In the third discussion, researchers debate about the appropriate role of case 
studies as evidence for or against more general claims about science. Some are 
pessimistic that case studies can provide such evidence (Brooke 1981; Meehl 1992; Faust 
and Meehl 1992; Pitt 2001; Faust and Meehl 2002), while others are optimistic that case 
																																																								
3 If I’d included more journals, including the dozens of specialty journals, we’d have seen not only an 
increase in the absolute number of articles that discuss or invoke cases and case studies, but I suspect the 
percentages would be higher as well.  
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studies can provide such evidence, at least in some situations (Donovan, Laudan, and 
Laudan 1988; Burian 2001; Chang 2012; Currie 2015; Kinzel 2015).  
I situate this chapter in the third discussion.4 I agree with those who say that we 
can use case studies to provide evidence that confirms or disconfirms somewhat general 
claims about science, but I acknowledge that the pessimists have raised important issues. 
If we want to produce better case studies, we need to continue to address those issues.  
 
Problems and Success Conditions 
The above literature notes many problems with case studies as they’re commonly 
used in studies of science. Here, I focus on two such issues: 
1) Researchers often bias their case studies to support their positions. 
2) Case studies provide poor empirical grounds from which to generalize about 
science. 
 
The first issue is often called the problem of cherry-picking, according to which 
researchers don’t randomly select cases for study, but they instead preselect cases that 
will confirm their pet theories. The second issue is that even a well constructed case 
provides, at best, a single data-point with which to confirm or disconfirm a general claim 
about science, so case studies can only disconfirm maximally general claims about 
science, and they otherwise provide little evidence for or against other claims. As such, 																																																								
4 While I situate this chapter in the third discussion, the overall dissertation provides an instance of what 
Currie calls the ahistorical project of using cases as instruction manuals by which to show others how to 
use newly engineered concepts (Currie 2015). For this dissertation, the newly engineered concepts are 
those of research projects and of epistemic goals. By showing how to investigate research projects and 
epistemic goals in my three cases, I attempt to show others how to redeploy my concepts in other 
situations. For more on instructional uses of case studies, see especially (Burian 2001) and (Chang 2012).  
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we cannot use them to decide between competing claims about science, especially 
philosophical claims like the realism or anti-realism about science.  
Many, especially since 2000, have addressed those issues in fruitful ways. For 
instance, Kinzel notes that case studies are no different than any other empirical style, 
and that they are prone to issues of, or related to, theory ladenness (Kinzel 2015). She 
indicates that such theory ladenness often gives the appearance of cherry-picked cases, 
but that such appearances can be wrong. I agree, but Kinzel’s argument doesn’t rule out 
that many case studies have been, are, or could be, cherry-picked. And I don’t think her 
argument will convince the pessimists who raise issue (1), most of whom were well 
aware of the empirical character of case studies and of issues of theory ladenness. I take 
Kinzel’s analysis a step further and ask: from the set of cases that might have been 
cherry-picked, how can we distinguish those cases that weren’t cherry-picked? 
As for the second issue, Burian stressed that case studies provide evidence for or 
against claims about science that have a limited and specific scope, especially for what I 
call local rationales, but others have called local epistemologies (Burian 2001). More 
recently, Currie argued that case studies provide evidence for claims more general than 
the ones Burian countenanced, provided that those employing the case studies established 
a patchy-unity among the set of cases covered by the general claim (Currie 2015). I agree 
with Burian and Currie, but again I think that their arguments won’t convince the 
pessimists. We face two further questions: how do we precisely specify scope and delimit 
local epistemologies, and how do we establish patchy-unity?  
To answer those questions, I pursue a different strategy. I don’t think that 
arguments based upon reflection alone will answer the above questions or satisfy case 
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study pessimists. Nor will such arguments alone yield tools to strengthen our methods 
and strategies of using case studies to investigate science or to provide evidence for or 
against claim about science. In addition to such arguments, I propose that we construct, 
make explicit, evaluate, share, and improve strategies and methods for case study 
research. While arguing for the evidential merits of case studies is helpful, what is more 
fruitful, and ultimately more convincing, will be research designed to explicitly address 
and mitigate the issues raised by pessimists.  
Later, I develop a set of tools that help ameliorate, but not completely solve, the 
two issues listed above. The tools include a concept of research project and two protocols 
for investigating them. The two issues above become success conditions for the total suite 
of tools provided. As success conditions, I rephrase the above issues as:  
1. Show how to delimit a population of cases, provide criteria to select cases—
justified according to the research question, and select cases.  
2. Make explicit how to evaluate inferences from evidence with tests of reliability, 
construct validity, and validity. 
 
Preliminaries 
 Before I describe the tools, I highlight some issues about case studies that I don’t 
address in depth in this chapter, but that nonetheless color the rest of my discussion.  
 First, researchers use the terms ‘case’ and ‘case study’ with many different 
meanings, and because those terms are imprecise, authors often talk past each other when 
they talk about cases and case studies. Some take cases to be idealized instances of 
general phenomena, while others take ‘case’ as synonymous with ‘case report’. Some 
	 24 
take case studies to be about only single cases, while others take case studies to be about 
multiple cases. We need a conceptual framework with which to talk about the many 
flavors of research involving cases, a project for future research. For this paper, I treat a 
case as an instance of some phenomena of specified generality, a case report as a 
description of that instance, and a case study as being about more than one case and 
involving multiple case reports.  
 A second and related issue is about case reports. Almost all of the authors cited so 
far assume that case reports have the structure of historical narratives or stories. While 
many reports do have that structure, and while that structure can serve the ends of a given 
case study project, it isn’t the only valuable structure (Eisenhardt 1991). This assumption 
is especially prevalent among philosophers and historians, who have a long running 
discussion about the appropriate relations between historical and philosophical studies of 
science. For instance, insofar as case studies aim to give explanations of phenomena, and 
insofar as historical narratives provide explanations, we can fruitfully use historical 
narratives of cases to explain phenomena. But while I agree that all data used to construct 
case reports is historical, I hold that not all reports must provide historical narratives 
(Creath 2010; Eisenhardt 1991).  
 A third and corollary issue is about the aims of case study analyses and their 
relations to evidence. Some, especially from the social sciences more broadly, hold that 
we only use case studies to test explicitly causal claims (George and Bennett 2005; 
Gerring 2006). I disagree. While we can use case studies to test causal claims, we can 
also use them as evidence for or against descriptive claims. In this dissertation, and 
following the suggestions of (Burian 2001), I use case studies to describe the local 
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rationales of research teams, and to compare those rationales across two research teams. I 
do so to establish trends, not to causally explain them (Gerring 2012). More generally, I 
hold that we can use case studies to further any number of epistemic goals, from 
discovering phenomena or describing them, to explaining or predicting them.  
 Finally, there is an underlying theme to the issues raised by those who are 
pessimists about the use of case studies as tools to provide support for or against claims 
about science. The issue is that, insofar as case study research is a style of research, those 
who claim to use the style often fail to employ the standards or tools of that style. The 
pessimists cited above raise few issues about the uses and limitations of case studies that 
haven’t been raised by case study theorists in other disciplines.  
In the social sciences more broadly, researchers have struggled for decades with 
issues of how to delimit populations of cases and individual cases, how to select cases, 
how to theorize with cases, and how much evidence cases provide. While those who 
study science could contribute much to those methodological debates, they could also 
learn much from the results of those debates. Social scientists have developed many 
explicit strategies and tools by which to design, conduct, and use case studies to 
investigate socio-epistemic units and organizations (Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt 1991; 
King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Yin 2003; Gerring 2004; George and Bennett 2005; 
Gerring 2006; Flyvbjerg 2007; Seawright and Gerring 2008). Insofar as we study socio-
epistemic units and organizations in science, we can borrow and improve upon many of 
those strategies and tools. 
In short, if we want to use case studies to provide evidence for or against claims 
about science, the best way to quiet the pessimists is to design our research, collect data, 
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make our inferences explicit, and evaluate our methods and results according to standard 
cannons such as reliability, reproducibility, and the various flavors of validity. The tools 
below enable researchers to design and evaluate the initial stages of case study research, 




2.3- A Concept of Research Project 
 In this section, I develop a concept of research project. I begin with a rough idea 
of the concept, then I explicate that rough idea into a categorical concept, I articulate that 
a related map of epistemic relations, and finally I provide one possible operationalization 
of that concept. The concept will help us begin to answer the question: That case is a case 
of what exactly? The answer will partly be: That case is a case of a research project.  
 
The Rough Idea 
 Compared to many of the socio-epistemic units of science listed in the 
introduction, real world researchers more often use the phrase “research project” to refer 
to their own work. They litter their papers and websites with that phrase as a way to 
bound their work and to relate it to the work of others. When they apply for grants, the 
grants are for projects. They use the phrase at conferences to introduce themselves and 
their work in their presentations or when they meet people. They also train their students 
to identify, pursue, and evaluate their own research projects. In short, researchers 
ubiquitously use the concept of research project, but it has received little if any attention, 
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even from those who study science and who might profitably use the concept to help 
ground their own studies.5  
From that ubiquitous use, I highlight some implicit aspects of research projects. A 
research project has at least some spatio-temporal aspects and some abstract 
epistemological aspects. I discuss each kind of aspect in turn.  
 
Spatio-temporal Aspects 
Like many of the units listed in the introduction, research projects exist in space 
and time. For that reason, we can collect evidence about them and we can test claims 
about them. Research projects have beginnings and ends, though those markers may be 
fuzzy. Research projects can have lulls in their temporal persistence, with periods of 
activity and output interpolated by periods of little activity or stasis. Like laboratories, 
research projects exist in space, which is generally the space of the researchers pursuing 
the project, and over time the location of the project can change. For instance, a particle 
physicist might have a project elucidating the quantum electrodynamic background for 
neutrino emissions, which she has conducted at the same university for several years. If 
she leaves for a higher paying job in a government agency in a different city, she might 
take her project with her.  
Research projects are conducted by people, either individuals or teams. If the 
project persists for a good length of time, the people who pursue the project can change, 
just as the members of a band can change over time. For instance, a primary researcher 
																																																								
5 There are some heuristic cookbooks that tutor new graduate students on how to conduct research projects 
in specific fields. But those cookbooks are often collections of best-practices, not sustained developments 
of the concept of research project.   
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who has a lab in a university might have a project that persists for about five years. In 
that five years, the primary researcher might have several different post docs, graduate 
students, and undergraduate students cycle through the project. Yet through those 
changes, the project persists.  
Compared to the kinds of units listed in the introduction, research projects refer to 
the smallest socio-epistemic units. From the list in the introduction, laboratories (Latour 
and Woolgar 1978) and repertoires (Leonelli and Ankeny 2015) are the smallest units. 
Research projects are smaller than laboratories, which are also centered on people and 
research teams. But in a laboratory, the researchers can, and often do, pursue many 
research projects. And an individual researcher, who collaborates with no one, also often 
pursues several projects. Research projects are also smaller than repertoires, which by 
definition take successful research projects as exemplars from which to develop a toolkit 
of practices and strategies.  
The bigger a project gets, with more people and more tools and materials, the 
more it can grade into units like repertoires and programmes. Items labeled as projects 
might fruitfully be described as projects and as programmes. The Human Genome Project 
is an example.  
In a research project, a research team studies phenomena, which themselves exist 
in space and time.6   
Finally, a team creates many kinds of outputs as part of a research project. Those 
outputs can be data, theories, models, computer programs, grant proposals, grant reports, 
																																																								
6 In this chapter, I assume that research projects are empirical endeavors. I think that my terminology could 
be loosened to create a concept that also refers to projects in purely analytical fields, but I don’t pursue that 
task here.  
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public outreach pieces, protocols, articles in journals and books, books, etc. A team 
receives feedback about those products at least in terms of funding, citations, awards, and 
by its ability to grow its project into repertoires, programmes, and paradigms. When we 
study research projects, those outputs become sources of evidence by which to infer 
information and test claims about those projects and their kin.  
 
Abstract Aspects 
Like many of the units listed in the introduction, research projects have abstract 
epistemological aspects. We can study the logical relations among those aspects. In a 
given project, the research team uses theories, hypotheses, models, and similar items 
collected under the label of scientific products. The team also collects data and infers new 
scientific products from those data. In doing those tasks, the team invokes and contributes 
to a special vocabulary and to a suite of methods. 
Researchers focus their research projects on specific issues within a broader topic. 
While the phenomena studied by a project exist in space and time, the topic that describes 
and contextualizes those phenomena is abstract. Topics are aspects of fields, and they are 
often about general phenomena. For instance, in the field of evolutionary biology, one 
topic might be the evolution of pupfish, and a specific project might study the evolution 
of pupfish in a half dozen ponds near the border between California and Nevada.   
In addition to focusing a topic, a team pursues a project to address questions, 
achieve epistemic aims, and to ameliorate problems. Fields or paradigms or programmes 
all have collections of questions, aims, and problems. But for a research project, the team 
specifies from those broad collections the particular problems or set of problems they 
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pursue. The same is true of particular epistemic goals and questions. Ultimately, the 
problems, questions, and goals pursued in a research project are much more specific 
compared to the sets of problems, questions, and goals that partly define units like 
paradigms, fields, etc.  
Furthermore, research projects exhibit a network of epistemic relations. For a 
given research project, the specific goals, questions, and problems pursued logically 
connect with data and scientific products to form a project rationale, or a logic of inquiry, 
according to which researchers can evaluate the quality of a research project. Often for 
fields, paradigms, etc., those logical connections cannot be delimited because the sets of 
problems, questions, and aims are so large. Or, if connections are made, they are too 
broad to be of much use. Not so in research projects, which regularly face evaluation of 
their quality in grant proposals, article submissions, institutional reviews, and the 
marketplace of ideas.  Therefore, research teams often take pains to explicate the logical 
connections among their problem statements, questions, epistemic goals, scientific 
products, and data.  
 
A Concept of Research Project 
 From the discussion in the previous section, I distil a concept of research project. 
The concept enables us to operationalize it and thus to collect evidence about research 
projects “in the wild”. But the concept provided is a first attempt, and as it is an empirical 
concept, we might later revise it in light of new evidence. Of the many kinds of concepts, 
the one provided is a categorical concept, which enables us to class phenomena as 
research projects or not.  
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 Research Project 
 Some x is a research project only if: 
1. A research team of at least one person conducts x 
2. x has a beginning and persists for a period of time (maybe to a 
termination)  
3. one set of outputs of x includes research publications, grant proposals, 
grant reports, institutional reports, public outreach pieces, all of which 
at least some of the team members create 
4. another set of outputs of x includes data, computer programs, and 
scientific products (hypotheses, models, theories, etc.), all of which at 
least some members of the team create 
5. as part of x, the team pursues a specific and relatively precise set of 
problems, questions, and epistemic goals 
6. as part of x, the team studies a specific and relatively precise set of 
phenomena 
7. x is partly constituted by those actions of the team members in which 
they pursue the problems, questions, and epistemic goals from (5); 
study the phenomena from (6), and produce the outputs in (3) and (4).  
8. x has an internal logic that fits together the pieces from (4–7) in a 
rationale and is reported in the items in (3).  
 
I note some features of the concept. First, it provides a set of necessary, but not 
jointly sufficient, conditions for an item to be a research project. That feature indicates 
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not only that might we revise the individual conditions in light of experience, but that we 
might also profitably add to them. For instance, some of the conditions describe outputs, 
but none describe inputs. I think that research projects have inputs, but I can’t yet think of 
a way to discuss them without biasing the condition towards projects conducted in 
laboratories. The concept needs conditions about inputs, a project I leave for the future. 
Similarly, projects might incorporate the a-epistemic aims of team members. Such aims 
could be for esteem, money, career advancement, etc. The concept above is silent on 
those issues, and on topics about the complex social reinforcements between scientists, 
thus limiting its ability to more fully describe projects.  
Second, condition (2) mentions the beginnings of research project, but it hedges 
on terminations. I hedge because while many projects have demonstrably ended, while 
others are active and ongoing. Someone studying a research project will have to 
determine how she wants to bound later temporal parts of the project.  
Third, the outputs listed in condition (3) often describe many of the aspects of 
research projects. They thus provide primary sources of evidence for research projects. 
However, they don’t provide the only sources, and those studying a given project can 
collect evidence about those projects from other sources, such as by interviews of the 
team members or by observations of the team in action.  
Fourth, I treat the outputs listed in condition (4) as exportable tools. Not only does 
a research team create and employ those tools to address the project’s problems, 
questions, and epistemic aims, but other teams can get and redeploy those tools for their 
own research projects. As they are tools created by teams with histories, those tools also 
have histories, and we can study those histories.  
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Fifth, condition (5) distinguishes research problems from questions, and both 
from epistemic goals. That condition assumes that we can conceptualize those things 
somewhat precisely and as distinct from each other, an assumption that some may 
disagree with. See the Chapter 3 and (Elliott 2016) for reasons to adopt that assumption.  
Sixth, conditions (5) and (6) invoke a phrase about specificity and relative 
precision. Such specificity and precision of research projects is relative to laboratories, 
repertoires, programmes, and other socio-epistemic units listed in the introduction.  
Finally, condition (8) mentions a rationale for a research project. for those who 
work to describe a given research project, they must describe that rationale as best as they 
can. To help in that task, I provide the following map of epistemic relations.  
 
Map of Epistemic Relations  
Burian and Currie left us with two questions: how do we delimit local 
epistemologies, and how do we establish patchy-unity? To begin to address those 
questions, I relate the concept of research project to a map of epistemic relations within 
research projects. Here, I posit it hypothetically, but I don’t show how I came to construct 
it or how it relates to similar maps. I leave that task for a future project.  
 
The Map 
The map in Figure 2.1 is at first glance overwhelming. There are nine nodes and 
twenty-six edges between them. I’ve already discussed most of the nodes, most of which 
are part of the explicit concept of research project. From that concept, Research Teams 
are part of condition (1), Products and Data are part of conditions (4) and (7), Problem(s) 
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and Question(s) and Epistemic Aims are parts of conditions (5) and (7), and Data 
Collection Methods and Inference from Data Methods are reified parts of condition (7). 
The only new node is that of Values, which we might include as part of condition (5), but 
which I keep separate.7  
 
Fig. 2.1. Map of Epistemic Relations for Research Projects. The model represents nine 
nodes and twenty-six edges, most of which comprise parts of the concept of research 
project. The lightly dashed lines represent causal or empirical relations between nodes. 
Solid lines represent analytical or logical relations between nodes. Heavily dashed lines 
represent relations that can be empirical or logical, depending on the aims and questions 
of the research about the research project.  
 
There are three kinds of edges, those with lightly dashed lines, as between 
Research Team and Data; those with solid lines, as between Data and Products; and those 
with heavily dashed lines, as between Products and Problems. The eleven dashed lines 																																																								
7 Many philosophers of science conflate epistemic aims with values. I think they are importantly different, 
so I distinguish them. But I’ve yet to develop a condition for the concept of research project that adequately 
captures my thoughts about values. I leave the development of that condition to later work.  
	 35 
represent connections between nodes that we most easily study with empirical means. 
They are the causal relations, about which we can collect empirical evidence when we 
investigate research projects as social scientists or as historians. Furthermore, the lightly 
dashed lines emanating from the Research Team node represent the actions described in 
condition (7) of the above concept. When we empirically investigate a research project, 
we often must first describe and specify the nodes and the causal relations between the 
nodes.  
The seven solid lines represent connections between nodes that we most easily 
study with analytical means. They are logical relations, which we analyze and tinker with 
when we investigate research projects as theoreticians or as philosophers. Together with 
their nodes, they represent the internal logic of the project discussed in condition (8). The 
eight heavily dashed lines represent relations that we might study with empirical or with 
analytical means. Our choice of means depends on the questions, aims, etc. that guide our 
own projects when we investigate the projects of others. Social scientists and 
philosophers might both study how a team’s products satisfy the team’s values, and if the 
social scientists and the philosophers differ in their conclusions, its likely because their 
own research questions stress different aspects of relations of satisfying. 
 
Burian and Currie 
 Burian proposed that we could use case studies to study the local epistemologies 
of research groups, which we then compare to other research groups, and from those 
comparisons we abstract ever more general epistemologies (Burian 2001). Burian has 
pursued this task in his own studies. But aside from his and similar examples, we have 
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few tools with which to construct local epistemologies such that we can systematically 
compare those epistemologies across groups.  
 I argue that the map above provides a theory of local epistemologies, which I call 
rationales, for research projects. A rationale is an instance of the general map that is 
specific to a given research project. When we isolate a research project, we bound 
something for which we can make systematic comparisons to similarly bounded things. 
When we describe a project, we specify the nodes and edges between the nodes that are 
represented in the general model. The specification of those nodes and edges is almost 
always an empirical task.  
 The map also provides a pattern that enables not only systematic description of 
single research projects, but also systematic comparisons across research projects. It 
enables us to precisely show that, for instance, distinct research teams develop different 
products to achieve the same epistemic aims, or that they develop the same products to 
achieve different aims, etc. That precision, I propose, enables those who study science 
not only to better understand science and its evolution, but also to better identify 
conceptual, empirical, and social roadblocks in the evolution of research traditions. 
Furthermore, when we compare projects and reveal similarities between them in their 
nodes or edges, we establish the patchy unity at which Currie and others have gestured.  
  
Notes on the Model  
 I present the model as a descriptive tool. When we study research projects, we can 
use it to guide us as we study the local epistemologies of those projects. But the model is 
more than a heuristic. Though I pose it here only hypothetically, it is testable, and given 
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data, we may revise it. Furthermore, the model enables certain kinds of counterfactual 
studies into research projects. For a given project, were the specific contents of a node or 
edge to change, the contents of the nodes they influence are likely to change as well. That 
counterfactual aspect enables causal testing of the dynamics of research projects. It also 
enables researchers to specify the meanings of concepts according to the roles those 
concepts play within a project and across compared projects.8    
 
An Operationalization of the Concept of Research Project 
 We might operationalize the concept specified above in many fruitful ways. For 
the process of operationalization, we start with a somewhat precise concept like the one 
detailed above. Then we specify ways by which to collect evidence about the objects to 
which that concept refers according to the conditions of that concept, and we collect 
those ways in a list. I treat such a list as the operationalized concept. We can develop 
different operationalizations of the same concept based at least on the conditions of the 
concept that we stress, on the kind of evidence we have available, and on the questions 
we ask of the objects referred to by the concept. Thus, the relations between a starting 
concept and its operationalizations is one-many, and no single operationalization 
provides the true or best definition of the starting concept itself. While below I provide 
one operationalization of the concept of research project, others could fruitfully develop 
other operationalizations. 
																																																								
8 Thanks to Rick Creath for encouraging me to think about counterfactual comparisons of research projects 
as potential tools for conceptual role semantics of scientific terms. On this topic, I’m especially influenced 
by Sellars (1953) and now by Creath (1994).  
 
	 38 
 The operationalization that I provide in this chapter has the following bases. I ask 
of research projects: how can we identify a research project and isolate it from other 
research projects that are similar to it either because they share a general topic or because 
they are pursued by the same people? To help address that question, I focus on the first 
three conditions from the concept of research project. Finally, I focus especially on 
research publications as the outputs of projects that provide evidence for the existence 
and spatio-temporal bounds of research projects.  
 I represent the operationalization of the concept of research project in Table 2.1. 
For each condition of the operationalized concept, the table specifies a name, the relevant 
conditions from the concept of research project, an informal characterization of the 
condition, and a more formal hypothetical characterization of the condition.  
To use the table, I start with a collection of research publications. Some of those 
publications may cluster together as outputs from distinct research projects, but we don’t 
yet know which will do so. To help infer the existence of research projects, it will help if 
the papers in the collection aren’t totally random, but are about a common but general 
topic. For the remainder of this chapter, I treat topics as collections of publications that 
share themes. In the protocols in the next section, I show how to generate such topics.  
Given a topic, I use the conditions in Table 2.1, especially condition ORP-4, to 
generate networks of papers. Each network indicates the existence of a research project. I 
use condition ORP-3 to identify the members of the team that conducted the project. And 
I use condition ORP-5 to bound the project in time. We need use no other conditions to 
infer networks that represent research projects. But the networks are at best first 
approximations, and many of the networks will falsely indicate that networks of papers 
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represent distinct research projects. Often, those networks will be too inclusive, 
representing several research projects as one.  
Table 2.2 is a little different, and the conditions in it help us overcome the issue 
described in the previous paragraph. We can interpret the conditions in Table 2.2 in at 
least two ways. In the first, the conditions in Table 2.2 just add to those in Table 2.1, and 
they further specify the conditions in the concept of research project. In the second, the 
conditions in Table 2.2 provide means to check the validity of our inferences from the 
conditions in Table 2.1. That is, we use the conditions in Table 2.2 to check that the 
networks inferred via the conditions in Table 2.1 in fact represent distinct research 
projects. I prefer the second interpretation of Table 2.2, as Table 2.1 provides minimal 
conditions to infer the existence of projects, but nothing is wrong with the first 
interpretation.  
Each table represents its conditions with a natural language or warrant form and 
with a hypothetical form. I use the natural warrant form to understand the gist of the 
condition, and I use the hypothetical form to make explicit our inferences from data. The 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4- Protocol to Infer Research Projects 
 While the previous sections describe tools to conceptualize research projects, this 
section provides simple protocols to isolate them from one another, to collect them in 
populations, and to select projects from those populations for case study analyses. 
Protocols to ensure the reliability and replicability of our studies, features that I listed as 
desiderata on the total suite of tools provided in this chapter.  
 In this section, I provide a general protocol to infer populations of distinct 
projects. In Appendix A, I provide a more specific protocol for the same task that 
employs a suite of digital tools. Third I provide a general strategy for selecting small 
samples of cases. Fourth, I use the specific protocol to infer a population of research 
projects at the interface of evolutionary genetics and developmental genetics, and I use 
the general strategy to select two cases from it.  
 
General Protocol 
 To use the general protocol below, I must begin with a topic, or a collection of 
research papers about a common theme. Anyone can use this protocol when they aim to 
infer a set of possible research projects from that collection. So the protocol presupposes 
condition ORP-1. The protocol also presupposes that, if we use it, we have a rationale for 
our own projects that includes our research questions, aims, phenomena of study, etc. The 
general protocol is:  
1. Use informal methods to list a small collection of research projects (4–8) related 
to the theme of interest. This is a set of known cases. 
2. Form a topic, or a collection of papers about a common theme. 
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3. For any two papers, compare the authors, and place the papers that share an 
author in a common pile or folder (ORP-4).  
4. From the papers in each pile or folder, infer the team members (ORP-3) and the 
temporal period of the project (ORP-5).  
5. List each putative research project, its members, and its time period. Each pile or 
folder represents a putative research project. The collection of piles or folders 
represents a population of research projects.  
6. Check for false negatives in the population of cases. Use the set of known cases 
from step (1). Compare the population to that set, and if the population lacks 
many of those cases, begin again at step (1). Use a new method to collect papers 
for step (2).  
7. Check for false positives. Focus on putative projects with many more papers or 
members, or with much longer temporal periods, than other putative projects in 
the population. Those putative projects may represent several research projects. 
To distinguish those projects from each other, use inference methods (V-ORP-6 
through V-ORP-9). Furthermore, check that authors with the same name are in 
fact the same person.  
8. Check for false positives. If step six doesn’t resolve large putative projects into 
distinct smaller projects, use V-ORP-10 on the abstracts of the papers.   
9. Check for false positives. For each project, search for other papers by the same 
authors in roughly the same time period about the same theme. Additional papers 
further support the existence of that project.  
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10. Check for false positives. For each project, search for other kinds of documents 
that could be outputs of the project. Such documents include grant applications or 
reports, white papers or institutional documents, outreach pieces, etc. Additional 
documents further support the existence of that project.  
11. Validate the results. For each project, if possible, contact the members of the 
team. Ask them if, given the concept of research project, they would classify the 
papers listed as outputs of the same project. Assent provides further evidence for 
the existence of the project. Dissent provides evidence against the existence of the 
project, and perhaps a need to modify the set of papers, the relevant team 
members, or with enough dissent, the concept of research project.  
 
Notes on the General Protocol 
 First, the protocol itself isn’t surprising. Many who study science implicitly use 
procedures similar in many respects to the one described above. But insofar as they do, 
they don’t publish those procedures so that others can evaluate their work or redeploy 
those procedures for novel phenomena. Furthermore, they don’t tie their procedures to an 
explicit concept of research project, as I do in steps (3) and (4). The protocol above 
makes my procedure explicit, and it enables us to evaluate the reliability of that 
procedure. It also enables us to check the replicability of results that my procedure yields. 
As the protocol explicitly ties to an empirical concept, we can evaluate the construct 
validity of the concept within the procedure. As such, the protocol helps me meet many 
of the desiderata of strong case study methods.  
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 Second, the protocol makes explicit its steps to check the validity of a 
representation of an inferred population of individual projects. Steps (1) and (6–11) 
stipulate validity tests by which we can ensure that the protocol yields not just reliable 
results, but also true or empirically well confirmed results. Steps (6–11) represent just a 
few of the possible means by which we might test the validity of those results. 
Furthermore, they represent further avenues of research. For example, as stated above, 
steps (1) and (6) represent a rough metric for evaluating the quality of an overall 
population of research projects. To be more useful, that metric should be made precise.  
 Finally, step (2) provides something of an anchor for the overall protocol. Insofar 
as those who study science collect a small number of papers, or focus on the papers of 
already established research groups, the populations that they infer will be biased, as will 
studies of the cases in those populations, thus inviting legitimate concerns of cherry-
picking. If the protocol above is to yield a good representation of a population of research 
projects inferred from many research articles, then step (2) must be further specified.  
 
A More Specific Protocol 
 In Appendix A, I provide a more specific protocol. I use it to overcome the 
limitations of the general protocol, to address the above issue facing step (2), and to 
further specify steps (2–5). The protocol employs a suite of digital tools. Those tools 
include the Web of Science database of scientific papers, software for analyzing those 
papers, specifically the Tethne program and research system developed by Erick Peirson 
and his colleagues (Peirson et al. 2015), and software for representing networks of those 
papers, specifically Cytoscape (Kilcoyne et al. 2009; http://www.cytoscape.org/).  
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 The output of the protocol is an image of multiple networks. Each node represents 
a paper, each edge represents a relation of having an identical author between two papers, 
and each network putatively represents a research project.  
 As each network represents a putative research project, the collection of such 
networks represents the putative population of research projects related to a topic. The 
putative population is an approximation to the actual population of projects related to a 
topic. The above protocols bias the putative population in at least two ways. First, they 
reconstruct only those projects that had research papers as outputs. Second, they 
reconstruct only those projects that published papers in journals indexed and sorted by 
the academic database used, Web of Science in this case. Furthermore, much depends on 
the sets and structures of keywords used to generate a corpus in the databases, and those 
who use the protocols will have to tinker with those sets and structures before they get 
usable results.  
 Furthermore, there is a trade-off between the specificity of a theme and the size of 
the population of research projects. The more specific the theme, as represented by the 
structure of the intersections and unions of the search results of many keywords, the 
smaller will be the population. The less specific the theme, the larger the population. If 
the population is small, we face issues of how to select projects for individual case study 
without biasing our results. I address this issue in the next section. Also, if the population 
is large, many of the networks will represent clusters of many research projects, and a 
case study researcher will spend much time distinguishing distinct projects.  
 Finally, if we conduct detailed case studies on a research project or on projects 
identified by the above protocols, the results of those studies generalize to the population 
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from which they were selected. Thus, the concept of research project and the protocols 
enable us to specify an answer to the question raised in the introduction. That case is a 
case of what, exactly? If we use the concept and the protocols, we can answer: That case 
x is a case of research projects RP related to topic T. Each individual answer must specify 
a single case x, a population of cases RP, and T.  
 
Selecting Small Samples 
 An issue remains. I have developed a concept of research project and protocols 
for finding populations of research projects. My aim is to use those as tools by which to 
address the problem of (potential) cherry-picking of cases by those who study science. If 
we wish to do a case study of science, if we focus on research projects and use the 
protocols above, and if we develop sufficiently large populations and samples of research 
projects, then we should be able to select individual projects from the population for 
focused study without cherry-picking. But we still face the issue about the 
representativeness of the cases.  
 But if a sample of cases is small in proportion to the population, even if the 
sample is randomly selected, the sample will exhibit bias (Seawright and Gerring 2008). 
Even with well-delimited populations, almost all case studies have small samples. Thus, 
even if we don’t cherry-pick our examples, we will still face the problem of which cherry 
picking is just one source: imprecise samples and therefore imprecise results.9 The 
problem is one of practice, not of principle. For a given case study, those conducting the 
																																																								
9 I suspect, contra (Kinzel 2015), that this issue, more than issues of theory-ladenness, yields the 
appearance of cherry-picked cases when researchers didn’t in fact cherry-pick their cases. 
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study could intensively study enough cases to have a large enough sample to yield 
unbiased results.  
 We can see the weight of the practical problem, however, when we examine the 
size of a population. For small populations of less than 100 individuals, as populations of 
research projects often are, precise samples would require the researcher to select at least 
half of the cases to infer conclusions about the population with high statistical 
significance. For larger populations, the proportion of a sample in relation to the overall 
population lessens, but the absolute number of the sample will be larger than those for 
small populations. For instance, a population of around 1,000 would require a sample of 
roughly 278 for conclusions to be statistically significant according to standard norms of 
high significance.  
 So those who wish to use case studies to investigate research projects face a 
dilemma. Even when they precisely delimit a population of cases, if they randomly 
sample a few cases for focused study, their results will still be imprecise. But if they 
randomly sample enough cases to avoid bias, they will assume an especially onerous 
task.10 If we accept the dilemma, the most straightforward path is to accept the second 
horn and to grind out the onerous task. But I think we can find techniques to lessen the 
force of the first horn, and thus still fruitfully study small samples of cases.  
 So how do we select a small sample of cases in such a way as to minimize the 
imprecision of the sample? Random sampling isn’t sufficient. Seawright and Gerring 
(2008) address this question by specifying seven selection techniques that are specific to 
																																																								
10 I find this dilemma to be more problematic than the one (Pitt 2001) proposed. Among the case study 
pessimists, Faust and Meehl (Meehl 1992; Faust and Meehl 1992; Faust and Meehl 2002) came closest to 
appreciating and postulating this dilemma.   
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the kinds of questions asked by those doing the case study research. For one such 
technique, Seawright and Gerring suggest that researchers partition a population 
according to some categories or variables, and that they select cases from those partitions. 
Within each partition, researchers might select cases for any number of reasons and 
techniques, such as randomly or because the selected cases exemplify some feature that 
makes them typical to the other cases in their partitions. While Seawright and Gerring 
focus on relatively large populations and on causal investigations, I argue that their 
techniques also work for smaller populations and for non-causal investigations.  
 When we sample instances from a population at random, we do so to maximize 
the chances that the selected instances are independent of each other. When we partition a 
population, we do the same thing. Those who study research projects might use any of a 
variety of categories to partition their population and to ensure the independence of the 
cases across partitions. They might partition projects into distinct groups according to the 
institutions at which the projects were conducted, or to the time periods when they were 
conducted, or to the academic lineage of those who conducted the projects, etc.  
 I propose the following strategy to select a small number of cases from a 
population of research projects. First, delimit the proposed population and validate the 
proposal by checking it for false positives and false negatives. Second, from the question 
that drives the research into the population of cases, identify a category by which to 
partition the population. The category functions as a criterion of independence among the 
cases. Apply that category to each case and partition the population. Select cases from 
each partition. The default selection technique is random, but look to (Seawright and 
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Gerring 2008) for other legitimate selection techniques. I illustrate this general strategy 
below.  
 
Example from the Interface between Developmental Genetics and Evolutionary Genetics  
 As part of a broader project, I ask: What are projects in which researchers use 
models from evolutionary genetics with models from developmental genetics? I use the 
protocol developed in this chapter to answer that question. The question seeks a 
description of phenomena, not a causal explanation or a prediction on phenomena. The 
protocol above yields a description that addresses the question. I follow the ten steps to 
show how to produce that description.  
 
Step 1 
 Using an informal literature search, I developed a set of five research projects that 
I could use to later check for false negatives in an overall population of research projects 
I would infer. I limited the search to include the years 2000 to 2014. The set is:  
1. True and Haag on developmental systems drift. (True and Haag 2001; Haag 
2007; Haag and True 2007; Haag 2014).  
2. Klingenberg on morphometrics and quantitative trait loci in mice. 
(Klingenberg et al. 2004; Klingenberg 2008; Klingenberg 2010).  
3. Hansen and Wagner on the evolution of genetic architecture. (Hansen and 
Wagner 2001a; Hansen and Wagner 2001b; Hermisson et al. 2003; Carter et 
al. 2005; Hansen 2006; Hansen et al. 2006).  
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4. Stewart and Plotkin in the evolution of binding site motifs (Stewart et al. 
2012a; Stewart et al. 2012b; Stewart et al. 2013a; Stewart et al. 2013b).  
5. Plomin and his team on genome wide association studies linking QTLs and 
psychological traits in humans. (Plomin and Kovas 2005; Butcher et al. 2008; 
Plomin and Davis 2009; Plomin et al. 2009). 
 
Step 2 
 To form a topic, I used the Web of Science (WoS) database of scientific 
publications. I developed a structure of keywords related to my overall question, which 
seeks projects that use models from evolutionary genetics and developmental genetics. I 




WEB OF SCIENCE SEARCH STRUCTURE 
 
Evolutionary genetics Developmental genetics 
“evolutionary geneti*” “developmental geneti*” 
“population geneti*” “molecular geneti*” 
“quantitative geneti*” “gene regulat*” 
 “gene network” 
 “genetic pathway” 
 “cis regulat*” 
Each cell represents search terms used in a single search. Terms are in quotation 
marks to ensure that search results return complete phrases. Stars (*) enable 
WoS to return results with similar suffixes. For instance, “gene regulat*” returns 
results for both “gene regulation” and for “gene regulatory”. Each column 
represents the union of the results returned for the single searches in its 
constituent cells, and the table as a whole represents the intersection of the 
results from the columns.  
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For each cell, I used the terms in the cell to do a unique search on WoS. Then, for 
each column, I combined the search results from the cells into single databases. Finally, I 
took the intersection of the two columnar databases to create a final database, which had 
632 scientific papers and was the topic of the project. 
 
Steps 3–5  
 To group papers in the topic by shared author, I used Tethne, its 
author_coupling() function, and default program settings. I exported the results as a 
GraphML file. I opened the file in Cytoscape, and using a Prefuse force-directed layout, I 
represented the network of papers as Figure 2.2. Each distinct network represents a 
putative research project. Each node represents a paper, and each edge represents a 
relation of same author between papers.  
The image represents 367 isolated papers, 48 networks with only two papers, and 
32 networks with three or greater papers. Cytoscape enabled me to output the networks, 
their authors, and dates, and thus to infer the project team members and the temporal 
periods of the projects. 
 
Step 6 
 To check for false negatives within the overall population, I searched the 
representation for the authors and projects listed in Step 1. The representation included at 
least some of the papers for all of the projects, except for the Hansen and Wagner project, 
which wasn’t represented at all. I concluded that the representation captured the vast 
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majority of projects relevant to my questions, but that it could be missing as many as 20 
percent of them.11  
 
 
Fig. 2.2. Population of Putative Research Projects. The figure above shows networks 
that represent putative research projects. Each node represents a paper, and each edge 
represents a relation of shared authorship between the nodes. Each isolated network 
represents a putative research project. Further work must be done to delineate actual 
research projects.  
 
Steps 7 and 8 
 To delineate projects in large networks, I applied conditions V-ORP-6 through V-




11 I said earlier that we need to build stronger and more quantitative metrics and procedures of external 
validity for the results of the protocol. Once we have those metrics and procedures, if the false negative 
number proves to be too high, we need to return to and revise the keyword list and begin the process again.  
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Steps 10 and 11 
 I applied these steps only to the two cases I selected for further study, as per the 
discussion below.   
 
Case Selection Steps 
  From the population of projects represented above, I wanted to select a sample of 
cases for further in-depth study. But I faced issues of selecting small samples.  
 To select cases, I began with the putative projects represented in Figure 2.2. I 
used ORP-2 to eliminate all of the isolated networks of single papers as unlikely to 
provide much information about sustained research projects. Next, I partitioned the 
remaining projects intro three groups based on the kinds of populations studied in the 
projects, as described in the abstracts of the papers. Those projects in the first group 
studied purely theoretic organisms as part of modeling processes. Those projects in the 
second group studied organisms in laboratory populations. Those projects in the third 
group studied organisms in wild populations. Those three kinds of populations, theoretic 
or lab or wild, represent independent phenomena, and they require identifiably distinct 
research strategies and assumptions (Winther et al. 2015). To simplify this dissertation, I 
combined the partitions for lab populations and wild populations into a single partition.  
 From each partition, I selected a case at random, for a total of two cases.  
 
1. Theoretic Population: Norman Johnson, Adam Porter, and Alex Tulchinsky’s 
studies of hybrid incompatibility due to mutations in gene regulatory architecture. 
	 57 
(Johnson and Porter 2001; Porter and Johnson 2002; Tulchinksy et al. 2014a; 
Tulchincsky et al 2014b). 
2. Wild/ Lab population: Greg Wray’s group studying evolving cis regions in wild 
sea urchins. (Balhoff and Wray 2005; Garfield et al 2012; Runcie et al. 2012).  
 
Next, I confirmed with further documentation that each of the three cases listed 
above in fact were the outputs of single research projects. For instance, with case 1, I 
found further papers that were outputs of the same project (Johnson and Porter 2000; 
Johnson and Porter 2007; Johnson 2007), and personal communication with the authors 
confirmed the existence of a distinct project (Johnson 2015; Porter 2015).  
 Finally, with well-articulated topics, populations of research projects, and 
individual cases, I could in-depth case studies, described in later chapters. Given those 
topics, populations, and cases, I could compare the cases to each other and specify the 
generalizability of my results. I could also use the map of epistemic relations in Figure 




Limitations of the Tools 
 Each of the tools has some limitations. The concept of research project is a 
categorical concept, and it faces all of the problems that such concepts face in empirical 
domains (Cassirer 1923). As research into research projects develops, it may prove useful 
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to replace or refine the categorical concept with a concept of a different logical form, 
especially for tasks other than description of research projects.   
 For example, we can’t use the categorical concept to definitively distinguish all 
research projects from all other research projects. Tough cases remain, and often those 
tough cases are prevalent in populations or networks of research projects. Furthermore, 
we can’t use the concept, without adding to it, to predict the development of new research 
projects.  
 The protocols have their limitations, as well. The protocols work best when 
studying research projects that focus on relatively narrow topics in recent history. As we 
focus on broader topics, the protocols yield increasingly larger populations of projects, 
connected in increasingly more complex networks. Those who study broad topics in 
science will have to work harder to distinguish research projects than those who study 
narrow topics. But even if they focus on narrow topics, the older the time period studied, 
the less relevant become scientific journal articles and the less helpful become digital 
journal databases. Given the temporal scope of articles in JSTOR, WoS, and Scopus, 
those databases are of no help for research into scientific projects that existed only before 
1920 or so. Thus, the protocols are limited in their robustness.  
 But given those limitations, the tools remain useful. While together they don’t 
perfectly pick out research projects or populations of them, they still increase the 
precision, transparency, and replicability of our attempts to do so. A critic may not like 
how someone distinguished research projects form each other, but if the person who 
distinguished them used the tools above, the critic will be able to pinpoint exactly where 
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she disagrees with the procedure, and she’ll have a framework in which to suggest 
revisions.  
 
Questions Raised and Addressed 
 Throughout this chapter, I raised several questions. I return to them now and 
review them in light of the success conditions I set. The conditions are:  
1. Show how to delimit a population of cases, provide criteria to select cases—
justified according to the research question, and select cases.  
2. Make explicit how to evaluate inferences from evidence with tests of reliability, 
construct validity, and validity. 
 
 One question is: how can we identify a research project and isolate it from other 
research projects that are similar to it either because they share a general topic or because 
they are pursued by the same people? The concept and operationalization of research 
project, and the protocols enable us to do so.  
 Together, they meet the two success conditions. The concept and 
operationalization enable us to identify and isolate research projects, and they enable us 
to employ the protocols to delimit a population of cases. The concept of research project 
enables tests of the construct validity of various operationalizations of it, while the V-
ORP conditions of the operationalization enable validity checks of isolated and putative 
research projects. The protocols provide replicable and reliable procedures for inferring 
the existence of research projects from corpora, and for checking the validity of 
populations of putative research projects.  
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 A second question is: how can we distinguish those cases that weren’t cherry-
picked? I argue that cherry-picking is just one manifestation of a larger problem of 
selecting cases that aren’t independent from each other. If we want to ensure that a 
researcher selects independent cases, we need to check that he provides a population of 
projects and a partition of that population. Next, we need to check his criteria for 
partitioning that population, and we need to ensure that those criteria are theoretically 
grounded.  
 A related question is: how do we select a small sample of cases in such a way as 
to minimize the bias of the sample? We use theoretically grounded criteria to partition the 
population. Then we specify our technique for drawing from the partitions. Finally, we 
strive for multi-case studies.  
 A fourth question is: how do we precisely specify scope and delimit local 
epistemologies, and how do we establish patchy-unity? I argue that we use the map of 
epistemic relations to describe the local epistemology of a research project. We compare 
the instantiated models across projects to establish the similarities and differences in 
those projects. Similarities reveal patchy unity.  
 The question that motivated this chapter is: That case is a case of what, exactly? 
Given the tools provided above, a general answer is: That case x is a case of research 
projects RP related to topic T. Each individual answer specifies a single case x, a 
population of cases RP, and T. For the example of evolutionary developmental biology 
provided in section 4, the answer is: Johnson and Porter’s project to study hybrid 
incompatibility due to mutations in genetic architecture in simulated populations is a case 
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of the 80 or so projects in which researchers use models from evolutionary genetics with 
models from developmental genetics.  
 The tools provided in this chapter provide only some of the tools needed to study 
research projects within case study designs. But they enable such projects to begin from a 
good foundation. For studying the particular aspects of particular research projects, and 
for systematically comparing those aspects across research projects to address 





12 I argue for three main steps in case study research of projects. 1: Identifying a population of projects and 
selecting some for study; 2: Collecting data and inferring conclusions about particular research projects; 3: 
Comparing those data and inference across cases. In the next chapter, I develop a protocol for an instance 
of the second step.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HOW TO CONCEPTUALIZE AND STUDY EPISTEMIC GOALS  
 
3.1- Introduction 
This chapter proposes a concept of epistemic goals or aims such that they are 
aspects of scientific research projects, and it describes a general procedure to study them 
with content analysis methods. The chapter ends with some of the documents required to 
use content analysis in this dissertation. The tools provided in the chapter enable those 
who study science to address some perennial issues that they face. First, the concept 
provides an explicit but fallible framework with which researchers can study the aims of 
sciences, a historically vague topic. Second, the content analysis procedure provides an 
instance of a general procedure that enables researchers to systematically collect data 
from, and make inferences about, scientific texts. That procedure provides one route by 
which those who study science can improve the reliability and replicability of their 
results.   
 Those who study science, especially philosophers of science, have a recurring 
interest in the aims of science, sometimes called the ends or epistemic aims of science. 
Recent discussions often argue for one preferred or primary aim of science (Kitcher 
2001; Potochnik 2015), for the need to study such aims (Hardcastle 1999; Kitcher 2004), 
for their social aspects (Fallis 2007), or for their relations to concepts or theories 
(Brigandt 2010; Brigandt 2012; Love 2013). Furthermore, some have noted that there are 
multiple aims, and that philosophers too often focus on explanation at the expense of 
other aims (Douglas 2009 and references therein). 
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 Those discussions evolved from discussion from the late 1970s to the early 2000s 
in which researchers often collapsed concepts of epistemic aims with those of epistemic 
virtues or cognitive values (Kuhn 1977; Laudan 1983; Laudan 1987; Giere 1988; Laudan 
1990a; Laudan 1990b; Kitcher 1993; Rooney 1992; Longino 1996; Goldman 2002). 
While some researchers distinguish goals from values, acknowledging that the two are 
conceptually related, sometimes they are still lumped together (Douglas 2013). Older still 
are canonical discussions about the aims of science (Duhem 1914; Hempel 1952; Popper 
1957). 
 But given those discussions, we still lack explicit tools with which to study 
epistemic aims as actual aspects of scientific practice. We lack a reasonably precise 
concept of epistemic aims with which to distinguish those aims from epistemic values, 
and the concept of epistemic aim remains implicit. We also lack a tentative and revisable 
list of the different species of epistemic aims, so we tend to focus only on explanation 
and prediction. And we lack methods with which to empirically study the epistemic aims 
of actual scientific research projects, or with which to settle conflicting hypotheses about 
the aims pursued in those projects.  
 This chapter aims to ameliorate, but not to completely remedy, those issues. I 
propose a general concept of epistemic aims as it applies to scientific research projects, 
and I provide a taxonomy of different kinds of epistemic aims. Furthermore, I outline a 
procedure for studying the aims of research projects, and collecting data about those 
aims, using content analysis methods. 
 I organize the rest of this chapter as follows. In the next section, I review my 
account of research projects and my map of epistemic relations for those projects, in 
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which values and epistemic aims are central but distinct aspects. In section three I briefly 
present a rough idea of epistemic aims, then I propose a focused concept of epistemic 
aims, and I provide a taxonomy of kinds of aims. Section 4 provides a brief review or 
introduction to content analysis methods, and it shows how to adapt them to study 
epistemic goals. Section 5 provides operational definitions, specific to content analysis 
methods, for some of the species of aims, and it provides a protocol for data collection. 
Section 6 concludes this chapter and looks ahead to further chapters.  
 But first some caveats. First, this chapter doesn’t provide a final theory of all the 
aims that have ever been or will be pursued in science. It provides an incomplete list of 
aims that researchers have pursued as part of research projects, for at least in a short 
period of time that includes the 1950s to the 2010s. Furthermore, the tools provided are 
first attempts, and will require revision in light of new evidence.  
 Second, I treat the term ‘aims’ as roughly synonymous with the terms ‘goals’, and 
‘ends’, and to some extent, ‘functions’. When I focus on people or research projects, I 
talk of aims, goals, and ends. When I focus on models, theories, or other scientific 
products, I talk of functions and of their epistemic functional relations to phenomena. I 
acknowledge that in other contexts there are further and subtle differences in meaning for 
those terms. For my purposes in this chapter, such further subtleties are unimportant.  
 
 
3.2- The Context of Research Projects 
 I conceptualize epistemic aims as components of scientific research projects. 
Epistemic aims function centrally in the rationales of those projects. When researchers 
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design research projects, they do so partly by specifying the aims they wish to 
accomplish. Thus, we must appeal to a research team’s epistemic aims to describe or 
explain the rationale of its projects. Furthermore, when we evaluate a team’s rationales 
for proposed or for completed projects, we appeal partly to the team’s proposed or 
avowed aims and to the achievability of those aims from the team’s proposed or used 
research procedures. 
 For a given project, the specific aims pursued have several functions. First, they 
provide one set of criteria by which the team selects its methods to collect data. Second, 
they provide a standard that directs the team as they construct their scientific products or 
deploy them in relation to data. Finally, they provide one of several benchmarks by which 
the team and those outside of the team can evaluate the effectiveness of the products and 
the success of the project.  
Over the career of a project, the team may revise or change its epistemic aims in 
light of many factors, including unexpected data, thus altering the project’s rationale and 
import. Hence, in the career of a project, a team most strongly commits itself to specific 
epistemic aims, or any other component for that matter, when it rationally reconstructs 
the project and publishes it in the format of research presentations, posters, and papers.  
While we evaluate projects as epistemic units according to the aims the teams 
ultimately set for those projects, we needn’t evaluate scientific products or data according 
to those same aims. Those who produce scientific products or data can select poor goals 
by which to evaluate their products, sometimes due to lack of imagination but likely more 
often due to theoretical or social constraints. Products or data from projects may be, and 
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often are, repurposed much later by other teams in other contexts with other rationales. In 
that way, the value of data and products outlives the value of research projects.  
 
 
3.3- A Concept and Taxonomy of Epistemic Aims 
 This section proposes some conceptual tools. While we can empirically describe 
the rationales of proposed and completed research projects, we can also evaluate those 
projects according to at least the problems they ameliorate, the questions they address, 
the values they satisfy, and the epistemic aims they meet. If we want to empirically 
describe those aspects, we need tools and concepts by which to identify them. This 
chapter focuses on epistemic aims, and below I describe a rough idea of epistemic aims, 
then I propose a concept of such aims, and finally I propose a taxonomy of aims.  
 
The Rough Idea 
 Epistemic aims are by definition a species of a more general concept of aims. 
Before I propose my concept of epistemic aims, I first discuss some aspects of a rough 
idea of aims. That discussion will provide some focus and common ground, and from it I 
propose my concept of epistemic aims in the next subsection.1 In this and the next few 
subsections, I use the term ‘goals’ more often than the term ‘aims’, though I treat them as 
synonyms.  
																																																						
1 To be clear, the rough idea doesn’t provide a justification or an exact target for the concept later proposed. 
Instead, discussing the rough idea is more like collecting the clay from which to fashion a pot. Such a 




 When we think of goals, we often think of the goals that individuals set for 
themselves or the goals that social groups set for the group. Psychologists study the first 
kind, and many kinds of social scientists study the second, including researchers who 
study organizations, city planning, design, etc. Psychologists have done more than others 
to propose concepts of goals, to operationalize them, and the to test the construct validity 
of those concepts.  
 For individuals’ goals, useful concepts are trickier to specify than might seem. 
Most dictionary definitions interdefine goals with aims and ends, giving little help. I start 
by thinking of goals as things that people set or specify and work to achieve or avoid 
(Elliott and Fryer 2008). In that sense, goals partly motivate people to act, and they 
regulate those actions so that people fallibly strive to meet those goals.  
 We also use goals to evaluate the actions and projects of others, especially 
organizations. Some agent can set a goal but do nothing to achieve it, such as when the 
US government explicitly aimed to irrigate the western US for mostly family farms, but 
did nothing to ensure that irrigated water in fact reached such farms. Furthermore, 
someone can, with perfect strategy and execution, achieve a goal. But if we deem the 
goal wrong, perhaps such as Kit Carson’s achieved goal of military subjugation of the 
Navajos, we criticize the endeavor.   
Researchers in many different fields sometimes disagree about how to further 
define goals. Are goals states of affairs or are they representations of those states of 
affairs?  Those who argue that goals are states of affairs stress that for an agent to achieve 
a goal, it must achieve a change in the world and not just create a representation.  
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Those who argue that goals are representations stress that, in causal processes, 
future states of affairs have no causal power on prior states, whereas prior representations 
of future states of affairs can have causal influence on future states of affairs. So if we 
want to appeal to goals to causally explain events, we should conceptualize them as 
representations. Furthermore, only the later account can capture our natural discourse in 
statements like “I have a goal to get a job” or “The electric company aims to stifle solar 
energy”. 
I tend to agree with the latter camp about the usefulness of treating goals as 
representations, but the former camp makes an important contribution about the 
importance of states of affairs.2 I next propose a somewhat clear concept of goals. But 
rather than fitting all of the desiderata of such concepts into a single concept, as many in 
the previous two camps try, I propose a cluster of concepts to meet those desiderata.  
Goal State: 
a possible or actual state of affairs that  
1. some agent could represent 
2. some agent could want to happen (or whatever other cognitive attitude) 
3. without action, will not become or persist in being actual.  
 
Goal Representation: 
1. a representation of a goal state 
																																																						
2 Both camps make useful points. But there may be a fact of the matter between them about which concept 
more closely captures natural language concepts, a fact that matters to researchers when they design 





a possible or an actual state of affairs (goal state) that some agent 
1. actually has or represents 
2. wants to happen or to be actual (or whatever other cognitive attitude) 
3. acts to bring about or to cause to happen 
a. and so acts because of (1) and (2) 
b. those action directively correlate with goal state 
 
The above concept of goal is strongly influenced by Raimo Tuomela’s account of 
joint goals (Tuomela 1990). But Tuomela didn’t propose concepts of goal states or of 
goal representations. Neither have psychologists or other social scientists. As a result, 
previous conceptual toolkits for talking about goals has seemed limited, engendering 
disputes like the one described above. Such disputes are likely verbal.  
Some notes about the above concepts. First, while we tend to think of goals as 
aiming at the future, we needn’t. Given a point in time, goal states are often future states 
of affairs. But they needn’t be, as goals may already have been achieved, in which case 
the goal states would be prior states of affairs. Furthermore, goal states may be achieved 
in repeated or regular fashions, in which cases goal states could be past and present states 
of affairs.  
Second, the second conditions of the concepts of Goal State and of Goal describes 
the possible or actual wanting of agents. Wanting is a cognitive attitude, but it may prove 
to be the wrong or an infelicitous attitude to include in the definitions. A different 
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cognitive attitude, or a group of them, may prove more useful, but I leave the task of 
arguing for such attitudes for a later project.  
Third, the concepts of Goal States and of Goals both refer to agents, which can be 
many kinds of things. Such agents can include individuals, organizations, businesses, and 
maybe some kinds of computers. But for automatons, many kinds of organisms, and 
many kinds of devices, which are not canonically agents, the above concept won’t apply. 
For those kinds of things, the above concepts must be modified, especially the conditions 
about representations and about cognitive attitudes.3  
 
A Concept of Epistemic Goals 
 For epistemic goals, researchers generally pursue one of two strategies to define 
or account for them. For the first strategy, they argue for one ultimate epistemic goal or 
another, such as truth (Goldman 2002), significant truth (Kitcher 1993; Kitcher 2001), or 
understanding (Potochnik 2015), and they argue that all other epistemic goals resolve in 
or derive from the ultimate goal. I disagree with those who employ the first strategy, but 
the disagreement may be verbal. I take truth to be a component of all science, but I don’t 
classify it as a goal. Next, I think significant truths and findings are important, but I think 
significance derives from questions, as does Kitcher, and ultimately from problems. As 
such, significance isn’t a feature of epistemic goals per se. Finally, I argue that there are 
many ways to understand phenomena, so the appeal to understanding simply passes the 
																																																						
3 I claim, with (Sommerhoff 1974), that for those kinds of things, representations can be replaced by the 
more general concept of information. A more difficult problem, as indicated by robust literatures on 
organismic goals and functions, is how to replace cognitive attitudes.   
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buck, and often prejudices projects or products that yield causal understanding over other 
types, such as descriptive or predictive understanding.  
For the second strategy, some argue that such ultimate goals don’t exist 
(Hardcastle 1999), nor do general concepts of scientific or epistemic aims, and that the 
best we can do is to study specific goals for specific teams. On this second strategy, 
researchers list one or two kinds of epistemic aims, generally explanation or prediction, 
but they provide no comprehensive list, accounts, or unifying concept. I agree that the 
there are no universally true concepts of epistemic goals, and that we should study 
specific research teams and their specific goals. But I don’t think we can do so without 
explicit and somewhat general concepts of epistemic goals, though we must accept that 
those concepts evolve over time and vary across social groups.  
For my proposed concepts, epistemic goals comprise a subclass of goals 
simpliciter. The rule to specify and identify epistemic goals is a further specification of 
the rules to specify and identify goals.  The concepts below each have a list of necessary 
but not sufficient conditions for those concepts. As research into those concepts 
progresses, those conditions could change, or we could add to them.  
 
Epistemic Goal State: 
a possible or actual state of affairs that  
1. some agent could represent 
2. some agent could want to happen (or whatever other cognitive attitude) 
3. without action, will not become or persist in being actual 
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4. without a scientific product with explicit relations to evidence, will not 
become or persist in being actual 
 
Epistemic Goal Representation: 
1. a representation of an epistemic goal state 
 
Epistemic Goal for a Research Project: 
a possible or an actual state of affairs (goal state) that some agent/team  
1. actually has or (incompletely) represents 
a. but if some individuals in the team don’t have or represent it, they 
have or represent subgoals 
2. wants to happen or to be actual (or whatever other cognitive attitude) 
3. acts to bring about or to cause to happen 
a. and so acts because of (1) and (2) 
b. especially by constructing or using scientific products 
c. such that those actions directively correlate with the epistemic goal 
state 
4. provides a criterion by which an agent in a research project partly selects 
methods used in the project 
5. to be realized or achieved, requires at least one scientific product with 
explicit relations to evidence 
6. provides a standard by which partly to evaluate 
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a. the scientific products used in the project such that they function to 
achieve the epistemic goal state 
b. the actions of the agent in the project such that they directively 
correlate with the epistemic goal state and helped yield or employ 
the scientific products 
c. the quality of a research project 
 
Such goals are epistemic in that they relate scientific products to evidence. If we 
talk of beliefs, an epistemic goal is one component of a justified belief such that the 
component meets the above conditions. Insofar as the preponderance of the evidence 
supports the scientific product used to generate that belief, the belief is true. Insofar as 
there are different kinds of epistemic goals, there are different kinds of knowledge, and 
there are different kinds of ways to understand the world. For instance, if we can use 
evidence to support a product that describes some phenomenon, and if we can use other 
evidence to support a product that explains that same phenomenon, then description and 
explanation are equally legitimate, but perhaps not equally useful, ways of understanding 
the phenomenon.  
If we limit our talk to publically scrutable statements, an epistemic goal is a 
statement that meets the above conditions. Insofar as the preponderance of the evidence 
supports the scientific products described in those conditions, the product is true, or 
(perhaps) is similar to the world in some respect, and we can use it to achieve the 
epistemic goal. While the product may be empirically true (or similar, etc.), it may not 
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meet the epistemic goal set for it as part of a research project. A further claim is that the 
product in fact achieves or doesn’t achieve the epistemic goal.   
For my purposes here, I treat epistemic goals as statements or as parts of 
statements. The above concepts enable us to talk about, or construct statements about, 
goals in general. Those concepts enable us to pick out species of goals, but not instances. 
Types but not tokens.  
To pick out instances of epistemic goals, we need a bit more conceptual 
machinery. We need a list of types of epistemic goals. Again for my purposes here, I treat 
types of epistemic goals as scrutable statements. Such statements have at least one of two 
forms. The first form highlights goals as actions and the second highlights goals as states 
of affairs. In the first form I treat goals as verbs, in the second form I treat goals as 
nominalizations. The difference is one, for instance, between explains and is an 
explanation.  
 
Type of Epistemic Goal (Action) 
To X is a type of epistemic goal only if  
1. it’s possible for an agent to use scientific products to X some phenomenon or 
another scientific product  
2. to X some phenomenon or scientific product as part of a research project, an 
agent must identify a state of affairs that meets the conditions listed in the 
concept of Epistemic Goal for a Research Project  
3. to X is to realize or achieve the epistemic goal state if one meets further 
conditions specified as part of an explicit concept ‘to X’ 
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Type of Epistemic Goal (Nominalization) 
An X is a type of epistemic goal only if 
1. it’s possible for an agent to use scientific products in an X of some 
phenomenon or other scientific product 
2. in an X of some phenomenon or scientific product, and as part of a research 
project, an agent must identify a state of affairs that meets the conditions listed 
in the concept of Epistemic Goal for a Research project  
3. an X realizes or achieves the epistemic goal state if it meets further conditions 
specified as part of an explicit account of ‘an X’ 
 
Whether or not we choose to talk about types of epistemic goals as action or as states of 
affairs, the difference is of little consequence. I use the two versions interchangeably 
depending on the grammar I need to construct my sentences.  
 Now for an example. Imagine that we observe a pinecone falling from a tree, and 
we wish to understand that phenomenon. There are many such ways we could understand 
it. We could describe or represent the phenomena for further study, we could develop 
tools to predict when other pinecones will fall in the future, we could develop tools to 
explain how they fall, etc.  
 Select the task of explaining how the pinecone fell, and let’s assume we want a 
causal explanation. That information fits into the concepts of Epistemic Goal and Type of 
Epistemic Goals as follows. The relevant possible state of affairs is the state of having 
explained the pinecone’s fall. Insofar as I represent that goal, I meet condition 1 of 
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Epistemic Goal, and insofar as I want to explain that phenomenon, I meet condition 2. If 
those conditions motivate us to create or employ scientific product to achieve the goal 
state, I meet condition 3.  
To meet conditions 4 through 6, I need first to employ our concept of Type of 
Epistemic Goal. I need a detailed account of what logical form or representational pattern 
causal explanations must have. Select Salmon’s causal mechanical account of causal 
explanation (Salmon 1984). Given that account, I can meet the first two conditions the 
concept Type of Epistemic Goal, and Salmon’s account provides the further conditions, 
required by condition 3 of Type, to detail what form or pattern causal explanation must 
have in his account.  
 Given that account, I can select the methods needed to collect data that will help 
me use or employ scientific products to achieve that pattern. Thus I meet condition 4. 
Insofar as I collect data, relate those data to the scientific product, and evaluate those 
relations according to standards of evidence, I partially meet condition 5. Insofar as the 
scientific products meet the form or pattern of Salmon’s account, they meet the rest of 
condition 5 and realize the epistemic goal of putatively explaining the pinecone’s fall. 
Finally, given the representation of what I want, and given Salmon’s account, I can 
evaluate whether or not a putative explanation in fact satisfies his account, whether or not 
my actions in pursuing the project helped me build or employ products that would satisfy 
his account, or whether or not I was right to even pursue a causal explanation of the 
pinecone’s fall.  
 Before I list some species of epistemic goals, I note a potentially confusing issue. 
My proposed concepts above focus on goal states as things pursued, achieved, and 
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maintained by agents. But we often use the words or phrases of types of goals in other 
ways. For instance, we often say that a theory or a model, not an agent, explains or 
predicts phenomena. In this way, we abstract away from the particulars of research 
projects and describe supposedly eternal features of models. That move is largely 
rhetorical, as it lends an extra air of objectivity to scientific products by removing agents 
from the picture. That said, I think that we can legitimately talk about scientific products 
as explaining, predicting, describing, etc.  
 When we shift from talking about agents to the tools they create, we should shift 
from talking about goals to talking about functions. Consider the following statements. 
 
1. The Sears team explains how limbs develop in mice. 
2. The representations of causal regularities of morphogenesis explain how limbs 
develop in mice.  
 
The two statements are similar in grammar, with just the subjects of the statements 
differing. Yet ‘explain’ picks out two different concepts in the two sentences. In the first, 
it picks out an epistemic goal of a research team. In the second it picks out an epistemic 
function of a scientific product.4   
 
																																																						
4 To explicate many commonplace statements, then, I might need to develop  tinker with the concepts 
above to specify an account of epistemic functions of scientific products. I don’t pursue that end here, but I 
flag it for a future project. For my purposes here, I note that functions don’t exist without relevant systems, 
or for tools, to relevant agents. When we replace talk of epistemic goals of research projects with epistemic 
functions of scientific products, we change the relevant social system that gives meaning to the products 
and their ends. The relevant social system is no longer a local research team, but instead it’s a larger 
community of researchers, perhaps better characterized as a movement, tradition, discipline, or paradigm. 
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Types of Epistemic Goals  
 One issue that motivates this chapter is that those who study science too often 
focus on the epistemic aims of prediction and especially of explanation. To ameliorate 
that issue, I provide a list of different types or species of epistemic aims.  
 Philosophers of science, I argue, have spent much of the last one hundred years 
providing accounts of specific types of epistemic goals. In the most general sense, I treat 
an account of a type of an epistemic goal as provided the pattern, form, or schemata that 
some representation must meet or satisfy to count as an instance of a putatively realized 
goal. Most often, philosophers provide sets of conditions or logical schemata for their 
accounts of types of epistemic goals, but not always.  
While philosophers often provide competing accounts of explanation, they also 
have addressed representation, prediction, control, and a several other aims. The list 
provided below is in some way a taxonomy of much of that work. I undoubtedly missed 
some species of epistemic aims and some accounts. The list is a first attempt and will 
require revision after further research into specific epistemic aims. But it provides a 
starting point. 
Another issue that motivated this chapter is that those who study science often 
conflate epistemic aims with epistemic values, sometimes called cognitive virtues of 
theories. The standard lists of such virtues include simplicity, conservatism, economy, 
refutability, modesty, generality, accuracy, fruitfulness for discovery, and explanatory 
power (Quine and Ullman 1970; Kuhn 1977). Critics argued that those virtues weren’t 
purely cognitive and had political content (Rooney 1993; Longino 1996). Those critics 
suggested further values of novelty, applicability to human needs and dignity, and 
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diffusion of power. Others suggested that all cognitive virtues derived from the virtue of 
tending to produce true beliefs (Kitcher 1993; Goldman 2002). The set of virtues has 
expanded so much that Heather Douglas proposed a taxonomy of virtues based on when 
we use them in the investigative process (Douglas 2013).  
I argue that some things often classed as cognitive virtues would more helpfully 
be conceptualized as epistemic aims. But even with the concepts detailed above, I 
provide no perfect tool to always distinguish epistemic goals from cognitive values. That 
issue partly stems from a lack of clear concepts, as opposed to lists, of cognitive virtues.  
Roughly, I argue that we use values, cognitive or otherwise, to help us select 
among competing problems, questions, and epistemic aims (Brigandt 2015), and to help 
us select between scientific products that equally ameliorate the same problems, address 
the same questions, and achieve the same epistemic aims. Within a rationale of research 
projects, virtues and aims have different functions.  
Consider a scientific product that meets a value, such as conservatism, but that 
doesn’t achieve an epistemic aim, such as predicting phenomena. In such cases, the 
product has no use as a tool, and that it meets a certain value provides us with no reason 
for selecting it from the toolshed. Now consider the reverse case, a product that fails the 
virtue of conservatism but predicts phenomena. Its function (achieving an aim) provides a 
reason for selecting it from the toolshed to begin with. But if we find next to it in the 
toolshed a product that predicts phenomena and meets conservatism, we have a reason for 
choosing the latter product over the former.  
Cognitive virtues and values provide criteria for selecting between products that 
achieve the same epistemic aims, not for choosing scientific products simpliciter. We 
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evaluate products partly on if and how well they achieve epistemic aims. Only after that 
should we evaluate products on other advantages they provide. That’s not to say that 
values have a derivative importance. A product might well achieve an epistemic aim, but 
if the aim is abhorrent, such as predicting the effects of non-medicated syphilis in 
uninformed black patients, we can criticize the aim or the project or the team that pursued 
it.  
From the common lists of cognitive virtues, I treat explanation, discovery, 
prediction, control, and unification as epistemic aims for which we might employ 
scientific products, not as cognitive values. But my selection is fallible. Some research 
teams might use concepts like the ones detailed above to conceive other virtues, such as 
simplicity, as epistemic aims for a project. In such cases, teams would have to specify the 
pattern or schemata for their account of simplicity, which may prove difficult.  
 The two tables below provide two lists of epistemic aims. Table 3.1 lists 
epistemic aims that relate scientific products to phenomena. Table 3.2 lists aims that 
relate scientific products to other scientific products. There is a column of type of 
epistemic goals, each unique type underlined. Within the types, there are subtypes, which 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4- Content Analysis Methods to Study Epistemic Goals 
 Research projects are empirical objects. We can collect evidence about them and 
about their components, and we can collect evidence about the epistemic goals pursued in 
a project. There are many potential sources of evidence about epistemic goals within the 
framework of research projects. But most boil down to extracting information from texts 
that describe those projects and their constituent aims. This section briefly describes the 
method of content analysis, which enables researchers to extract that information so that 
it’s verifiable and replicable, and via methods that are repeatable. Later in this 
dissertation, I use content analysis to extract information from research articles about the 
epistemic goals of research projects.  
 
Introduction to Content Analysis 
Researchers use content analysis for roughly two aims. In the first, they use it to 
describe manifest content of texts. In those situations, content analysis provides the 
methods and data with which to test claims roughly like: That text clearly 
mean/says/states XYZ. Often, such methods are used to read large amounts of texts, 
numbering in the thousands, and with the aid of computers.  
For the second aim, researchers use content analysis to infer implicit content or 
meanings of texts. Many content analysis methods originated as tools for the second aim, 
especially in World War II when Allied researchers developed the techniques to infer 
information about their opposing armies from the latter’s propaganda.  
Content analysis methods are widely used in the social sciences. Social scientists 
generally agree that the distinction between manifest and non-manifest or implicit content 
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is one of degree, not of kind. Increasingly, they argue that the theoretical machinery 
needed to infer implicit content is also required to ground studies of manifest content.  
There are many manuals for content analysis, but the standard one is Klaus 
Krippendorff’s (Krippendorff 2013). His manual covers everything from how to 
conceptualize and design studies that involve content analysis, to collecting documents, 
coding them, collecting data, making inferences, evaluating those inferences, and 
answering research questions.5 He summarizes all of that information into several 
diagrams. The diagram reproduced below summarizes the overall process of content 




Fig. 3.1. Standard Model of Content Analysis. (Reprinted with Permission from 




5 Like ‘case study analysis’, the phrase ‘content analysis’ has several senses, meaning sometimes the 
general family of methods, sometimes a specific technique, other times the results of a technique. I hope 
that the sense appropriate to a sentence will be somewhat clear from the sentence’s context. 
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The diagram represents eight subprocesses, each represented by heavy lined 
boxes. It also represents eight sets of documents needed, represented in unboxed text near 
the boxes. The process starts by designing the research with the aid of theories about 
content and some research questions. Given a set of texts, a content analyst unitizes them 
into chunks, say paragraphs or sentences. Based on a sampling plan, she samples some of 
those units, and based on some coding or recording instructions, she records data from 
them. Given simplifying tools, she reduces or cleans the data. Those processes together 
comprise the main data-collection subprocess. Once she has completed them, and given 
an analytic construct of the particular phenomenon that interests the researcher, she infers 
the content of the texts, which she uses to answer the research questions in a report that 
accords with the standards of her particular discipline. At any point in the process, a 
researcher may learn something that convinces her of a problem in her design, and she 
may halt the process, revise her design, and begin again.  
 
Documents of a Content Analysis 
Krippendorff’s diagram nicely captures the process of content analysis. But in my 
use of content analysis methods, I found that Krippendorff’s diagram has two problems, 
both of which are easily remedied. First, the diagram pays little attention to two key 
processes in content analysis. The first process is evaluating the reliability of the data 
collecting methods, and the second is evaluating the reliability and validity of the 
inferences made from those data with the aid of the analytical construct. Both processes 
are central components of any content analysis, and they mustn’t be overlooked. Readers 
should mentally add those stages to the above diagram. 
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The second problem is about the documents needed for content analysis. I take the 
term ‘document’ in a liberal sense, referring to any self-contained set of printed 
information. The diagram gives too little attention to the breadth of documents needed to 
complete a content analysis, or to the order in which a researcher must create them before 
she can move from one stage of the overall process to the next. To remedy that issue, I 
provide the following diagram.  
 
 
Fig. 3.2. The Documents of Content Analysis.  
 
 The above diagram shows 18 documents. A researcher who pursues a content 
analysis should create at least those 18 documents. And for those evaluating, reviewing, 
or learning from the analysis, the above 18 documents provide public information that 
can be criticized, revised, borrowed, etc. Though I order the documents linearly, that 
order shouldn’t imply a perfect stepwise procedure to content analysis. At any point in 
the process of creating those documents, a researcher may return to drafts of earlier 
documents, revise them, and begin the analysis anew.  
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 I won’t review the general features of the above 18 documents. Rather, I refer 
readers new to content analysis to Krippendorff’s manual and to the expansive literature 
on content analysis methods cited in his book. In the rest of this chapter, I provide 
instances of the above documents specific to this dissertation. In this chapter, I provide 
instances of documents 1–10, and 14. I collect data for two projects, and I summarize the 
data from Document 12 and in tables in the next two chapters, which also provide 
Document 18 for each project.  The remaining documents I collect in protocols in 
Appendices C and D at the end of this dissertation.   
 
 
3.5- Content Analysis for Epistemic Goals 
In the previous chapter, I selected two cases for further study. Each case 
represents a research project in which the teams in some way use models of evolutionary 
genetics with models of, or information about, gene regulation. Each of the sub sections 
below provide the information by which I designed and completed a content analysis on 
the research publications of those three projects.  
 
1 List of Research Questions 
 While the overall dissertation pursues several questions, I use content analysis to 
address only the following one. 
 What are the epistemic aims of the two selected projects that jointly use models of 
gene regulation with models of evolutionary genetics?  
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I use content analysis to provide evidence for the specific kinds of aims pursued in each 
project. While I could use it to identify many other features of the projects, such as the 
models employed, I do not. Those features aren’t in doubt, at least for my project, so I 
needn’t provide systematic evidence and reconstruction. What are in question, however, 
are the epistemic aims of those projects, so I use an explicit methods to generate 
systematic evidence for or against claims about the pursuit of some species of epistemic 
aims in those projects.  
 
2 List of Texts to Analyze 
I use content analysis on a specific kind of text. Each project has several kinds of 
outputs, one of which includes their published research reports. Those reports include 
research articles, review articles, and dissertations. For each project, I focus on the set of 
published research reports. I don’t here list all of the articles selected for each project. I 
instead list them in the following two chapters, in the relevant subsections specific to the 
individual projects.  
I ignore other kinds of outputs from the projects. I didn’t analyze grant 
applications or reports, interviews, or research notebooks. Those kinds of documents 
surely have much information about the epistemic aims that the teams pursued in their 






3 Model of Communication 
 Each content analysis assumes a model of communication. Content analysts 
conceive of content as not always perfectly manifest in texts, but instead as something 
that holds between the creators of texts and the consumers of those texts (Krippendorff 
2013). If the creators of a text remain constant, then the contents of the texts will vary 
with different kinds of consumers. Content analysis involves inferences from textual data 
to content. To ground those inferences, it presupposes a model of communication that 
specifies the creators, the kinds of consumers, and the behaviors of those consumers that 
the texts may influence.  
 Even though many have studied communication in science, few have developed 
well-articulated models of communication for research reports. Many content analyses of 
such reports forego a communication model, and thus they limit or undermine the 
strength and clarity of their inferences. To better ground their inferences, and ultimately 
their causal explanations of science and its progress, those who study science have much 
to gain by further specifying their communication models.  
Of those who have developed models, they often build on the sender-receiver 
model of Shannon’s model of information flow (Shannon 1948). Communication 
theorists often describe that model as too simplistic to capture the complexity of 
communication between people, but when they propose alternative models, they 
generally build on Shannon’s model and add arrows for feedback from destination to 




Fig. 3.3. Shannon’s Model of Information Flow. (Redrawn from (Shannon 1948)). 
 
In the early 1970s, Garvey and Griffith developed the now most commonly cited 
model of communication among scientists, which traces a normal process of development 
for scientific research, from informal discussions to presentations at meetings to 
published papers (Garvey and Griffith 1971). The model built on their earlier work, in 
which they’d argued that to investigate communication among scientists, researchers 
should conceptualize that communication as a social phenomenon that produces scientific 
products and information, among other things, which feed back into the overall system of 
communication (Garvey and Griffith 1967). Garvey and Griffith’s model remains 
standard today, modified only slightly by the advent and implementation of contemporary 
technology, such as personal computers, digital databases, the internet, and email (Brown 
2010).  
I focus on only the final stages of Garvey and Griffith’s model, in which 
researchers publish articles of their own research or consume the articles of others. That 
stage lacks detail. If we focus on those stages, we can loosely model the interactions as a 
Shannon processes. For one such process, the source is the set of article authors, the 
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destination is the set of intended readers, and the article is the channel, or perhaps a 
packet of information in the channel.  
But I need to add a bit more to the model. Critics of Shannon’s model argue that 
the model is too simplistic for human communication, as it incorporates little about 
feedback and because it abstracts away from a key component of human communication: 
the purposes for which people engage in it.  
Both points are correct, but they don’t undermine Shannon’s model. Shannon’s 
model captures information flow in its most general and abstract form. If we 
conceptualize human communication as a kind or species of information flow, then we 
should de-abstract the model a bit so that it more fully captures features that we wish to 
study. For instance, when theorists add arrows to the model to represent feedback from 
destination to sender, which they often do, they have de-abstracted the basic model to 
capture a more specific activity. I do the same for the purposes of scientific 
communication.  
To succeed, communication among people must satisfy at least some purposes 
from at least two sets. The first set includes the purposes of those who send the 
information. The second set includes the purposes of those who receive the information 
and return feedback to the sender. The more purposes satisfied, the more successful the 
communication.  
For a research article, we can focus those purposes. For an article to succeed as a 
bit of communication, it should satisfy at least some purposes of the authors or at least 
some purposes of the readers. The more purposes satisfied, the more successful the article 
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functions in the process of communication. Those who study communication between 
scientists have noted those two sets of purposes.  
Researchers have studied the purposes of scientific authors. Garvey and Griffith 
argued that authors of scientific articles aimed to change the behaviors of those who read 
those articles (Griffith and Garvey 1967; also Bazerman 1981). According to them, 
authors want their readers to recognize a record of priority and complete information and 
to cite the articles in review articles or textbooks. Gusfield stressed that authors aim to 
convince their readers about the truth of the claims in their articles (Gusfeld 1976). He 
also argued that authors also interpret their data, especially in social sciences, in such a 
way as to subtly influence the attitudes that readers form about the objects studied 
(Gusfield 1976). While some have studied the potential aims of those who author 
research reports, much more research is needed (Hyland and Salager-Meyer 2008).  
Researchers have also studied the purposes of those who read articles. Many have 
noted that scientists read the reports of others to discover relevant background knowledge 
and literature for their own research (Garvey and Griffith 1967; Bazerman 1981). Tenopir 
and Volentin surveyed biologists to find the purposes for which biologists read academic 
literature (Tenopir and Volentin 2012). They reported that biologists read articles to 
inspire new thinking in their research, to improve their own results, or to change their 
research focuses. Biologists report that, of the articles they read, they read almost 80% 
for research purposes. But Tenopir and Volentin found further purposes as well, 
including 7% for teaching and 11% for current awareness. Other sciences reported 
similar numbers.  
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From the above information about purposes, I sketch a tentative communication 
model for communication between scientists via published research articles.6   
 
 
Fig. 3.4. Basic Model of Communication via Scientific Publication. The model 
represents key nodes in the process of information transfer among scientists when they 
publish scientific articles. While it specifies the basic nodes of a Shannon model, it also 
adds three new nodes: Author Purposes, Reader Purposes, and (Reader) Behaviors. It also 
adds a channel of feedback from the readers (behaviors) to the original researcher.  
 
Figure 3.4 specifies the nodes in Shannon’s model, and it adds three new nodes: 
Author Purposes, Reader Purposes, and (Reader) Behaviors. Those nodes help explicate 
the social aspect of the communication process, the goal-directedness of it, and that when 
a research team communicates about their research, they ultimately aim to change the 
behaviors of their readers. Figure 3.5 adds more detail to Figure 3.4, and it lists species or 
kinds of purposes or behaviors.  
																																																						
6 I stress two caveats. Perhaps no human communication is as purpose-driven as is that among scientists via 
their published reports. Thus, the model specified below may little represent the process of communication 
via published documents in non-scientific communications. Furthermore, even among scientists, little 
communication between them is as purpose-driven as is that via their published reports. Thus, the model 
specified below may little represent other kinds of communication among scientists. 
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 The above model has many uses. I use it in this dissertation to ground descriptions 
of the phenomena I study, the epistemic goals pursued in research projects. But 
researchers often use Shannon’s model, and derivatives of it, to explain and predict 
phenomena. To use the above model to explain some processes of communication among 
scientists, researchers must show that the additional nodes are isolable and manipulable. I 
doubt that their isolability will be difficult to show. More interesting, and more fruitful, 
will be their manipulability. But that is a project for another day.7  
For this dissertation, I use the Figures 3.4 and 3.5 to ground my content analysis 
of the articles published as the outputs of the research projects I study. Given the above 
models, a research team partly writes and publishes research articles to convince others to 
use those products or to believe the results of those products. There are many strategies to 
convince readers. A common one is to use the articles to display the products and to show 
how they helped the research team achieve its epistemic aims. Sometimes authors are 
explicit about their epistemic aims, but often those aims are implicit. Content analysis 






7 To show that they are manipulable, we must show, for example, that altering a researcher’s purposes for 
communicating will alter how she constructs her article, the medium in which she publishes it, the 
researchers who read it and change their behaviors (or not) because of it, and the feedback the original 
researcher receives also changes.  
 
8 Given the above models, there are many interesting projects that those who study science could pursue. 
One that seems especially important is to examine the rhetorical structure, or content model (Introduction, 
Methods, Results, Discussion, Conclusion), of research articles to see whether or not that structure helps or 









































































































4 List of Analytical Constructs 
 This dissertation relies on two analytical constructs. The first is that of research 
project, reviewed in section 2 of this chapter and more fully discussed in Chapter 2. The 
second is that of epistemic goal, detailed in section 3 of this chapter. The first construct 
enables me to conceptualize and bound the cases I study. The second enables me to focus 
on a specific phenomenon of interest in those cases.  
Especially important is the taxonomy of epistemic goals listed in Tables 3.1 and 
3.2 above. Those tables provide the specific goal concepts that I operationalize below.9 
While I also study the models deployed in the research projects that I study, those units of 
analysis are less difficult to identify that are research projects or especially epistemic 
goals. As such, I don’t treat models or arguments as analytical constructs, which means I 
don’t provide explicit definitions or operationalizations of those notions. The choice is 
one of convenience, and a more in-depth study could treat those units of analysis as 
constructs.  
 
5 Scheme for Unitizing Texts 
 To unitize the texts studied in this dissertation, I followed the following scheme.  
1. Turn each text into a txt document. 
2. Each paragraph is a unit.  
3. The abstract is a unit. 
4. The article title is the first unit.  
5. Each header is a unit. 
																																																						
9 Thanks to Wes Anderson for stressing this requirement to me.  
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6. Each numbered indent (e.g. a model assumption) is a unit.  
7. Each graphic/table/figure caption is a unit.  
8. Each sidebar counts as a unit, regardless of the number of paragraphs within 
it.  
9. All units are numbered with whole numbers, starting with 1.  
10. Numbering proceeds top to bottom, left to right.  
11. Numbering proceeds in the order of sections demarcated by section headings.  
12. All items of text, as described in steps 2–5, are numbered first, and without 
break, from the beginning of section to the end, taking the sections in order, 
including appendices.  
13. All sidebars and figure captions are numbered next. The are the final 
paragraphs in the sections in which they are first mentioned in the text.  
14. Supplementary methods sections or text documents should be included and 
unitized.  
15. The sources/ bibliography are not units.  
 
6 Operational Definitions for Analytical Construct  
Here, I operationalize the concept of epistemic goals so that I can use content 
analysis methods to collect data about them. Specifically, I collect data about which goals 
are pursued in the three research projects I study. I based the operationalizations below 
on the definition of epistemic goals and the taxonomy of kinds of epistemic goals.  
I provide four operationalizations in Table 3.3. All of them refer to codebooks, 




OPERATIONALIZATION FOR CONCEPTS OF EPISTEMIC AIMS  








Form Hypothetical Form Notes 
OK-1 None Paragraphs that have 
instances of the terms 
and phrases from 
[Know] indicate the 
that the authors discuss 
knowledge in the 
paragraph. 
If a paragraph describes a 
possible state of 
knowledge, then if we 
check the paragraph, we’ll 
find instances in it of the 
terms and phrases in the 
[Know] list.  
We can use OK-1 
to see if authors 
use knowledge 
terms only when 
they aim to explain 
phenomena, or if 
they also use it for 





Paragraphs that have 
instances of the terms 
and phrases from 
[Goal] indicate the that 
the authors had or 
pursued a goal 
described in the 
paragraph. 
If a paragraph describes a 
goal of project, then if we 
check the paragraph, we’ll 
find instances in it of the 
terms and phrases in the 
[Goal] list. 
We can use OEG-1 
to identify all kind 
of goals, not just 





describe a goal and a 
product indicate that 
the product is relevant 
to the achievement or 
realization of the goal.   
If a paragraph describes an 
epistemic goal of a project, 
then if we check it we’ll 
find references to the 
product AND instances of 
the terms or phrases from 
at least one of [Know], 
[Goal], [Amalgam], 
[Control], [Describe], 
[Discover], [Explain] and 
[Cause], or [Predict]. 
I provide no 
codebook of terms 
for scientific 
products, and I 
leave to coders the 
evaluation of 
whether or not a 
product is 
mentioned in a 
paragraph.  





Paragraphs that have 
instances of the terms 
and phrases from the 
following lists indicate 
the that the authors had 
or pursued a specific 
kind of goal described 
in the paragraph. The 
lists are: [Amalgam], 
[Control], [Describe], 
[Discover], [Explain] 
and [Cause], and 
[Predict].  
If a paragraph describes a 
specific type of epistemic 
goal of a project, then if 
we check the paragraph, 
we’ll find in it instances of 
the terms or phrases from 
the lists: [Amalgam], 
[Control], [Describe], 
[Discover], [Explain] and 




that connote a shared meaning. For instance, the codebook for the concept of general goal 
includes terms like ‘aim’, ‘end’, and ‘goal’, among many others.  
The first operationalization is OK-1. It is an operationalization of a general 
concept of knowledge, but not of a more specific concept of epistemic goals. The next 
operationalization is OEG-1, which operationalizes the first condition of the concept of 
Epistemic Goal for a Research Project. The third operationalization is OEG-5, which 
operationalizes the fifth condition of the concept of Epistemic Goal for a Research 
Project. I don’t operationalize conditions 2,3,4, or 6 of the concept of Epistemic Goal for 
a Research Project. Those conditions provide routes by which, when operationalized, we 
might use them to provide (in)validating evidence for conclusions based on data drawn 
from the first two conditions. The final operationalization below is OTEG-3, which 
operationalizes condition three of the concept Type of Epistemic Goal.  
I use those four operationalizations to collect data about the existence or pursuit 
of specific kinds of epistemic goals in the contexts of research projects.  
 
7 Description of Sampling Strategy 
 I don’t use a sampling strategy for several reasons. First, my corpus is small, and 
the data I require can be collected quickly and efficiently. Second, I’m unsure that a 
larger corpus, which might require a sampling of lexical units, would help me address the 
descriptive question that guides this research. The data I seek are often so few and subtle 
that they’d likely be missed in large scale statistical analyses. Finally, larger corpora are 
good for identifying large trends, but for the fine grained analysis I pursue, it’s better to 
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bound phenomena in scientific research projects and then to study the documents in those 
contexts.  
 
8 List of Sampled Units 
 The list of sampled units includes all paragraphs for all of the documents I study. 
On the raw data sheet, each paragraph is numbered and identified as a column. Each 
sheet in a workbook represents a different scientific publication, and each workbook 
represents a different research project. 
 
9 Recording Instructions and Data Language 
To record data, I employ the following instructions. I require no special data language.  
1. Select a text and unitize it into paragraphs according to the scheme described 
above.  
2. For the first paragraph of the text, and for the first list of words from the 
codebook, look for the first word from the list in the paragraph.   
3. If you see an instance of the word:  
a. on the spreadsheet, find the row for the operational definition tied to 
the list of words on the codebook. 
b. find the column for the numbered paragraph. 
c. at the intersection of the two, list the word in the topmost empty cell. 
d. at the intersection of the two, list the containing sentence for the word 
in the next empty cell. 
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4. If you don’t see an instance of the word, move on to the next word listed on 
the codebook and repeat the above steps.  
5. Repeat the above steps for all of the words in the first list of words from the 
codebook.  
6. If you don’t see any words from the first list in the first paragraph, leave blank 
the intersection cells of the paragraph and the operational definition.  
7. Repeat the above steps for all of the words in all of the lists in the codebook.  
8. Repeat the above steps for all of the paragraphs of the text. 
9. Repeat the above steps for all of the texts studied in the research project, with 
data for each text stored on an independent sheet in a spreadsheet workbook.  
10. Review the raw data recorded. For each word and sentence recorded: 
a. Read the relevant paragraph, sentence, and word. 
b. Determine if the word is used to describe epistemic goals, or if it is 
used for some other function. 
c. If it is used for epistemic goals, mark ‘yes’ at the bottommost empty 
cell at the confluence of the numbered paragraph and operational 
definition.  
d. If not, mark a ‘no’.  
11. For each text, make a refined data sheet. 
a. Delete all of the data for the cells marked ‘no’.  
 
The last two steps are steps to clean the data and to separate noise from data. 
Coders should store both raw data files and scrubbed data files.   
	 102 
10 List of Reliability Tests/ Procedures 
 There are several ways in which researchers interpret the reliability of data. I 
follow Krippendorff, who argues that reproducibility is perhaps the most important 
interpretation. As such, I must develop and describe methods such that others can 
reproduce my data. That task is relatively easy, as I analyze all paragraphs in texts, and as 
I require no statistical analyses. For my corpus, if others follow the unitizing scheme and 
the recording instructions described above, they should be able to exactly recreate my raw 
data. I also use the detailed protocol in Appendix C.  
 To further indicate the replicability of my data, I also use computational tools. 
Given my corpus of unitized texts, I employ the instructions above within the software 
package WordSmith Tools (Scott 2012). That software enables researchers to quickly 
find words in texts, their containing sentences, and their paragraph numbers. The 
software automates steps 2 through 8 in the recording instructions. I use the software to 
ensure that I get the same raw data every time.  
 One issue remains. In the recording instructions, the final two steps indicate how 
a researcher should scrub the raw data to remove the noise from the information. To 
ensure that such steps aren’t idiosyncratic, content analysts often use multiple coders to 
scrub the data, and they rate the inter-coder reliability. For this dissertation, only one 
researcher scrubs the data, and there are no inter-coder reliability scores.  
The reliance on only one coder is a flaw, however minor, of the project. It is 
necessary for reasons of expediency. It is mitigated due to the perfect replicability of the 
rest of the data collection methods, and as the raw and scrubbed data are both published 
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as part of the project. Future work should aim to evaluate inter-coder reliability of the 
scrubbed data.  
  
14 List of Procedures to Infer Answers to Questions 
 I use a set off inference procedures to infer answers to my research question from 
the collected data. The set of procedures is listed below. Other researchers may wish to 
categorize some of the procedures as further operational definitions of the concepts of 
Epistemic Goal for a Research project or of Type of Epistemic Goal. Furthermore, some 
may wish to use some of the inference procedures as tools to guide the scrubbing of data. 
I see nothing wrong with either tactic, but for reasons of clarity and brevity I don’t pursue 
them here. The procedures are:  
   
1. If a paragraph has at least one instance of terms or phrases from [Amalgam], 
then that paragraph indicates that one goal of the project was amalgamation of 
phenomena or theories.  
2. If a paragraph has at least one instance of terms or phrases from [Control], 
then that paragraph indicates that one goal of the project was control of 
phenomena. 
3. If a paragraph has at least one instance of terms or phrases from [Describe], 
then that paragraph indicates that one goal of the project was description or 
representation of phenomena. 
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4. If a paragraph has at least one instance of terms or phrases from [Discover], 
then that paragraph indicates that one goal of the project was discovery of new 
phenomena or theories. 
5. If a paragraph has at least one instance of terms or phrases from [Explain], 
then that paragraph indicates that one goal of the project was explanation of 
phenomena or theories. 
6. If a paragraph has at least one instance of terms or phrases from [Predict], 
then that paragraph indicates that one goal of the project was prediction of 
phenomena. 
7. If a paper has more instances of terms or phrases from [Amalgam] than for 
any other type of epistemic goals, then the paper indicates that amalgamation 
of phenomena or theories was the primary goal of the project for the period of 
research described by the paper. The same holds for [Control], [Describe], 
[Discover], [Explain], and [Predict].  
8. From the relative frequency in a paper of terms in [Amalgam], [Control], 
[Describe], [Discover], [Explain], and [Predict], we can infer the relative rank 
or importance of those kinds of epistemic goals of a project for the period of 
research described by the paper.  
9. If the same paragraph has at least one instance of terms or phrases from 
[Know] AND from [Goal], then the paragraph indicates that knowledge was a 




15 List of Procedures to Validate Truth of Inferred Claims 
There are at least two primary kinds of validity that my project must satisfy. The 
first is construct validity. To show that my project meets construct validity, I must show 
that I use explicit concepts for my analytical constructs of research projects and epistemic 
goals. I must also show that I operationalized them in such a way so as to collect 
evidence about them. Most importantly, I must show that the data I collected provides 
evidence about specific cases of the explicit concepts, especially of epistemic goals, and 
not about closely related features. 
 Much of this chapter enables me to establish construct validity. I provide explicit 
concepts of research project, of epistemic goal, and of type of epistemic goal. Next, I 
operationalize the concepts of epistemic goal and type of epistemic goal so as to collect 
evidence about them from scientific articles. All that remains is to establish that the data 
collected provides evidence for the existence of epistemic goals, and not some similar 
feature, within research projects. The most likely similar feature is that of epistemic value 
or virtue.  
To show that the feature of epistemic value differs from that of epistemic goal, I 
must provide concepts of both and show how they differ in contexts of research projects. 
I haven’t done so. Therefore, others may justly question the construct validity of my 
results.  
I mitigate the impact of such questions in at least two ways. First, I note that the 
project of explicating concept of epistemic goals falls within a larger project of 
explicating a model of local epistemologies of research projects, as depicted in Figure 
2.1. Though I don’t explicate the concept of values for research projects as part of this 
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dissertation, I must eventually do so. Second, I urge critics to look to my 
operationalizations and codebooks for epistemic goals. Critics should provide their 
concepts of epistemic values and show that my tools provide more evidence about those 
values than they do about my proposed concepts of epistemic aims.  
There is a second form of validity that my project should meet. I label it 
corroborative validity. I must show that my results stand up to potentially disconfirming 
evidence. A common route is to analyze one set of documents, in this case scientific 
articles, and then analyze a somewhat independent set of documents, perhaps grant 




This chapter provides a series of tools with which to study the epistemic aims of 
research projects. It provides a general concept of epistemic aims and a taxonomy of 
specific kinds of epistemic aims. It also provides many of the tools needed to collect 
evidence about epistemic aims with content analysis methods.  
This chapter also describes 18 documents, which are themselves tools, needed for 
content analyses. Of special importance, this chapter details a novel model of scientific 
communication via research articles, and it provides operationalizations for the concepts 
of Epistemic Goals of Research Projects and Type of Epistemic Goals. For the design of 
content analysis, this chapter provides a scheme for unitizing texts studied, data-
recording instructions, procedures for inferring descriptions of goals from data, and 
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reliability and validity procedures. Appendices C and D provide detailed protocols and 
codebooks for conducting the content analyses.  
The next two chapters provide case descriptions, and they describe the results of 







CONTEXT FOR CASE DESCRIPTIONS 
 
4.1- Introduction 
 Each of the next two chapters provides a description of a research project in 
which a team somehow uses gene regulatory models with evolutionary genetic models. 
This chapter introduces the structure of those descriptions, and it addresses some of the 
assumptions implicit in them. I discuss those topics here to make the descriptions shorter, 
unburdened by interpretative footnotes, and easier to read.  
 This brief chapter has several primary sections. After this introduction, I describe 
the aims and basic ontology presumed by the descriptions, and I preview the five sections 
of each description. In section 4.3 I discuss the general methods used to create the 
descriptions, and in the next section I describe some issues with collecting and refining 
the content analysis data. In 4.5, I discuss some of the limitations of the descriptions. I 
conclude with a section about three concepts I presuppose in my case descriptions: 
models, mechanisms, and research questions. Those topics are the subjects of robust 
debates, and many may wish to see how I approach those topics in my descriptions. The 









In the two chapters, I aim only to describe the two cases. I don’t aim to explain, 
predict, control or discover new phenomena. As such, with the descriptions, I aim 
primarily to answer the questions: 
1. What models of evolutionary genetics do researchers use with gene regulatory 
network (GRN) models?  
2. When researchers use those two kinds of models in tandem, what epistemic aims 
do they pursue? 
 
To answer those questions, I focus on two cases for extended study. Each case is about a 
research project. Case study, however, isn’t the only way to address those questions, and 
others may use different methods.  
In Chapter 7 after the descriptions, I aim to do more than just escribe the cases. In 
that chapter, I comparing them to each other. I separate the steps of description and 
comparison for purposes of replicability. If people wish to replicate the methods and 
results of this dissertation, they should focus on one of the two steps at a time, because 
each step pursues different aims and employs different methods and logics to achieve 
those aims.  
 
Ontology  
The descriptions rely on an ontology developed in earlier chapters. That ontology 
includes at least research topics, research projects, and research teams. For this 
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dissertation, the research topic is the use by scientists of gene regulatory models with 
evolutionary genetics models. In Chapter 2 I inferred a set of research projects about that 
topic, and I represented those projects as networks of research papers connected by 
similar authors. Projects tend to span multiple years, and have multiple research 
publications. If I focus on a single publication, and the rationale of that publication, I call 
the object of that focus a study. In a sense, a research project decomposes into studies. 




 Each of the two case descriptions has five sections. The first section describes the 
research team, locating it in time and space, and each of its members. The second section 
describes the research project. It lists all the documents treated as outputs of the project, 
and which provide the basis for most of the information and textual analysis of the 
project. For another description of the same project, we might exclude some of those 
outputs or include others, so the list provides an explicit basis.  
The second section also describes the type of population studied by the team, 
either simulated, laboratory, or wild (Winther et al. 2015). I use those three types of 
populations to partition into three parts the set of research projects in which researches 
use evolutionary genetic models with GRN models. However, for purposes of this 
dissertation, I partition the set into two subsets: projects about simulated populations; and 
populations about laboratory or wild populations.  
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The second section also describes many aspects of the project’s rationale. It 
describes the primary phenomenon studied, the problems and questions pursued in the 
project, and the methods the team used.  
The third section describes the models used in the project. A team may use many 
models, and many kinds of models in a research project. I aim to describe all of them, and 
to focus on evolutionary genetic models and GRNs. I classify some models as 
mechanistic. I further discuss my assumptions about models and mechanisms in a later 
section of this chapter.  
The fourth section describes information related to the epistemic aims of the 
project. I provide two kinds of information about the aims of a project. The first is a 
collection of whole sentences that I judged as explicitly relevant to the aims of the 
project. The second is a set of tables that represent count-data for terms related to 
different epistemic aims. That latter information is the result of the content analysis 
described in previous chapters. I discuss it a bit further in a later section of this chapter.  
The final section of each description summarizes the main conclusions from each 
study of the project.     
 
 
4.3- General Methods 
 To develop the case descriptions, I used the following methods. First, I identified 
a population of cases and selected two for study according to the procedures described in 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Second, I drafted the case descriptions without the content 
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analyses. Third, I conducted the content analyses and summarized their results with 
tabulated information in the case descriptions.  
The second and third steps decompose into many sub-steps. To ensure 
consistency in procedure across cases and that other could replicate my descriptions, I 
wrote, revised, and followed protocols for writing the case descriptions and for doing the 
content analyses. The protocols are Appendices B, C, and D to this dissertation.  
For most sections of the case descriptions, I used methods familiar to historians 
and philosophers of science. For a given research project, and with a specific question in 
mind, I carefully read the documents that I had classed as outputs of the project. For 
instance, when I asked what were the problems pursued by the team, I read the 
documents and annotated the sections of text that were relevant to the question. From 
those annotations, I summarized my answer to the question, and in some cases I provided 
lists of sentences as evidence from the analyzed texts.  
For other sections, I used methods that historians and philosopher may find 
unfamiliar, but that social scientists will find familiar. Content analysis is one such 
method, though I apply it only to find the epistemic aims pursued in the projects. Another 
is my use of protocols for constructing case descriptions. Such protocols enabled me to 
mechanize much of the data collection and description processes. Social scientists will 
recognize my use of protocols as an attempt to ensure the reliability of my methods and 
the reproducibility of the case descriptions. Some historians and philosophers struggle to, 
or don’t care to, meet those criteria for objective results.  
Similarly, historians and philosophers, but not social scientists, may find the 
structure of my case descriptions unfamiliar. Philosophers and historians often construct 
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case descriptions to tell historical narratives. Such narratives serve important functions 
(Beatty 2016). But not all products of historical research need be narratives, and my case 
descriptions are not narratives. While my descriptions don’t tell stories, they enable 
comparisons across cases, which I pursue in Chapter 7 of this dissertation (Eisenhardt 
1989; Eisenhardt 1991).  
 
 
4.4- Content Analysis 
A Note about Focus 
I take content analysis to be a better method by which to interpret texts according 
to the following criteria: ability and ease for others to see and critique every step of the 
interpretation process, ability and ease for others to replicate the interpretations, explicit 
connection between interpretations and theories. If I aim to meet those criteria, and if 
content analysis is better than traditional readings, why do I use it to collect data about 
only the epistemic aims of the projects I study, and not about other facets, such as 
research problems, values, etc.?   
Though I focus on some aspects of rationales and not on others, the difference in 
treatment is due to my effort to address this dissertation’s specific research questions. The 
difference isn’t due to some intrinsic centrality to the rationales of the features I focus on, 






I report the results of my computational content analyses as count data. A count is 
the number of words of a given type used in a text. Count data indicate, but don’t 
guarantee, the relative importance of different types of words in texts. Content analysts 
use count data to indicate the content of a text, especially implicit content in comparison 
to the explicitly declared content highlighted by authors.1  
I employed nine types of words. Each type is a general concept, and each concept 
had its own list of words. Counts for ‘Goal’ and ‘Know’ describes the number of times 
the team used general goal terms or described states of knowledge, respectively. Counts 
for ‘Cause’ describe the number of causal words used by the team. All other counts 
describe the number of words used by the team to describe more specific kinds of goals: 
Amalgamating phenomena and theories, controlling phenomena, describing phenomena, 
discovering novel phenomena, explaining phenomena, or predicting phenomena. 
The raw data are noisy for several reasons. First, the tools I developed, especially 
the word lists, are new and need further refinement. Second, natural languages, especially 
those employed by scientists, are complex, with many homonyms, and no content 
analysis tools can perfectly systematize such language.2 As a result, the data includes 
many false positives in its counts, and it may exclude false negatives.  
																																																						
1 For instance, an author may state that her text is about only urban topics. But if a count analysis indicates 
that the author uses more words associated with rural topics than with urban topics, the analysis provides 
interpreters with reasons to temper the author’s explicit statement. In general, content analysists don’t judge 
authors as maliciously hiding information, but simply as not highlighting all of the relevant content.  
 
2 The formal content analysis methods can’t perfectly capture the shades of meaning found in natural 
language, it remains useful. We use them to make clear and explicit our interpretations of texts, and to 
show where they are fallible. The methods aren’t perfect, but they’re better than their alternatives.   
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 I address those issues in several ways. To address potential problems with false 
negatives, I revised my tools and operational definitions three times throughout the 
course of the data collection, each time enabling the tools to collect a wider array of 
terms. To deal with false positives, I removed noisy terms from my word lists as I revised 
the lists. After each revision, I started the analysis from scratch.  
 Regardless of those revisions, many false positives remain in the data of Table 
4.2. To filter out the remaining noise, I checked each datum and its surrounding 
sentence(s) to verify that it was relevant to the concept at hand. I discarded any single 
datum if it had at least one of the following issues:3  
1. Infelicitous homonym 
2. Infelicitous cognate 
3. Metadiscourse 
4. Describes phenomena, not project rationale 
5. Describes layout of graphics 
6. Describes research of other teams 
 
For instance, though instances of ‘present*’ often provide some indication that the 
team aimed to Describe phenomena, I marked as noisy any instance in a phrase such a 
‘…we present our earlier results in (Johnson and Porter 2000)…’, as that instance was 
both an infelicitous homonym and an instance of Metadiscourse about papers. To ensure 
																																																						
3 Due to the large amount of data related to the concept of Cause, I didn’t clean much of that data. Had I 
made inferences from that data, I would have needed to clean it more thoroughly.   
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intracoder reliability, I annotated the data twice and unified my results, as described in 
the protocol for data collection.4  
Finally, my codes, and the resultant counts, depend on a couple of assumptions. 
The first is that the causal terms aren’t evidence that the team pursued explanation of 
phenomena over other aims. If the opposite of that assumption is true, then causal 
explanation is far and away the dominant aim of the projects. The second assumption is 
that ‘Know’ and ‘Explain’ are distinct concepts. Some use those terms interchangeably, 
or at least as more akin than I treat them here. I treat terms like ‘understand’ as providing 
data for knowledge claims, not for explanation claims, which some may disagree with. 
Different codebooks could yield different relative rankings for ‘Explain’. The most I can 
do is to publish my codebook (Appendix D) along with my summary data for public 





The conclusions from the content analysis have several limitations in terms of 
validity. First, they rely on data generated from only one kind of source: peer reviewed 
journal articles. Stronger and more well confirmed results would rely on data drawn from 
several different sources, including grant applications, grant reports, lab notebooks, 
correspondence between team members, interviews of team members, etc.  
																																																						
4 My results would be strengthened by checking their reliability across multiple coders. That task must wait 
for future research.  
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 Second, I eliminated data that seemed to be obvious noise. Stronger conclusions 
would come from a more precise protocol for identifying noise, from using multiple 
coders to eliminate noise, and to compare the results of their eliminations.  
 Third, I need stronger distinctions between epistemic goals and values. I deployed 
a theoretical concept and operational definition of ‘epistemic goals’ that partly function to 
distinguish such goals from values. But I didn’t specify a concept and operational 
definition of ‘value’. Stronger conclusions would result from specifying such tools, from 
using them to collect data about the values pursued in the project, and from comparing 
the conclusions about the values pursued against the conclusions of the epistemic goals 
pursued. Doing so would ensure that the concepts are different, and that the operational 
definitions collect different evidence in support of each concept.   
 
Case Reports 
 Similarly, the overall case report has several limitations that future research could 
remedy. First, I used only two kinds of documents as sources of evidence for information 
about the JPT team and project: published articles and correspondence with the team 
members. If I’d collected information from more sources kinds of sources, especially 
structured interviews of the team members, the conclusions would be stronger. Especially 
weak is the section on research questions pursued by the team.  
 Second, while the case report describes many aspects of the project, I employed 
content analysis to collect data for only the sections about epistemic goals. A stronger 
case description might employ content analyses on other aspects of the project, especially 
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for the models used by the team, the research questions and problems pursued, and their 
primary results.5  
 Finally, the case reports are about projects conducted by researchers. A stronger 
validation process would involve the team members. In such a process, which would 
involve a semi-structured survey, the team members would review the case descriptions 
and evaluate their accuracy. I’d originally planned to conduct such surveys, but as my 
project proceeded, they became increasingly unfeasible. The next step to continue this 




4.6- Assumptions about Models, Mechanisms, and Research Questions 
Models 
There is a robust debate about how best to understand models as they are used in 
various fields (Frigg and Hartmann 2012, and references therein). Rather than getting 
sidetracked by issues in that debate, I posit simply that there are many kinds of models, 
that among those kinds there are models that represent the mechanical aspects of 
phenomena, that there are models that clearly do not, and that there is a continuum 
between the two kinds.   
																																																						
5 Given the vast literatures on models, on mechanisms, and on questions, it would be difficult to provide 
operational definitions, for instance of models, that would capture all of the properties of those things. But 
the vast literature also provides many theoretical concepts from which to build different operational 
definitions. We might make progress in many of the debates about models, mechanisms, questions, etc., if 
we operationalized competing theoretical concepts and systematically studied research projects such that 
we could compare the strengths and weaknesses of competing concepts.  
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I assume that gene regulatory models represent mechanistic aspects of gene 
regulation to a good degree, and that evolutionary genetic models by and large don’t 
represent mechanical aspects of evolution. In those assumptions I’m influenced by 
(Mathewson and Calcott 2011; Davidson 2006; Glymour 2006; Sober 1984; Lewontin 
1974). I set aside issues of how best to characterize the representation relation between 
models and phenomena, and of how best to characterize the relations between models and 
theories, issues that are traditional topics among philosophers. I hold only that researchers 
can build, evaluate, and use models to help them achieve some epistemic goals, and that 
we can empirically investigate those behaviors and goals. I also sidestep issues about 
whether or not selection is a mechanism.  
In this chapter, I use different evidence to support my descriptions of the models 
employed by research teams than I do to support my descriptions of the epistemic goals 
pursued by those teams. For epistemic goals, I provide a specific concept of epistemic 
goal, I operationalize it for use with content analysis, I collect data from texts about the 
goals pursed, and I reconstruct those goals from the data. For models, I assume two kinds 
of models and the features common to instances of those kinds, and I represent the 
models with citations to texts that indicate that the models had the features I represent. 
The latter method is considerably less systematic and reliable than is the former.  
I use different methods for several reasons. First, for the cases I study, the models 
are more explicit and evident than are the epistemic goals, and there should be little 
debate about what parts of the projects are the models, or about the features of the 
models. Epistemic goals, on the other hand, are often tricky to pin down, and a claim 
about a specific goal for a specific project or team requires a higher degree of empirical 
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support. Second, my research questions in this dissertation center more on epistemic 
goals than on models, and so independent verification of my results should scrutinize my 
results about epistemic goals more heavily than my representations of models.  
Projects similar to mine but with different questions and aims might use content 
analysis to investigate models much as I use it to investigate epistemic goals. I originally 
planned to do so in my project, and I sketched operationalized concepts of models and 
used them to collect preliminary data. But I ultimately found that, for my research 
questions, the data yielded no insights beyond the manifest presentations of models in the 
research teams’ published articles.  
 
Mechanisms 
Much like for models more generally, there is a robust debate about how best to 
understand mechanisms and mechanistic models as they are used in various fields, 
especially for purposes of explaining phenomena (Anderson 2014a, 2014b, Craver and 
Tabery 2015; and references therein).  Rather than getting sidetracked by issues in that 
debate, I aim in this chapter merely to describe models. I adopt the list of general features 
of mechanistic models from the irenic account of (Tabery 2004), and to describe a 
mechanistic model, I specify the details of those features for the given model. In this 
strategy, I’m influenced by (Mathewson and Calcott 2011). Though I do not do so here, 
one might profitably describe gene regulation processes using Salmon’s account of 
conserved marks or quantities (Salmon 1984).  
On the irenic account, a mechanism is composed of parts, activities of the parts, 
and interactions between parts or activities, all of which are organized so as to effect the 
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phenomenon of the mechanism. Parts are generally conceived as chunks of matter. 
Activities and interactions are less straightforward.  
An activity is some behavior of a part or of a subset of parts within the 
mechanism. A part or unit has many activities, but not all of them are relevant to all of 
the mechanisms to which the unit is a part. Researchers evaluate models of mechanisms 
partly by how well those models represent the activities necessary to the causal operating 
of the mechanism, and by how well those mechanisms abstract away from unnecessary 
activities.  
An interaction differs from an activity in that it is more explicitly a relation 
between two parts or processes, whereas activities needn’t be. Furthermore, an 
interaction, which is localized to a spatial subregion of the mechanism, induces changes 
in the properties of at least one of the things interacting. Again, researchers evaluate 
models of mechanisms insofar as they represent only those interactions that are necessary 
to describe the causal operating of the mechanism.  
 
Research Questions 
Though I don’t focus on a team’s research questions to address the questions of 
this dissertation, I do discuss those questions in my case descriptions. I do so to help 
contextualize epistemic aims and models as elements of larger research rationales, which 
include research questions. Sometimes I find it useful to categorize those questions, and I 
explain that categorization here.  
Biologists ask different kinds of questions for different kinds of population 
studied. There are at least two types of questions that map onto the three types of 
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populations (simulated, lab, and wild). The two types of questions are respectively about 
the general possibility of phenomena, and about the actuality of phenomena (Forber 
2010). When researchers investigate simulated populations, they ask general possibility 
questions about those populations. When they investigate laboratory or wild populations, 
they ask actuality questions about those phenomena.  
To answer general possibility questions, researchers construct models and study 
them with analytic or computer simulation techniques. They do so partly to determine the 
internal logical consistency of their models, and to determine the bounds and scope of 
their models.  
To answer questions about actual phenomena, researchers collect evidence, either 
from the lab or from the field, about those phenomena. They do so to develop, confirm, 
or disconfirm competing theories, hypotheses, or claims about those phenomena. The 
first team I study, the Johnson Porter, Tulchinsky team, addresses general possibility 
questions. The second team, the Wray, Garfield, Runcie team, addresses questions about 
actual phenomena.  
 I develop my taxonomy of questions from work about related topics by Patrick 
Forber and Carl Craver. Neither focuses on research questions, but their analyses readily 
export to that topic. Forber focuses on evolutionary phenomena, on explanations, and he 
discusses three, not two, types of explanations: global how possibly explanations, local 
how possibly explanations, and how actually explanations. He maintains that researchers 
use different kinds of methods to provide those explanations. For global how possibly 
explanations, researchers simulate evolutionary phenomena under a variety of model 
parameters. They do so to determine the bounds of the model. For local how possibly, 
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they provide plausible just-so stories that could explain actual or specified evolutionary 
phenomenon. And for how actually explanations, they collect evidence to confirm or 
disconfirm competing just-so stories and to pick one as an actual causal explanation of an 
evolutionary phenomenon. See (Craver 2007) for a similar distinction between how 
possible, how plausible, and how actual explanations for mechanistic phenomena.  
I generalize on Forber’s and Craver’s accounts in several ways. First, I focus on 
questions and not on explanations. So I posit how-possible questions, how-plausible 
questions, and how actual questions. The respective explanations would answer their 
respective type of question. Second, I posit that there are different types of legitimate 
questions pursued by researchers, types beyond the how-questions that researchers 
answer with causal explanations. I propose a taxonomy of general possibility questions, 
local possibility/plausibility questions, and actuality questions. Different questions within 
each modal type motivate different epistemic goals. For instance, a how-actually question 
aims for a causal explanation of a phenomenon, but a what-actually question aims for a 
description of a phenomenon. Third, while I here study projects that themselves study 
evolutionary or mechanistic phenomena, and thus fit nicely in Forber’s and Craver’s 
frameworks, I intend my taxonomy to apply to non-evolutionary or non-mechanistic 
phenomena.   





CASE 1: JOHNSON, PORTER, TULCHINSKY, AND SIMULATED POPULATIONS 
 
5.1- Research Team 
Time period and location of the research team 
 The research team coalesced in late 1998, published its first paper in 2000, and its 
most recent papers in 2014 (Johnson 2015, personal communication; Porter 2015, 
personal communication). It loosely persists at the writing of this description. The team 
started at, and is mostly based at, the University of Massachusetts, Amherst in Amherst, 
Massachusetts. 
  
Members of the team 
Member 1: Norman Anthony Johnson.  
  Johnson in one of the team’s two founding members. He received his PhD in 
biology in 1992 from the University of Rochester in Rochester, New York. Chung-I Wu 
supervised his dissertation. Among other positions, in 1998 Johnson became an adjunct 
research professor at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in a department that later 
became the department of biology, a position he maintained throughout the period of the 
project and into 2015. Born in 1966, Johnson was thirty-two years old when he started 
the project, and he was a member of the project throughout. (Johnson 2015; Johnson 




Member 2: Adam Hampton Porter. 
 Porter is one of the team’s two founding members. He received his PhD in 
biology in 1989 from the University of California, Davis in Davis, California. Arthur 
Shapiro supervised the dissertation. By 1998, Porter was an associate professor at the 
University of Amherst, Massachusetts, in what later became the department of biology, a 
position he maintained throughout the period of the project and into 2016. Born in 1961, 
Porter was thirty-seven years old when he started the project of which he was a member 
throughout. (Porter 2015; Porter 1989).  
 
Member 3: Alexander Y. Tulchinsky. 
 Tulchinsky received his PhD in biology in 2013 from the University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst. Adam Porter supervised his dissertation, and Norman Johnson 
was a member of the dissertation committee. Tulchinsky, born in 1982, was a graduate 
student and researcher on the team through at least 2015. (Tulchinsky 2013). 
 
Member 4: Ward Belfield Watt.  
 Watt joined the team for a period between 2013 and 2014. He received his PhD in 
biology in 1967 from Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut. Charles L. Remington 
supervised the dissertation. While he was a member of the team, Watt was a professor at 
the University of South Carolina in Columbia, South Carolina. Born in 1940, Watt was 




5.2- Research Project 
Name of Project 
 For the purposes of this dissertation, I name the project currently being described 
as the JPT Project, after the last names of the three primary members. I also sometimes 
label the team as the JPT team. 
 
Outputs of the Project 
 There are eight primary papers that comprise the output of this project. Five are 
reports of research, one is a review/ opinion article, one is a journal issue introduction, 
and one is a dissertation. In chronological order, they are:  
 
Review Articles 
1.  “Toward a New Synthesis: Population Genetics and Evolutionary 
Developmental Biology,” by Johnson and Porter (Johnson and Porter 2001).  




1. “Rapid Speciation via Parallel, Directional Selection on Regulatory Genetic 
Pathways,” by Johnson and Porter (Johnson and Porter 2000).  
2. “Speciation Despite Gene Flow When Developmental Pathways Evolve,” by 
Porter and Johnson (Porter and Johnson 2002). 
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3.  “Evolution of Branched Regulatory Genetic Pathways: Directional Selection 
on Pleiotropic Loci Accelerates Developmental System Drift,” by Johnson 
and Porter (Johnson and Porter 2007).  
4. “Hybrid Incompatibility Arises in a Sequence-Based Bioenergetic Model of 
Transcription Factor Binding,” by Tulchinsky, Johnson, Watt, and Porter 
(Tulchinsky et al. 2014a).  
5. “Hybrid Incompatibility Despite Pleiotropic Constraint in a Sequence-Based 
Bioenergetic Model of Transcription Factor Binding,” by Tulchinsky, 
Johnson, and Porter (Tulchinsky et al. 2014b).  
 
Dissertations 
6. “Evolution of Hybrid Incompatibilities in Gene Regulatory Networks,” by 
Tulchinsky (Tulchinsky 2013).  
 
Type of Population Studied 
 Research teams in biology typically study one of three kinds of populations: 
simulated, laboratory, or wild (Winther et al. 2015). For its project, the JPT team studies 
simulated populations of individual organisms.    
 
Research Rationale 
 According to the map of epistemic relations described earlier in the dissertation, I 
should be able to describe several aspects of the research project, including research 
problems, research questions, methods, primary phenomena of study, scientific products, 
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epistemic aims, and values. In the next section, I focus on the JPT project’s scientific 
products and epistemic aims. In this subsection, I discuss the projects research problems, 
research questions, methods, and primary phenomena of study.  
 
Primary Phenomena of Study 
Throughout the project, the JPT team studied allopatric speciation, the process by 
which two populations, which share a common ancestor population, become 
reproductively isolated, such that individuals from the two populations don’t interbreed. 
Those two populations evolve to become distinct species. 
There are several routes by which one population can become two populations 
that are reproductively isolated. The JPT team focused on one such route called post-
zygotic isolation. In post zygotic isolation, individuals from one species can mate with 
individuals from the other, and they can produce zygotes, but those hybrid zygotes are 
less fit than either the parents or non-hybrid zygotes. The more unfit the hybrids, the 
more likely the two populations become distinct species.  
There are several possible causes that could contribute to instances of post-
zygotic isolation, but evolutionary geneticists, including the JPT team, focus on problems 
in the genomes of hybrid zygotes, called hybrid dysfunctions or incompatibilities. In 
particular, they focus on hybrid dysfunctions that result from epistasis, in which multiple 
alleles at different genomic loci interact with each other to produce phenotypes. 
Evolutionary geneticists argue that in hybrids, the alleles interact with each other in ways 
that produce less fit phenotypes, compared to non-hybrids. Thus, hybrids on average die 
earlier than do non-hybrids, so they cannot reproduce to the same level as non-hybrids. 
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While evolutionary geneticists have developed mathematical models that describe 
epistasis in abstract, the JPT team proposed that gene regulatory models provided a 
potential empirical interpretation for epistasis (Johnson and Porter 2000, 528).  The JPT 
team studied gene regulation, the process by which a gene produces a transcription factor 
protein or some other product, which then, either directly or indirectly (signaling), 
physically connect to the cis regions of other genes, enabling or inhibiting those genes as 
they produce their own products. Such interactions eventually enable cells to differentiate 
into specific kinds of cells, to move about within an organism and form tissues, and to 
produce phenotypes.  
 
Research Problems 
Early in their project, the JPT motivated their project with the problem that 
researchers have a broad goal to understand speciation, but especially for cases of 
allopatric speciation due to post zygotic isolation and hybrid dysfunction, that goal isn’t 
met. Specifically, researchers little understood how populations evolved such that 
changes in genes resulted in hybrid dysfunction. Furthermore, while researchers 
acknowledged the role of epistasis in models of post zygotic evolution, they hadn’t 
studied gene regulation as a possible physical interpretation of epistasis in those models 
(Johnson and Porter 2000, 528). 
Later in their project, the problem that motivated the JPT team became more 
specific. In the work described in their first few papers, the team developed a model to 
ameliorate the problem described above, and they tweaked it to work in several different 
evolutionary scenarios. But the model had its own issues with empirical interpretation. As 
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described below, the original model employed a concept of binding strength, for which 
the team had no empirical interpretation, and which limited the empirical testability of 
their model. The team wanted a model that could be empirically tested, but the model that 
they built early in the project frustrated that aim (Tulchinsky 2013; Tulchinsky et al. 
2014a). So while the team maintained the problem described in the previous paragraph, a 
more specific problem with their own model motivated their later work.  
 
Research Questions 
Except for (Tulchinsky 2014b), the JPT team doesn’t use questions, either as 
logical or as rhetorical devices, in their research reports. Instead, they contextualize their 
project with research problems and epistemic goals. I don’t infer, however, that research 
questions were absent from the project. If I had used other sources of evidence, such as 
grant applications, lab notebooks, or interviews, I might have found evidence for specific 
questions. As questions aren’t central to this dissertation project, I didn’t collect such 
evidence.  
I provide the following questions as heuristic devices, to help readers better 
contextualize the JPT project within the map of epistemic relations provided earlier.  
1. Johnson and Porter 2000. 
a. How might we model speciation via post zygotic isolation with an 
evolutionary genetic model that represents some aspects of gene 
regulation?  
b. Is that model good? 
	 131 
c. How does that model compare to a similar model that represents 
epistasis, but not gene regulation? 
2. Porter and Johnson 2002. 
a. If we alter our model to capture gene flow between the two 
populations, how does that alteration affect the model’s account of 
speciation? 
3. Johnson and Porter 2007. 
a. If we alter our model to include more complex types of gene 
regulatory pathways for more than one phenotype, can the model also 
capture cases of developmental systems drift? 
b. If so, how does the evolution of two phenotypes, correlated by a 
common regulatory pathway, affect representations of speciation? 
4. Tulchinsky et al. 2014a. 
a. How might we revise the earlier model to empirically interpret the 
concept of binding strength? 
b. Is the revised model good? 
c. How does the revised model compare to the previous model? 
5. Tulchinsky et al. 2014b.  
a. “How might cis-by-trans divergence occur if adaptation in trans is 
constrained by pleiotropy?” (Tulchinsky et al. 2014, 1646). 
b. If we alter our revised model to include more complex types of gene 
regulatory pathways for more than one phenotype, how does the 
alteration affect representations of speciation?  
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The questions listed above for the JPT project are general possibility questions. 
The JPT team built a model to investigate evolutionary phenomena, and they studied it to 
determine the bounds of possible phenomena to which it could apply (Forber 2010).  
 
General Methods 
Throughout their project, the JPT team simulated evolution in populations of 
individual organisms. The team constructed four models. The code captured those 
models, and it enabled the team to rerun their simulations under many different starting 
conditions and parameters. Over the life of the project, the team ran thousands of 
simulations, changing the number of individuals in the populations, the number of alleles 
in the population or the number of genes in the GRN, the number of generations, of 
hybrids, the type of selection, and other aspects of their models (Table 5.1).  
The JPT team studied the speciation via hybrid incompatibility, so they 
constructed or procedure to simulate the evolution of two populations that shared a 
common ancestor population, and they studied hybrids. To study the evolution of 
populations, the team labeled a replicate or a run as the complete period of evolution in 
two populations over the same number of generations. For each run, the two populations 
started out as copies of each other.  
To study hybrid incompatibility, the JPT team constructed hybrids. To do so, they 
simulated interbreeding, without population mixing, between individuals of the two 
evolving populations within a run. Within a run, the JPT team generated F1 and F2 
hybrids at multiple stages. The team described the fitnesses and phenotypes for the 
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individual hybrids, and they calculated the mean fitness and mean phenotypic value for 
the F1 and F2 populations. Eventually, they compared those mean values to the mean 
values of the evolving parental values. Throughout the project, each time the team 
generated hybrids, they created 50 F1s and 50 F2s.  
Throughout the course of their project, the JPT team manipulated the parameter 
values of their model and initial simulation conditions. But they manipulated different 
values and conditions at different stages of the project. In (Johnson and Porter 2000), they 
manipulated the number of genes in a single regulatory pathway, the number of alleles 
for genes, the allelic mutation rate, the variability in the phenotypic values at the start of 
the simulation, the population size, and the number of runs. In (Porter and Johnson 2002), 
they manipulated the population size, the population structure or migration rate, the 
number of loci, the number of generations, the number of runs, and the percent change in 
optimal phenotype or speed of evolution. In (Johnson and Porter 2007), they manipulated 
the structure of gene regulations along with the number of loci, the pathways that faced 
different kinds of selection, the optimal phenotype, and the kind of selection studied: 
stabilizing, directional, and though it isn’t selection, neutral evolution.  
In (Tulchinsky et al. 2014a), the JPT team manipulated the kind of selection, the 
direction of selection, the phenotype values at the beginning of the simulations, 
population size, and the bioenergetics parameters of transcription factor binds to 
regulatory DNA, parameters that determines the relation between genotype and 
phenotype and fitness. In (Tulchinsky et al. 2014b), the team manipulated the kind of 












































































































































































mutation rates for all loci, mutation rates for cis regulatory regions, and the bioenergetic 




 The JPT team used at least four distinct models in each stage of their project. The 
first modeled gene regulation, the second modeled natural selection on quantitative 
phenotypes, the third modeled speciation due to hybrid incompatibilities, and the fourth 
modeled reproduction and generational turnover. I describe each below.  
 
Model of Gene Regulation 
 The JPT team developed a model of gene regulation, and then they tinkered with 
it over the span of their project. The model described the mechanical aspects of a system 
in which alleles yielded protein products, some of which bound to the regulatory regions 
of other genes. To better describe this model, I list the model’s system, parts, the 
activities of the parts, and the interactions between the parts. 
 
 System: The explicit general system is a developmental pathway. Implicitly, the 
pathway is within the cells of organisms. Furthermore, a pathway may traverse cells 
within an organism. An explicit specific system includes at least two alleles at different 
loci and the regulatory connection between the output of the first allele and the 
functioning of the second.  
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 Parts: The explicit parts of developmental pathways are alleles and proteins. Each 
allele itself has two parts, a cis regulatory promoter site, and a trans protein production 
site. There are two kinds of proteins, transcription factors (tfs) and generic, which may be 
tfs but needn’t be. As the organisms are diploid, there are two alleles at a given locus on a 
chromosome, and for any given individual, the alleles may occur in more than one locus 
throughout the genome. Implicitly, the system includes all of the parts required to 
transcribe and translate the DNA within the alleles, to construct and fold proteins from 
polypeptide chain, and to move tfs through cells. 
 
 Activities of parts: In the developmental pathway models of the JPT team, the 
parts with activities are the trans regions of alleles and the proteins. The trans region 
produces tfs or other proteins, and the proteins and tfs move within or between the cells 
of individual organisms.  
  
Interactions: In the developmental pathway models of the JPT team, the 
interactions are between the tfs from one allele and the cis regions of another allele, and 
between the cis and trans regions of single alleles. There are many more interactions 
implicit in the model, such as those required for protein production, folding, and 
transport, but the model abstracts away from them. For the first kind of interaction, a tf 
from one allele attaches to the cis region of another, such that the tf changes its property 
of moving about the cell and becomes affixed to the allele. For the second kind of 
interaction, the cis region, with an affixed tf, promotes the trans region of that same allele 
to produce the protein product of that trans region. The promotion depends on how well 
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the tf binds to the cis region, with stronger binds yielding increased promotions, and 
ultimately more protein produced from the trans region. For their early simulations, the 
JPT team employed a scheme to represent the binding strength between tfs and cis 
regions, discussed in Fig 5.1.  
 
    
 
Fig 5.1: Gene regulatory pathway. The figure represents two variants on an interaction 
between two alleles. The alleles are labeled B and C. In the first and topmost variant, the 
first allele produces a tf with a shape represented by the value 1.01. That tf binds to the 
cis region of the second allele, which has a shape represented by the value 0.98. The 
difference in values is 0.03, indicating a tight bond, and thus inducing the second allele to 
produce a lot of its own protein. In the second and bottommost variant, the same 
interaction occurs, but the tf of the first allele has a shape represented by the value 1.10, 
and the cis region of the second allele has a shape indicated by the value 0.85. The 
difference in values is 0.25, indicating a looser bond compared to the topmost variant, 
and also inducing the second allele to produce less protein than did the topmost variant 
(Reprinted with permission from (Johnson and Porter 2000, 29)).  
 
 
 Throughout the course of their project, the JPT team studied different specific 
regulator pathways that employed the basic structure described above. In (Johnson and 
Porter 2000), the team studied pathways that were connected linear links of 2, 3, 4 or 10 
alleles. They also studied pathways of 2, 3, 4, or 10 loci, such that each locus had two 
alleles, each susceptible to mutation and selection independently of its pair.  Such 
pathways more accurately captured the genetics of diploid organisms, and they enabled 
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the evolution of dominance relations between loci. In (Porter and Johnson 2002), the 
team used pathways of 2,3, or 4 four loci. In (Johnson and Porter 2007), the team studied 
branched pathways of three loci, such that the product from the first locus regulated the 
cis regions of two distinct loci. The team compared evolution on those branched 
pathways to the evolution of two discrete pathways, each of which had  two-loci.  
 By 2014, the team had revised its mechanistic model. The previous model had at 
least two major problems. The first was that the concept of binding strength, the central 
component of the model, referred to nothing in the pathways of actual organisms. The 
concept lacked an interpretation. The second problem was that the overall model enables 
evolution only in one direction with respect to the pathways. Such pathways could evolve 
only from tighter to looser connections between the tfs and the alleles they regulated. 
They could never evolve from looser to tighter connections. The first problem prevented 
laboratory and field biologists from applying the JPT team’s evolutionary model, which I 
discuss in the next section, to actual populations of organisms. Even if they could apply 
that model, the second problem severely limited the range of phenomena they could use it 
to study.  
 Tulchinsky joined the team as a doctoral student and aimed to create a 
mechanistic model of regulatory pathways that would overcome those problems 
(Tulchinsky 2013; Tulchinsky et al. 2014a). Tulchinsky helped the team develop what 
they called a lock and key model of interactions between tfs and DNA. The model 
captured bioenergetics processes that occur when tfs bind to DNA sequences.  
 The basic mechanism is as follows. Tfs, once produced, exist in the cell and bind 
to DNA sequences in at least two ways. In the first, the pressure within the cells pushes 
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them to unbound sections of DNA, where they attach at random. Once attached, they 
slide over the strand much as a boxcar over a track, but are also able to jump from 
segment to segment. In the second, tfs sliding over DNA track stick or bind at specific 
spots, and no longer slide. In those spots, strong hydrogen bonds form between the base 
sequence of the protein and the nucleotides of the DNA sequence.  
A tf sequence binds with different strengths to different sequences of DNA 
nucleotides, so the stronger a bind, the more likely the tf will stay at the site and perform 
a regulatory function. Researchers have developed methods to measure the free energy 
used to form bonds between tfs and DNA sequences. As a tf or a DNA sequence evolves 
over generations, the free energy used will increase or decrease on a continuous scale, 
enabling the evolution of stronger or weaker bonds, which enables the evolution of 
regulatory interactions between tfs and DNA.  
Tulchinsky and the rest of the JPT team saw the above mechanism as something 
that could help them overcome the problems with their earlier model. The above model, 
though most well developed for prokaryotes, had been empirically established and could 
provide an interpretation for their abstract notion of binding strength. Furthermore, it 
enabled the evolution of stronger and weaker binding, not just weaker.  
The team developed a heuristic model of a lock and key to represent binds 
between tfs and DNA sequences. A single tf molecule has a segment that has a sequence 
of 12 units or bits, and each bit can take the value of either 0 or 1. The same is true of cis 
regions. A tf maximally fits a cis region when all of the 0 bits of the tf align with all of 
the 1 bits of the cis region, when all of the 1 bits of the tf align with the 0 bits of the cis 
region, and when neither the tf nor the allele has bits that interpose between the bits in the 
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sequence of the otherwise exactly aligned molecules. A tf has the bit sequence encoded 
from its source allele.  
The team heuristically visualized the two states in bit value as differences in 
length on the teeth on a key and in a lock, with keys representing tfs and locks 
representing cis regions. Bits with the value of 1 had long teeth, and those with the value 
of 0 had short teeth, as in Fig. 5.2 (Tulchinsky et al. 2014a). Long teeth best fit with 
shorts teeth from the interacting molecule, and vice versa. Keys that fit very well with 
locks used more free energy, and thus bound to each other with greater strength, than did 
lock and key combos with poor fits. Each tooth represents the additive effects of the 
sequences to the total amount of free energy used. The team formalized the above 




Fig 5.2: Example of a lock and key interaction as a regulatory pathway. The figure 
represents how a transcription factor (tf) with multiple bits of information binds to a cis 
region that also has multiple bits of information. The light grey rectangle on the left 
represents the trans region of an allele, and the numbers within the rectangle represent 
the value of the bits of information transcribed to its tf products. The dark gray “key” 
represents the transcription factor, each tooth represents a bit, and the length of a tooth 
represents its value, with long teeth encoded as a 1 and short teeth encoded as a 0 in the 
trans region of its source allele. The key fits onto a “lock”, which is the cis region of the 
allele represented by the light gray rectangle-oid on the right side of the figure. The lock 
also has teeth, some that are long and some that are short. Keys fit best with locks when 
long teeth of one align with short teeth of the other. (Reprinted with permission from 




Given the language of parts, activities, and interactions, the new model differed 
from the old in several ways. First, for parts, the new model included alleles and proteins, 
but also specific nucleotides and tf bases. For activities, the new model implicitly 
assumed the range of behaviors performed by tfs as they travel from ribosomes to DNA 
sequences, and slide over DNA strands. For interactions, the new model explicitly 
focused on the use of free energy between tfs and DNA sequences as the tfs slid over the 
DNA or as they bound to specific sequences.  
 With that new model, the team focused on two kinds of genetic systems. The first 
system included two loci and one kind of tf. The first locus had two alleles, each of which 
produced its version of the tf. The second locus had two alleles, to which the tf bound, 
and which produced their own protein products (Tulchinsky et al. 2014a). The second 
system differed in that it included three loci, two of which were regulated by the tf 
produced by the first (Tulchinsky et al. 2014b)  
 
Evolutionary Genetic Model 
 The JPT team developed a model of genetic evolution with their first publication, 
and they tinkered with that model as they studied different kinds of genetic systems, 
population structures, and regulatory mechanisms.  
 The model published in 2000 included four equations, all of which represent 
distributions assumed to be normal. The first two represent generally binding strength 
between loci, and more specifically between the tfs of one locus and the regulatory 
region(s) of other loci. For cases with two loci and haploid organisms (Fig. 5.1),  
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(a) ! ", " + 1 = 	exp	{−[./01234	 " − /56 " + 1 ]8} 
 
where b represents binding strength or degree of match between the two loci, j is the 
locus that produces the tf, and product(j) is the allelic (shape) value of the tf produced by 
j. Similarly, j+1 is the regulated locus, and reg(j + 1) is the allelic value of the regulatory 
element. Both product(j) and reg(j + 1) are represented by decimal numbers, such that 
equal numbers represent perfect binding, and yield a maximum binding strength of 1.0. 
The better the fit, the more product is produced by (j + 1). Furthermore, those allelic 
values randomly mutated at a rate µ over generations of organisms. 
 For cases with polyploid organisms,  
 
(b) ! ", " + 1 = exp − [./01234 ", 3 − /56((" + 1, 3)]8<  
 
where the c represents the average of the shape values across the polyploid copies of the 
loci.  
 From those functions, the JPT team defined a phenotype as the amount of product 
produced by the final gene in a regulatory pathway, an amount compounded by 
interactions upstream in the pathway.  
 
(c) = = 	 !(", " + 1)>?@AB@  
 
such that P represents the phenotype value of the pathway, and the product operator 
multiples the binding strengths of all of the upstream interactions in the pathway.  
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 From that function, the team developed a fitness function for changing 
environments as  
 
(d) CD = 5E. − FG?FHIJK 8  
 
where Wi is an individual’s fitness, Pi is its phenotype, Popt is the optimal phenotype for 
the environment, and W is a scaling constant that enables comparisons across runs in 
which the team manipulated the effects of mutation and the rates of change to Popt.   
 The team used the same model in their 2002 report. But in addition to the random 
mutation rate µ, the team introduced allelic variation into populations of organisms via 
migration, represented as m, a decimal assigned to each organism that represented their 
probabilities of moving to the other population.  
 For their 2007 report, the team tweaked their model. They studied simulated 
pathways of three loci, in which the first loci regulated the latter two, which didn’t 
regulate each other. Representing (j + 1) now as k, the team defined the amount of 
product made by k as  
 
(e) expressionk = expressionj * bindingjk   
 
and they fixed expressionj at 1.0 and didn’t allow it to change in value. Given (e), the 
phenotypic value for each two-locus pathway became  
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(f) P = expressionk 
and given the branched pathways, the fitness function became  
 
(g) C(=) = 5E. − FG?FHIJ8K 8 . 
 
When the team changed their mechanical model to incorporate more bioenergetic 
properties, as first reported in 2014, they had to change their mathematical explication of 
the binding process. They replaced their abstract concept of binding strength with that of 
equilibrium fractional occupancy, q, or how well a tf bound to a DNA sequence.  
 
(h) L = MNOMNOPQ∆SNOT∆SU 
 
in which NTF is the number of tfs in a cell, DGTF is the free energy of binding between the 
tf and the site in question, DGb is the background free energy of binding between all other 
sites and any tfs. Furthermore, with m as the number of mismatched bits between a tf and 
its binding site, DG1 the free energy contribution of a single bit to an overall bind, and 
DGmatch as the free energy of a perfect bind, the team could represent the effect of 
mutations to alleles on q, such that DGTF = DGmatch - mDG1. They held the mutation rate at 
0.001 per locus. Furthermore, they defined a parameter, Ediff, which captured the 
difference between background free energy and a perfectly bound tf, such that             
Ediff = DGb - DGmatch. They used the above two definitions to recast (h) in terms of 
mismatches between tfs and their binding sites.  
	 145 
(i) L = MNOMNOPQTV∆SWTXYGZZ  
 
To account for dominance of one allele over another at a common locus, and 
other allelic interactions, the team scaled (i) so that they could use it to account for the 
number of tfs in a cell specific to a single allele.  
 
(j) L′ = MNOMNOP\QTV∆SWTXYGZZ 
 
The details of the scaling factor a aren’t essential here for redescription, other 
than to note that the factor captures, for a competing allele, the number of its tf 
molecules, the number of mismatches between one of those molecules and its regulatory 
site, and Ediff for those molecules. The JPT team calculated q ¢ for each of the four kinds 
of allelic interactions, and they assumed that any two competing alleles produced the 
same amount of tfs. The team built (j) from (h) and (i), and they used only (j) for their 
simulations.  
While the team still studied expression levels as the phenotypes of interest, they 
had to modify their mathematical treatment of those phenotypes. They defined the rate of 
expression, r, for an allele as the sum of its q ¢s multiplied by a constant k, such that         
r = k Sq ¢. The final phenotype for a locus was the sum of the output of each of its alleles.  
 
(k) P = Sr  
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The team focused on tfs that were activators, and they scaled the r’s so that a perfect 
match between a tf and its target site yield a phenotype of P = 1.0.  
 For a fitness function, the team used equation (g), replacing the symbol W with 
the symbol s2s to more standardly represent the variance of fitness around the optimal 
phenotypic value. For their second 2014 study, the team used equations (i), (j), and (k), 
and they altered their simulation assumptions.  
 Throughout their project, the JPT described their evolutionary models as sub 
collections of the above series of equations (a) through (k). We might instead say that 
equations (a), (b), (e), (h), (i), (j), and perhaps (c), (f), and (k) are instead mathematical 
explications or descriptions of the mechanical models described in the previous section.  
Researchers could, and do, use those equations to study gene regulation without studying 
the evolution of regulatory networks, so those equations aren’t necessarily evolutionary. 
On this line of classification, only equations (d) and (g), as well is the hybrid 
incompatibility model described in the simulation structure, represent the actual 
evolutionary components of JPT’s models.  
 I follow JPT, however, and describe all equations (a) through (k) as properly 
components of their evolutionary models. First, the fitness functions have no meaning 
without the phenotype functions, and the phenotype functions have no meaning without 
their foundational binding or bioenergetic models. For the whole evolutionary model to 
work, the equations travel as sets, though some of those equations have uses outside of 
evolutionary studies. Second, as the JPT team classifies sets of those equations as 
evolutionary models, they indicate the integrative, and not just complementary, flavor of 
their project.  
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Model of Speciation 
 The JPT team built their research around the Bateson-Dobzhansky-Muller (BDM) 
model of speciation (Coyne and Orr 2004, 269). I’ve already reviewed aspects of the 
model in earlier sections about the simulation structure. Here, I collect that information 
into a short description of the model.  
The model represents how speciation occurs between two populations, which 
begin as one, but later become distinct (Fig. 5.3). The organisms in the root population 
share a genetic structure. For whatever reason, the two populations become distinct, and 
as the populations respond to selection pressures, the genetic structure, once common to 
all organisms in the two population, evolves into two distinct structures, one common to 
each population.  The longer the two population evolve, the more their genetic structures 
become distinct.  
To assess the distinctness of the two populations, or how ‘speciated’ they are at a 
given time, researchers study hybrids.  For a given time, they a subset of organism from 
the two populations and interbreed them. They compare the fitnesses of the hybrids to 
those of the organisms in the distinct populations.  
If the hybrids have the same average fitness as do the organisms of the distinct 
populations, then researchers conclude that the two populations, while distinct, aren’t 
reproductively incompatible. If the two populations are considered distinct species due to 
their relative reproductive isolation, but if they cause of their isolation, say a glacier, were 
to disappear (melt), and if the two populations again intermixed, then we would reclassify 
them again as a common species.    
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If the hybrids are less fit than the organisms in the distinct populations, then their 
genetic structure forestalls them from, upon interbreeding, producing offspring likely to 
perpetuate the lineage. The less fit the hybrids, the more irrevocable the speciation.  
The JPT team used the BDM model with a novel twist. Previous researchers 
deployed the BDM model mostly to study genetic structures of two loci and multiple 
alleles for each locus. While many used the model to study genes hypothesized to interact 
with each other in the development of phenotypes, the model doesn’t require it. The JPT 
team used the model to study genetic structures with multiple loci and multiple alleles. 
Most importantly, while they also studied loci that interacted with each other, the team 
deployed explicit and mechanistic models of gene regulation for those interactions.   
Throughout the JPT project, a “run” or a “replicate” had the same meaning. A 
single run involved the simulated evolution of two populations that began with similar 
features, evolved separately for a set number of generations, and for specific time slices 
produced first and second generation hybrids solely as a means to compare the fitnesses 
of the hybrids to those of the organisms in the evolving populations.  
 
Model of Reproduction and Generational Turnover 
 The team never identified the above model as a model. But biologists often 
describe reproductions/generation representations as models, the team manipulated 
aspects of the representation (e.g. number of generations) just as they did aspects of the 
other models, and the representation fits the hallmarks of mechanistic models described 
earlier. As such, I describe the representation as a mechanical model with a system, parts, 
activities, and interactions.  
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 System: The model represents a system of at least two discrete populations, such 
that one population descends from the other via organismal reproduction, and that all of 
the organisms in the parental population die before those in next generation mature to 
adults.  
 
 Parts: The parts of the systems fall into two levels. For the first level, the parts are 
the populations and gene pools. In the second level, the parts are the items that make up 
the populations. For the second level, those parts are individual hermaphroditic 
organisms, their ova, and their sperm. Each organism has a developmental pathway, the 
end molecular product of which provided the phenotype studied.  
 
 Activities: Adult organisms contribute gametes to a gene pool. Each adult 
provides sperm and two ova. Parents die after contributing gametes to an offspring pool, 
and couldn’t contribute offspring to more than one generation. Some zygotes matured to 
be viable adults. If the number of zygotes exceeds the population cap, zygotes die at 
random. For adults, if the value of their phenotypes exceeds a number, selected anew and 
randomly every generation, they survive and contribute gametes to the gene pool; 
otherwise, they die (selection).  
 





5.4- Epistemic Aims 
 This section describes the results for my content analysis of the JPT teams’ 
published articles, for which I focused on the team’s epistemic aims. I discuss three kinds 
of results below: sentences collected via open coding; counts of relevant words/ 
sentences, based on the general procedure and operational definitions developed in the 
previous chapter; and overall conclusions.  
 
Open Coding 
Using open coding, I collected the following statements about epistemic goals 
from the team’s published papers. The quotes provide a (subjective) collection of 
sentences in which the JPT team explicitly mentions its epistemic goals. The quotes 
enable comparisons with the count data presented afterwards. I exclude analysis of 
(Johnson 2007) for lack of content.   
 
Review Articles:  
 
From (Johnson and Porter 2001), eleven passages:  
“Given the ubiquity of regulatory genetic pathways in developmental processes, we 
contend that study of the population genetics of these pathways should become a major 
research program” (45). 
 
“The synthesis of population genetics and development would form the basis of a 
micro-evolutionary theory of adaptation rooted in knowledge of how phenotypes are 
constructed from genotypes” (45).  
 
“The evodevo studies emphasize what happened deep in the history of life but not how 
these developmental systems continue to evolve. To accomplish the latter, we need to 
	 151 
incorporate the principles of population genetics into the study of regulatory pathways, 
and vice versa” (48).  
 
“Given this evolutionary lability, the breeders’ equation is too simple to predict long-
term evolutionary change…. Ultimately, these predictive models should be grounded 
in a mechanistic understanding of how G-matrix components evolve” (49).  
 
“Mechanisms are needed for representing how different DNA sequences might 
translate into phenotypic effects, through physiochemical rules that govern the binding 
among proteins and nucleic acids” (49). 
 
“While the ambitious goal of a predictive model of phenotypic evolution is well 
beyond our current capacity, important limited progress can be made using very simple 
developmental systems” (49).  
 
“Answering these questions, even in very simple developmental systems, will help us 
understand the developmental and physiological reasons why different traits vary 
together. This understanding, in turn, will give us the connection we need between 
evolutionary studies at the level of the gene (and genetic pathways) and the statistical 
language we use to study the complexity of evolutionary pressures on covarying traits 
in an ecological setting” (50).  
 
“For these reasons, we believe that the investigation of speciation is also a logical 
place to build a bridge between population genetic and evolution-of-development 
studies” (52). 
 
“…we are examining speciation as a possible consequence of micro-evolutionary 
forces operating on phenotypes determined by interactions of genes in a linear, 
regulated pathway (Johnson & Porter, 2000; A.H. Porter & N.A. Johnson, manuscript 
in review)” (52).  
 
“A centerpiece of this synthesis of population genetics and development will be a 
mechanistic theory of adaptation, one rooted in what we know about how phenotypes 
arise from genotypes. Such a theory would simultaneously consider quantitative effects 
of allelic change and population processes” (55). 
 
“On the empirical side, we believe a central goal of such a synthesis should be 
determining the extent of allelic variation existing in the parts of molecules that have 




Compared to the other papers, the 2001 passages indicate a greater focus on synthesis as 
a goal of a research program, and that the synthesis will help researchers study complex 
phenomena across different levels of biological organizations, from genes to populations.  
  
Research Reports:  
 
From (Johnson and Porter 2000), two passages: 
“We explored the proposition that these [gene regulatory] pathways can provide a 
plausible source of the epistatic variation that has been implicated in the evolution of 
postzygotic reproductive isolation” (527). 
 
“We propose that regulated genetic pathways are a biologically realistic way to provide 
the complex epistatic gene interaction seen in empirical studies of hybrid fitness 
reduction. Here we investigate the plausibility of this proposition” (528).  
 
 
The passages indicate that the team explicitly conceived of its project as of exploring 
plausible routes of speciation, and of the role of evolving gene regulatory pathways in 
those routes. The passages don’t indicate, from the table of epistemic goals provided in 
earlier chapters, specific aims for the paper.  
 
From (Porter and Johnson 2002), seven passages:  
“To study speciation, we use a new class of population genetic models that incorporate 
simple developmental genetic rules, likely present in all organisms, to construct the 
phenotype” (2103). 
 
“We believe the study of the evolutionary dynamics of regulated developmental 
pathways can provide important insights linking models of speciation with more 
general models of adaptation (Johnson and Porter 2001). Here we use these models to 
explore the extent to which speciation can occur despite gene flow” (2103).  
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“Here we show that, given selection favoring identical but new phenotypes in two 
populations, postzygotic isolation can evolve even in the face of substantial rates of 
gene exchange between populations. This process occurs in simple Dobzhansky-
Muller models with this type of selection, but more importantly, it also occurs in 
models of developmental genetic regulation, which have the fundamental epistatic 
properties of Dobzhansky-Muller models but capture more effectively the mechanisms 
of physiological gene action” (2104).  
 
“Developmental genetic models provide a plausible context for Dobzhansky-Muller 
incompatibilities to occur and bridge this gap to the microevolutionary models used by 
population and quantitative geneticists” (2104).  
 
“Our goal, however, was to study the effects of gene flow on speciation due to 
developmental genetic incompatibility alone” (2105).  
 
“We expect that developmental genetic models, with increasingly sophisticated 
mechanisms for translating genotype to phenotype and then to fitness, will continue to 
capture the fundamental dynamics of Dobzhansky-Muller speciation models (Johnson 
2002)” (2110). 
 
“Developmental genetic models will be useful for thinking about how physiologically 
based systems of interacting genes are affected by microevolutionary processes that 




The passages indicate that the team continued to take speciation as its primary kind of 
phenomenon, that evolution to gene regulatory pathways are important to that 
phenomenon, and that they studied the plausibility of those pathways to affect speciation. 
The passages indicate that the team aims at a dynamical description of speciation 
phenomena, but otherwise provides little information about other epistemic aims.  
 
From (Johnson and Porter 2007b), four passages:  
“Here, we use individual-based simulations to study the evolution of traits controlled 
by branched developmental pathways involving three loci, where one locus regulates 
two different traits” (57).  
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“Thus, a deeper understanding of the conditions under which such [molecular] 
interactions can diverge seems likely to be of great value in the study of speciation” 
(58). 
 
“Below, we will discuss how developmental system drift arises in branched pathways. 
We also find that many evolutionary properties (especially with respect to speciation) 
of these divergently branched pathways can be understood as extensions of what we 
have already learned from simple linear pathways” (59). 
  
“We use an individual-based simulation modeling approach to study the evolution of 
organisms with traits generated under these developmental rules [evolutionary genetic 
model]” (60).  
 
 
The passages indicate that while the team still uses a framework of speciation, when they 
study developmental systems drift, they pay more attention than they previously had to 
the evolution in gene regulatory networks structures themselves. Again, the passages 
indicate that the team takes its tools and results to be useful, but the passages aren’t 
explicit about the ends.  
 
From (Tulchinksy et al 2014a), six passages:  
“We explore the evolutionary conditions that promote and constrain hybrid 
incompatibility in regulatory networks using a bioenergetic model (combining 
thermodynamics and kinetics) of transcriptional regulation, considering the 
bioenergetic basis of molecular interactions between transcription factors (TFs) and 
their binding sites” (1155). 
 
“The present model is a mechanistically explicit case of the Bateson–Dobzhansky–
Muller model, connecting environmental selective pressure to hybrid incompatibility 
through the molecular mechanism of regulatory divergence. The bioenergetic 
parameters that determine expression represent measurable properties of transcriptional 
regulation, providing a predictive framework for empirical studies of how phenotypic 
evolution results in epistatic incompatibility at the molecular level in hybrids” (1155).  
 
“In this study, we investigate the effects of bioenergetic parameters on evolving 
genetic regulatory interactions and the evolutionary constraints imposed upon their by-
product, BDM incompatibilities” (1156).  
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“Our results overcome the limitations in the Johnson and Porter (2000, 2001, 2007) 
models and are well suited to empirical studies of the bioenergetic basis of gene 
expression…and bioinformatic data characterizing promoter sequences and TF binding 
…” (1156).  
 
“Thus, to understand at the molecular level how genetic incompatibility evolves 
between populations, we need a class of models that incorporate the relationship 
between genotype and phenotype in its bioenergetic context. To this end, we extended 
the gene-network speciation model of Johnson and Porter (2000, 2007) by 
incorporating an information-based statistical physics model of transcriptional 
regulation…” (1161).  
 
 
The passages indicate that while the team still ultimately targets the phenomena of 
speciation via hybrid incompatibility, they update their model of gene regulation to be 
more molecularly mechanistic. They indicate that understanding is partly tied to the 
mechanisms and partly to the predictive framework that results from using it.  
 
From (Tulchinky et al. 2014b), four passages. 
“We employed a mechanistically explicit bioenergetic model of gene expression 
wherein parameter combinations (number of transcription factor molecules, energetic 
properties of binding to the regulatory site, and genomic background size) determine 
the shape of the genotype–phenotype (G-P) map, and interacting allelic variants of 
mutable cis and trans sites determine the phenotype along that map” (1645).  
 
“The purpose of this study is to explore this apparent contradiction [cis regions as both 
a source and a constraint of evolution] from the perspective of the molecular basis of 
pleiotropic regulatory interactions, to determine the bioenergetic properties of these 
interactions that permit BDM incompatibilities to evolve despite evolutionary 
constraint” (1646). 
 
“In this study, we examine the conditions under which compensatory evolution 
between a TF and its binding site may facilitate cis-by-trans regulatory incompatibility 
despite pleiotropic constraint” (1646). 
 
“Here we examine the effect of the genotype-to-phenotype and phenotype-to-fitness 
functions on pleiotropically coregulated traits” (1647).  
 
	 156 
The passages indicate that the team connects its new model of bioenergetic gene 
regulation to their 2007 interests in developmental systems drift.  
 
Discussion  
 From the open coding, several general themes emerge. The general phenomenon 
studied is speciation between two evolving populations. The cluster of models used to 
study this phenomenon provide a way to plausibly understand that phenomena. Among 
the cluster of models, the mechanistic model of gene regulation has a special status.  
 While the open coding indicates that the team aimed to understand the general 
phenomenon, it rarely revealed what that understanding consisted in. “Understanding”, 
according to the team, has to be mechanistic in some sense. The team focuses on the aim 
of synthesis more in its opinion/review article, and hardly at all in its research articles. 
Otherwise, the open coding, and standard readings, doesn’t reveal the specific types and 
instances of aims pursued by the team. For that, I turn to content analysis.  
 
Counts 
Table 5.2 collects the raw data for the count analysis. Each row represents one 
publication by the JPT team, and each column represents one of the nine concepts 
studied. The numbers in the cells represent, for the given article, the number of its 
word’s—and by proxy the number of sentences—that relate to the relevant concept.1  
 
																																																								
1 Counts for Cause don’t function as proxies for sentences, and their interpretation raises difficulties as 




RAW COUNT DATA 
 
Paper Goal Know Amalgam Control Describe Discover Explain Prediction Cause 
Research 
Reports 
         
2000 36 9 10 11 30 15 10 30 236 
2002 18 3 2 6 24 6 6 14 205 
2007b 22 17 0 16 45 12 13 35 201 
2014a 47 18 5 13 43 22 12 17 251 
2014b 30 5 0 19 25 23 7 12 267 
Review  
Papers 
         
2001 55 25 29 9 33 10 40 30 245 
2007a 18 7 13 4 7 11 9 6 54 
 
  
The data above are noisy for the reasons discussed in Chapter 4. Per the methods 
discussed in Chapter 4, I removed noisy false positives from Table 5.2 to yield 
informative data collected in Table 5.3.2  
 
TABLE 5.3 
INFORMATIVE COUNT DATA 
 
Paper Goal Know Amalgam Control Describe Discover Explain Prediction Cause 
Research 
Reports 
         
2000 10 5 0 0 21 0 9 30 236 
2002 5 3 1 1 13 0 4 14 205 
2007b 5 16 0 0 25 5 10 35 211 
2014a 7 3 3 0 30 1 7 16 261 
2014b 10 2 0 2 14 0 6 12 278 
Review  
Papers 
         
2001 26 20 29 0 22 1 27 29 245 
2007a 3 4 9 0 1 0 0 2 53 																																																								




Table 5.3 provides an exploratory snapshot, not a final story, about the kinds of 
epistemic goals pursued by the JPT team. The most we can use counts for is to indicate 
the relative importance of different kinds of goals within a given paper. We cannot use 
them, without translating them into percentages of words or sentences per paper, to study 








Goal 1 Goal 2 Goal 3 Goal 4 
2000 Prediction Describe Explain  
2002 Prediction Describe Explain Amalgam/Control 
2007b Prediction Describe Explain Discover 
2014a Describe Prediction Explain Amalgam 
2014b Describe Prediction Explain Control 
Other Papers     
2001 Tie: Amalgam/Prediction Explain Describe 




Given Tables 5.3 and 5.4, I make some general notes. First, in the research papers, 
the goals of predicting, describing, and explaining phenomena were the primary kinds of 
goals pursued. Second, the goals of predicting and describing phenomena dominated the 
goal of explaining phenomena. Finally, the team only explicitly indicated its interest in 
some kind of synthesis in their non-research reports.  
 																																																								
3 That task is another that must wait for future research. Its results wouldn’t be directly relevant to my 
project here.  
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Discussion 
 The content analysis results above complement the open coding results from 
earlier. The above results indicate that the JPT team pursued several consistent types of 
epistemic aims. Foremost among those types were the goals of predicting and describing 
phenomena. Less important, but still relevant, was the goal of explaining phenomena. 
Confirming the results of the open coding, the JPT team discussed aims of synthesis 
primarily in opinion/ review papers, and sparingly elsewhere.  
 Further work should be done to tie each of the models studied to the specific types 
of epistemic goals above. As of yet, I can’t do so empirically, and so my analysis has the 
character of philosophical interpretation/analysis. That work oversteps the descriptive 
aims of this chapter, and I leave it to Chapter 7.   
 
 
5.5- Primary Conclusions of the Project 
 The project as a whole had one primary result, but the stages of the project, 
represented by the distinct publications, each had a set of primary results. I review those 
results below. There are myriad results not reviewed here. The results below are often 
indicated in the research reports as the most important, and they most directly answer the 
questions heuristically posed in section 2.  
For the project as a whole, the primary result was that it was possible, with 
increasing mechanistic detail of gene interactions, to model microevolutionary 
phenomena that led to speciation, a macroevolutionary event.  
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Johnson and Porter 2000 
 To evaluate their evolutionary genetic model, the JPT team simulated the 
evolution of populations in BDM speciation scenarios. They simulated thousands of such 
scenarios. They compared their results to two kinds of information.  
First, they calculated from theory (including the model equations) and for 
different sets of starting assumptions, the percentage of runs that would result in 
speciation. Then they compared the percentages from their simulated runs to the 
percentages of predicted runs. Insofar as the simulated percentages matched the predicted 
percentages, they were in some sense good. (confirmed? plausible?) 
Second, the team simulated the evolution of populations via a more traditional 
multiplicative model. In that model, the team calculated phenotypic values by 
multiplying the allelic values together, without any consideration for regulation between 
the alleles. They compared the percentages of runs that resulted in speciation across the 
traditional model and their model. Insofar as the percentages differed, the results 
indicated in which empirical situations to apply the traditional and JPT models.  
 
There were four primary conclusions 
1. Within an evolutionary genetic model, the team could represent gene regulation 
via the variable ! for binding strength, which they calculated for individuals via 
equations (a) or (b), which they interpreted mechanistically via the structure 
depicted in Fig. 5.1, and which partly determined the phenotype and fitness of an 
individual. Importantly, phenotypes were properties of genetic systems, not of 
adult anatomy, morphology, behavior, physiology, or life history.  
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2. For the simulations, the JPT model yielded runs that speciated in the percentages 
predicted by theory, especially for runs with few (~2,000) generations.  
3. For the simulations, the traditional model never yielded runs of few generations 
(~2,000) in which the populations speciated. 
4. For BDM scenarios of speciation with few generations, traditional models can’t 
capture those scenarios, while the JPT model could predict their likelihood, 
describe them, and causally explain them.  
 
Porter and Johnson 2002  
 The JPT team modified their model to include a parameter for the rate of 
migration between the two populations evolving in a BDM scenario. To evaluate that 
model, they simulated hundreds of such scenarios under different initial conditions, 
calculated the hybrid fitnesses of the two populations at the end of each run, and averaged 
the results across runs with similar starting conditions. They compared the results yielded 
by simulations on their evolutionary genetic model to the results yielded by simulations 
on a traditional model.4 The comparisons indicate which model applies to different kinds 





4 The team had shown in their previous study that the speciation rates between their evolutionary model and 
traditional models differed widely. To ensure that they could meaningfully compare the the models when 
they studied migration, they tweaked the values of parameters in the traditional model. Given those tweaks, 
the traditional model, without migration, yielded similar speciation rates to the evolutionary genetic model.  
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There were four primary conclusions.  
1. For the traditional model, speciation occurs generally at the same rate regardless 
of population size, but it also decreases the higher the proportion of migrants 
across the two populations. While small populations with high migrant 
proportions couldn’t speciate, larger populations with the same proportions could.  
2. For their regulatory model in which one locus regulated another, the same 
proportion of migrants lessened the chance of speciation in small population 
compared to large, and the higher the proportion, the less chance of extinction for 
those small populations. As the migration rate increased and population size 
increased, the chance of speciation decreased. Similarly, as the strength of 
selection decreased while the migration rate increased, the chance of speciation 
decreased.  
3. For multi-locus runs, regardless of migration rate, populations with organisms that 
had four loci regulatory pathways were less likely to speciate than similar 
populations with three loci pathways, and those populations were less likely to 
speciate than were populations with two loci pathways. Regardless, speciation 
still occurred at significant minority of runs for all populations.  
4. Researchers should prefer the JPT evolutionary model to the traditional model 
when they observe speciation despite even small rates of gene flow between 
populations, or when they study speciation in populations due to selection in 
known gene-regulatory structures or pathways that yield quantitative, not 
qualitative, variation in phenotypes.  
 
	 163 
Johnson and Porter 2007  
 The JPT team modified their 2000 model to study gene regulatory pathways other 
than the linear one studied previously. They studied pathways in which the transcription 
fact from one locus regulated two otherwise distinct loci. To evaluate how well their 
model captured speciation due to evolution to those pathways, they simulated evolution 
in two diverging populations thousands of times. They calculated hybrid fitnesses and 
averaged them over runs with similar initial conditions.  
 The team compared their simulated results about hybrid fitness (speciation) 
between populations with branched regulatory pathways to: 
1. Predictions from theory detailed in the 2000 paper and analytically applied to 
branched pathways.  
2. Simulated results from similar populations with branched pathways, but that 
experienced different kinds of selection. 
3. Simulated results from populations with four loci, in two distinct (unbranched) 
pathways.  
 
There were four primary conclusions.  
1. For two BDM populations with two independent gene regulatory pathways, and 
as predicted by theory, the populations didn’t speciate when both pathways 
received stabilizing selection, they speciated in half of the runs when one pathway 
received directional selection and the other received stabilizing selection, and they 
speciated in 75% of the runs in which both pathways received directional 
selection.  
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2. For two BDM populations with branched regulatory pathways of three loci, and 
as predicted by theory, the populations didn’t speciate when both branches 
received stabilizing selection, they speciated in half of the runs when one branch 
received directional selection and the other received either stabilizing selection or 
strong stabilizing selection.  
3. Contrary to predictions from theory, the populations speciated in 55.4% of the 
runs in which both branches received directional selection, a result that was 
statistically significant within a 95% confidence interval.  
4. In runs on populations that had branched gene regulatory pathways, 
developmental systems drift (DSD) resulted when one branch received directional 
selection and the other received either stabilizing or strong stabilizing selection.5 
DSD didn’t evolve in runs for which both branches received stabilizing selection. 
For runs in which both branches received directional selection, DSD didn’t result, 
but if researchers analyzed the data without knowing the genetic architecture of 
the organisms in the first generations of a run, as they often don’t in field studies, 
they might conclude that DSD had occurred.  
 
Tulchinsky et al. 2014a  
The JPT modified their 2000 model to provide a more empirically tractable 
mechanism of gene regulation, and they updated their evolutionary genetic equations to 
reflect that mechanism. To evaluate how well their new model captured speciation, they 
																																																								
5 Despite its name, developmental systems drift has little to do with drift in the sense of evolution by 
accumulated random genetic mutations. Rather, it describes the phenomenon in which a phenotype’s 
underlying genetic architecture can evolve while the phenotypes itself remains fairly constant.  
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simulated evolution in two locus runs hundreds of time for thousands of generations. 
They compared their simulated results from one set of initial conditions to the simulated 
results of many other simulated conditions. They also compared their results to their 2000 
results.6  
 
There were six primary conclusions.  
1. In an evolving population with two locus pathways, as the number of mismatches 
in bits between the cis-regulatory region and the transcription factor increased, the 
amount of final protein produced (phenotype) decreased, as did average fitness. 
For different values of the bioenergetic parameters across simulations, lineages 
with higher NTF or EDiff or lower ∆G1 values yielded organisms that produced 
higher values of the phenotype, despite as many as eight mismatches, compared to 
lineages with lower NTF or EDiff or higher ∆G1 values.  
2. Regardless of bioenergetic parameter values, stabilizing selection led to hybrid 
incompatibility (and speciation) most when populations and the effects of 
mutations were small rather than large. In large populations, stabilizing selection 
eliminated small and most large mutations from the population, while in small 
populations stabilizing selection eliminated mostly large mutations.  
3. For directional selection, the optimal phenotype in both populations evolving in 
parallel changed from high to intermediate expression, and thus from fits of tf to 
cis region with no mismatches to fits with some mismatches; or from intermediate 
																																																								
6 While in previous parts of the project the JPT team studied hybrid incompatibility and speciation in F1 
hybrids, starting with their 2014a study, they focused on F2 hybrids. Due to the altered mechanism and 
models, the F2 hybrids more clearly revealed hybrid incompatibility than did F1 hybrids.   
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to high expression, and thus from fits with some mismatches to fits with none. 
Hybrid incompatibility (speciation) resulted more often with populations evolved 
from high to intermediate expression than from intermediate to high expression.  
4. Regardless of the direction of selection, directional selected speciated the 
populations quicker and more severely than did stabilizing selection. The more 
substitutions to the DNA sequence between the derived and ancestral populations, 
the more extreme the change in fitness and the stronger the incompatibility of 
hybrids.  
5. By definition, one allele for the tf dominated the other when the first produced 
more tfs than did the second one. For directional selection simulations, as allelic 
dominance decreased and misregulation increased, F1 hybrids exhibited hybrid 
incompatibility at the same rates as did F2 hybrids. For stabilizing selection, 
decreases in dominance also decreased hybrid incompatibility in F1 and F2 
hybrids. In all other cases, F2 hybrids had more hybrid incompatibility than did F1 
hybrids.  
6. Researchers should prefer their new model to their previous models not only 
because it was more empirically tractable, but also because it enabled researchers 
to study directional selection in more than one direction, whereas their previous 
enabled such studies for only one direction, from stronger to looser binding.  
 
Tulchinksy et al. 2014b  
 The JPT team deployed their 2014a model to study the branched pathways they 
had studied in 2007. To evaluate how well their model captured the evolution of such 
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pathways, the simulated thousands of generations for hundreds of runs across many 
manipulations to the the values of the parameters in their evolutionary genetic model. 
They compared their simulated results for populations with 3-loci branched pathways to 
their simulated results for populations with two discrete 2-loci pathways, as a control. 
They also compared their simulated results for directional selection on traits to their 
simulated results for stabilizing selection on traits. They also compared their results to the 
simulated results from their previous 2014a study on 2-loci pathways.  
 
There were five primary conclusions.  
1. For simulations on populations in which organisms had two discrete 2-loci 
pathways, regardless of stabilizing or directional selection, the model yielded 
hybrid incompatibility (F2 misregulation) in the same patterns as predicted by 
their 2014a results. Thus, the two discrete pathways (4-loci) genetic structure 
provided a good control for the other simulations.  
2. For populations with 3-loci in branched pathways, in which the phenotype from 
one branch received directional selection and the phenotype from the other 
received stabilizing selection: 
a. directional selection on the phenotype of one branch resulted in less 
hybrid misregulation than directional selection on one phenotype in 4-loci 
structures, across all population size and bioenergetic parameters.  
b. across population sizes, the branch that received directional selection 
resulted in more hybrid misregulation in smaller, rather than larger 
populations. For different bioenergetic parameter values, the larger the 
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population, the more likely selection would eliminate organisms with 
unstable phenotypes likely to arise due to bioenergetic parameters that 
quickly led to misregulation.  
c. across population sizes and bioenergetic parameter values, the branch that 
received stabilizing selection resulted in hybrid misregulation roughly in 
the same patterns as the branch that received directional selection.  
d. but the branch that received directional selection resulted in more overall 
hybrid misregulation compared to the branch that received stabilizing 
selection, except in larger populations for bioenergetic parameters that 
lead to misregulation quicker. In those cases, hybrid incompatibilities 
were roughly the same across both branches, trending towards zero. In 
large populations, compared to smaller, selection eliminated organisms 
with mutations that quickly led to unfit misregulations. 
3. Compared to 4-loci cases, in three loci cases, the branch that received directional 
selection led to less hybrid misregulation, with the difference increasing as the 
bioenergetic parameter values tended towards unstable mutations. The branch that 
received stabilizing selection resulted in more hybrid misregulation than did 
branches that received stabilizing selection in 4-loci cases.  
4. If the researchers manipulated the mutation rate, smaller rates at all loci of, or just 
the cis region of, the directionally selected trait led to more hybrid misregulation 
than did higher rates. Similar manipulations on 4-loci cases or in cases of 
stabilizing selection yielded little variation is hybrid misregulation. 
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5. In populations with branched (pleiotropic) gene regulatory pathways, there is a 
“sweet spot” of conditions most likely to evolve hybrid incompatibilities. Those 
conditions are: smallish populations; weak but directional selection; moderate to 
high amounts of transcription factors (tfs) in the cell (dominance); moderately 
strong binds between tfs and cis regions; relatively long bit-lengths for binding 
motifs between tfs and cis regions; bioenergetic parameter values that yield 






CASE 2: WRAY, GARFIELD, RUNCIE, AND WILD-LABORATORY 
POPULATIONS 
 
6.1- Research Team 
Time period and location of research team  
The research team coalesced in the late 2000s, published its first paper in 2009, 
and its most recent papers in 2013. The team no longer persists, as most of its members 
have scattered across the world to pursue other projects in other laboratories.  The team 
started and existed in Gregory Wray’s laboratory in the department of biology at Duke 
University in Durham, North Carolina.  
Wray’s lab was, and continues to be, a midsized lab with Wray as a PI, a lab 
manager, several postdocs, and several grad students. The team studied here comprised 
one subset of the overall lab for the period studied. As the lab pursued several projects, 
members worked on different projects, with many members spanning several projects. 
But not all lab members worked on all the lab’s projects.  
The team and project studied here is one of many one could study from Wray’s 
lab. This project built on work completed in Wray’s lab in the early 2000s (Ramano and 
Wray 2003; Wray et al. 2003; Balhoff and Wray 2005). It also prompted additional but 
later projects in Wray’s lab (Wygoda et al. 2014; Israel et al. 2016). One could study a 
larger time period and set of team members from Wray’s lab. Here, I focus only on the 
team that studied sea urchins and published papers between 2009 and 2013. Compared to 
Wray’s other teams, only the one studied here published experiment articles and review 
	 171 
articles, studied both sea urchin development and explicitly studied sea urchin evolution 
within evolutionary genetic contexts, and featured a core team, the members of which 
little overlapped with sea urchin teams from earlier or from later in Wray’s lab.  
 
Members of the team  
Member 1: Gregory Allan Wray 
 Wray is the principle investigator of his lab, the founding member of the team. He 
received his PhD in biology, supervised by David R. McClay, from Duke University in 
1987 (Wray 1987). At the time when the team formed, Wray was a professor of biology 
at Duke, a position he maintained throughout the project. He was a member of the project 
throughout its existence. He (co)authored all six of the articles listed below.  
 
Member 2: David Aaron Garfield 
 Garfield joined Wray’s lab as a graduate student around 2008 after having been at 
Duke for a couple of years. He received his PhD, supervised by Wray, in biology from 
Duke in 2011 (Garfield 2011). Afterwards, he became a postdoctoral researcher at the 
European Molecular Biology Laboratory in Heidelberg, Germany, but he continued to 
publish papers with the team through 2013. In 2016, he became an assistant professor at 
the University of Berlin in Berlin, Germany. Born in 1980, Garfield was 28-years old 
when he joined the team. A member of the team throughout, he coauthored five of the six 
articles listed below. Two were short reviews, and three were research reports in which 
he was lead or second author.  
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Member 3: Daniel Erskine Runcie 
 Runcie joined Wray’s lab as a graduate student after Garfield, also after having 
been at Duke for a couple of years. He received his PhD, supervised by Wray, in biology 
from Duke in 2012 (Runcie 2012). Afterwards, he became a postdoctoral researcher at 
the University of California, Davis, in in Davis, California, but he continued to publish 
papers with the team through 2013. In 2015, he became an assistant professor at UC 
Davis. Born in 1983, Runcie was 24-years-old when he joined Wray’s lab. He coauthored 
two of the six articles described below, one as lead author and another as a second author 
on research reports.  
 
Member 4: Ralph McMillan Haygood 
 Haygood joined Wray’s lab in 2005 as a postdoctoral researcher. He received his 
PhD, supervised by Michael Turelli, in population biology in 2002 from the University of 
California Davis in 2002 (Haygood 2002). His postdoctoral position ended in 2009, after 
which he became an entrepreneur, but he continued to publish articles with the team 
through 2013. He coauthored all three of the research reports listed below, helping to 
design the experiments and analyze the data. While in Wray’s lab, Haygood primarily 
focused on other projects related to primate evolution and not this one.  
  
Member 5: Courtney Christine Babbitt 
 Babbitt joined Wray’s lab in 2006 as a postdoctoral researcher. She received her 
PhD, supervised by Nipam Patel, in biology from the University of Chicago in Chicago, 
Illinois, in 2005 (Babbitt 2005). Her postdoctoral position ended in 2013, after which she 
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became an assistant professor at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst, 
Massachusetts. She coauthored two of research reports listed below, helping to analyze 
data. While in Wray’s lab, Babbitt primarily focused on projects related to primate 
evolution.  
 
Member 6: William J. Nielson  
 Nielson was the lab manager in Wray’s lab. He co-authored two of the three 
research reports listed below, for which he helped with experimental procedures.  
 
Member 7: Jennifer Wygoda Israel 
 Israel joined Wray’s lab in 2011 as a graduate student. She received her PhD, 
supervised by Wray and David McClay, in biology from Duke in 2015 (Israel 2015). 
Afterwards, she became a postdoctoral researcher at the University of North Carolina in 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina. She coauthored one of the research papers listed below. 
After Garfield and Runcie left the lab, Israel’s research built on their work with sea 
urchins, but she focused on different species.  
 
Member 8: Sayan Mukherjee 
 Mukherjee was a professor in the department of statistics at Duke University, and 
he joined Wray’s team to help with analyses in (Runcie et al. 2012). He received his PhD, 
supervised by Tomaso Poggio, from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts in 2001. Hired at Duke as an assistant professor in 2004, he 
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6.2- Research Project 
Name of Project 
 For this dissertation, I name the project the WGR Project, after the last initial for 
the three primary researchers. I also label the team as the WGR Team.  
 
Outputs of the Project  
 There are eight items that I take as the primary published outputs of the team. 




1. “Comparative embryology without a microscope: using genomic approaches to 
understand the evolution of development,” by Garfield and Wray (Garfield and 
Wray 2009).  
																																																						
1 There is one further paper which looks as if it should be included in my analysis, but which I exclude. It is 
(Oliver et al. 2010), for which Garfield is second author and Wray and Haygood contributed. While the 
research is about sea urchin genetics and evolution, the study had differed enough from the others that it 
seemed not to fit. No one from Wray’s lab is a corresponding author, the research is much more explicitly 
comparative to another species of sea urchins, and it focuses much less on gene regulatory networks and 
contexts than do the other studied. That said, it does anticipate several of the questions, phenomena, and 
methods pursued in later studies. I suspect that if I had included the study in the case, my analyses from it 
would have aligned with those from the other studies.  
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2. “The Evolution of Gene Regulatory Interactions,” by Garfield and Wray (Garfield 
and Wray 2010).  
3. “Genomics and the Evolution of Phenotypic Traits,” by (Wray 2013).  
 
Research Reports 
4. “Population genetics of cis-regulatory sequences that operate during embryonic 
development in the sea urchin Strongylocentrotus purpuratus,” by Garfield, 
Haygood, Nielsen, and Wray (Garfield et al. 2012).  
5. “Genetics of gene expression responses to temperature stress in a sea urchin gene 
network,” by Runcie, Garfield, Babbitt, Wygoda, Mukherjee, and Wray (Runcie 
et al. 2012).  
6. “The Impact of Gene Expression Variation on the Robustness and Evolvability of 
a Developmental Gene Regulatory Network,” by Garfield, Runcie, Babbitt, 
Haygood, Nielsen, and Wray (Garfield et al. 2013). 
 
Dissertations 
7. “Selection and Constraint: Population Genetic Approaches to Understanding the 
Evolution of Sea Urchin Development,” by Garfield (Garfield 2011).  
8. “Genetic and Environmental Constraints on Developmental Systems: Towards 
Predicting Genetic Responses to Climate Change in Sea Urchins,” by Runcie 
(Runcie 2012).  
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As there is much overlap between the published articles and the dissertations, I omit 
analysis of the dissertations to ease the overall analysis. For this case report, I focus on 
the first six publications listed above.  
 
Type of Population Studied 
Research teams in biology typically study one of three kinds of populations: 
simulated, laboratory, or wild (Winther et al. 2015). For its project, the WGR team 
studied a population of organisms that I count both as laboratory and as wild. The team 
studied animals collected from the wild, and they bred the animals in the laboratory for 
the purposes of their study.2  
The team studied mostly purple sea urchins Strongylocentrotus purpuratus, which 
live and were collected from off the coast of California. Among other features discussed 
above and below, the different research reports are part of a shared project partly due to 
their focus on a common species.   
 
Research Rationale  
 Given the model of research rationales described in earlier chapter, I here briefly 
describe several aspects of the WGR Project, including primary phenomena of study, 
																																																						
2 For a longer project with more cases, I’d class the WGR Project as one that focused primarily on 
laboratory populations, and not on wild populations. But for the purposes of this dissertation, the WGR 
Project can stand for both laboratory and wild populations, given the constraints on their study that required 
laboratory manipulation, and on the scope of their inferences, which are to the wild population. This dual 
classification is possible due to sea urchins being both abundant in the wild and a model organism for lab 
studies.  
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research problems, research questions, and methods. In later sections, I detail the 
project’s scientific products and epistemic aims.  
 
Primary Phenomena of Study 
 The WGR team primarily studied two related phenomena. The first was variation 
in the DNA structure of regulatory regions of genes (Garfield et al. 2012). Traditionally, 
evolutionary geneticists aim to describe the kinds and amounts of genetic variation within 
populations of conspecific organisms, a phenomenon often called the genetic structure of 
a population (Roughgarden 1996; Gillespie 2004). For them, “genetic variation” means 
differences between organisms in the structure of their genes, either in the kinds of alleles 
at (homologous) chromosomal loci or in the DNA sequences that compose the alleles. So 
evolutionary geneticists often aim to describe what percentage of the organisms in a 
population have a given allele or set of alleles, or they describe how much the DNA 
structure of specific alleles varies across organisms. They often assume that their 
descriptions, while focused within species, are relevant to variation between species.  
The second phenomena the team studied was gene expression, or the amount of 
RNA molecules produced from segments of DNA. The team measured and analyzed 
gene expression amounts in purple sea urchins, and they studied how the amounts of 
expression varied across individuals, across developmental stages, in isolated gene 
regulatory pathways, and across different kinds of environments.  
This second phenomenon differs from the kind of phenomena often studied by 
evolutionary geneticists. The team was motivated by the hypothesis that much of 
phenotypic variation, on which natural selection acts, results not from variation to genetic 
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structure traditionally conceived, but on variation to the amounts of RNA produced from 
the genes in different developmental stages, developmental pathways, and environmental 
contexts. Focusing on expression levels, rather than merely on gene structure, enabled the 
team to study how genes regulate each other, and not just the genes themselves.  
 
Research Problems 
 For research problems, the team often cited deficiencies in understanding as 
justifications for its research. For instance, 
 
“…we know a lot more about how individual genes and proteins evolve than we do 
about how the interactions between genes evolve, and even less about the effects of 
changes in regulatory interactions on organismal fitness” (Garfield and Wray 2010, 
16).  
“…we understand relatively little about the evolutionary forces that shape the cis-
regulatory elements underlying developmental gene expression” (Garfield et al. 2012, 
152).  
“An outstanding challenge for both systems biology and evolutionary biology is 
understanding the molecular mechanisms that allow development to buffer phenotypes 
while retaining flexibility” (Garfield et al. 2013, 1).   
“The extent to which variation in molecular processes such as transcription, splicing, 
translation, and phosphorylation during early development affects later processes and, 
eventually, organismal phenotypes remains poorly understood” (Garfield et al. 2013, 
1).   
“It remains unclear, however, whether…” [or not segregating alleles that influence 
morphology] “…are common within natural populations and how they are able to 
influence morphology despite buffering during development” (Garfield et al. 2013, 1).   
“We can't fully understand an evolutionary process until we observe it in nature. The 
casebook is now much larger, but other prominent gaps in our understanding of 
evolutionary processes in nature remain” (Wray 2013, 56). 
“One of the major challenges facing evolutionary genetics is understanding the degree 
to which interactions between genes and between gene and environment influence trait 
variation, divergence, adaptation, and speciation…” (Wray 2013, 64). 
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“The extent of epistasis, or nonadditive interactions among genes, is not well 
understood, particularly in natural populations” (Wray 2013, 64). 
  
 
Those problems are intellectual problems, ones in which knowledge is valued but 
currently lacking or non-existent. The team also highlights some practical difficulties that 
hinder research.  
 
“Traditional approaches to evolutionary genetics are often difficult to apply to natural 
populations…” (Wray 2013, 55).  
 
“Unfortunately, finding the causal gene, much less the causal mutation, is generally 
much harder than identifying a QTL for several reasons…” (Wray 2013, 58). 
 
 
For one study, the team motivated their research to a larger problem related to ecology 
and climate change. They noted that the purple sea urchin is a keystone species in the 
Pacific shoreline region off the coast of North America, and that climate change is likely 
to raise that ocean’s temperature several degrees in the next few decades.  
 
“While such an increase is unlikely to prevent development of embryos from all but 
perhaps the most southern populations, it will expose more populations to conditions 
that cause abnormal development…and create stressful conditions that affect dispersal 
and reproductive success” (Runcie et al. 2012, 4548). 
 
One implication is, given their role as a keystone species, climate change could affect 
both the population of sea urchins and the overall ecosystem in which they live. If people 
could predict the effect of higher temperatures on developing sea urchins, they could also 





 The WGR team posed research questions, which differed in function across the 
two kinds of articles. In their review articles, they posed questions that could help orient 
and define a field in which researchers integrated tools from regulatory genetics with 
those from evolutionary genetics to study gene expression.3 In their research articles, they 
posed questions that directed, or at least provided a success condition for, the research 
they conducted and reported.  
 Review Articles: 
1. Garfield and Wray 2009 
a. “How does the genome-wide distribution of selection across 
development change when closely related species occupy very 
different habitats or differ markedly in their life history?” (Garfield 
and Wray 2009, 3). 
b. “Sampling a wider range of species comparisons may solve one of the 
oldest conundrums in evolutionary developmental biology: why 
development is so often conserved across vast phylogenetic gulfs and 
yet sometimes spectacularly diverged among closely related species.” 
(Garfield and Wray 2009, 4). 
2. Garfield and Wray 2010 
a. “How common is gene expression variation within and between 
species?” (Garfield and Wray 2010, 17). 
																																																						
3 These questions might be described as the higher-level questions in Philip Kitcher’s account of 
significance graphs (Kitcher 2001) or in Alan Love’s account of problem agendas (Love 2008).  
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i. “How often do gene expression profiles differ between related 
species?”  (Garfield and Wray 2010, 17). 
ii. “How often are expression differences due to genetic versus 
nongenetic (i.e., environ- mental) factors?” (Garfield and Wray 
2010, 17). 
iii. “Do the expression patterns of other genes change at the same 
time as the gene of interest?” (Garfield and Wray 2010, 17). 
iv. “Is there variation between individuals within a species?” 
(Garfield and Wray 2010, 17). 
v. “How often do changes in gene expression evolve in general?” 
(Garfield and Wray 2010, 17). 
vi. “Does this differ among different kinds of genes?” (Garfield 
and Wray 2010, 17). 
b. “What types of genetic changes underlie changes in gene expression?” 
(Garfield and Wray 2010, 17). 
c. “How does natural selection work to shape gene interactions?” 
(Garfield and Wray 2010, 17). 
d. “What kinds of changes in gene interactions produce trait 
differences?” (Garfield and Wray 2010, 17). 
3. Wray 2013. 
a. “[W]hy specific mutations in particular genes are involved” [in trait 
variation]” (Wray 2013, 52). 
b. “[H]ow these mutations affect phenotype” (Wray 2013, 52). 
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c. “[H]ow they [mutations] become established in natural populations” 
(Wray 2013, 52). 
d. “Further, important parameters are sometimes the very items we most 
need to measure. Should a model of adaptation allow for new 
mutations or should it be based on standing variation?” (Wray 2013, 
56). 
e. “What is the effect size of mutations underlying trait evolution?” 
(Wray 2013, 60).  
f. “Where does the genetic variation for adaptation come from?” (Wray 
2013, 61).  
g. “What is the dynamic of selection during adaptation?” (Wray 2013, 
61).  
h. “What is the role of hybridization in adaptation?” (Wray 2013, 61). 
i. “What kinds of genes are involved in trait evolution?” (Wray 2013, 
62). 
j. “What kinds of mutations are involved in trait evolution?” (Wray 
2013, 63). 
k. “Is the genetic basis for adaptation and trait variation predictable?” 
(Wray 2013, 63). 
l. “How extensive is epistasis?” (Wray 2013, 64). 
m. “What is the role of cryptic genetic variation?” (Wray 2013, 65). 
n. “How important are incompatible gene interactions in speciation?” 
(Wray 2013, 65). 
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o. “Do gene-by-environment interactions contribute to adaptation?” 
(Wray 2013, 65). 
 
Research Reports:  
4. Garfield et al. 2012. The team doesn’t use questions, even as rhetorical 
devices, to contextualize their results in this research report. I provide the 
questions below as heuristic devices to help my readers better understand the 
project. The questions are inferred from segments of the text (Garfield et al. 
2012, 152–54).  
a. What is the nature of gene expression variation for eight cis regulatory 
regions within a population of sea urchins?  
b. What kinds of selection (positive, stabilizing, negative, etc.) affect 
those regions?  
5. Runcie et al 2012.  
a. What are “the functional and evolutionary implications of 
environmental change in an important developmental model species?” 
(Runcie et al. 2012, 4549). 
b. “Here, we investigated the response of S. purpuratus embryos to a 
stressful, but realistic temperature range (12–18 °C), and asked if such 
temperature variation exposed evolutionary relevant GEIs [gene-
environment interactions] by perturbing developmental gene 
regulatory networks.” (Runcie et al. 2012, 4548). 
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c. How “buffered” are interactions between genes in regulatory networks 
despite changes in environmental temperatures? (Runcie et al. 2012, 
4549).  
d. “Lastly, we tested for GEIs in this network across genetic backgrounds 
from a natural population, and asked if the response of the network to 
environmental stress was genetically variable.” (Runcie et al. 2012, 
4549). 
6. Garfield et al. 2013. 
a. How much variation in the expression of developmental regulatory 
genes exists within a natural population? (Garfield et al. 2013, 1). 
b. What impact does this variation in gene expression have on 
downstream genes within a regulatory network? (Garfield et al. 2013, 
1). 
i. Are “r2 values between directly interacting genes, on average, 
stronger than those between active genes with no known 
regulatory interactions?” (Garfield et al. 2013, 12).   
ii. “How does the qualitative nature of regulatory interactions 
change over development?” (Garfield et al. 2013, 12).   
iii.  Is “the variation in gene expression encountered in nature 
buffered or propagated across a gene network during 
development?” (Garfield et al. 2013, 8–9). 
c. [H]ow does expression variation during development influence the 
morphological phenotypes that lie at the interface between organism 
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and environment and are therefore potential targets of natural 
selection? (Garfield et al. 2013, 1–2). 
 
Methods 
 Throughout the project, the WGR team used methods commonly employed by 
developmental geneticists and developmental biologists, and another set of methods 
commonly employed by evolutionary geneticists.  
 For their first study, the team studied variation in eight genes across adult sea 
urchins (Garfield et al. 2012). They used standard developmental genetics methods. They 
collected tissue from the sea urchins and extracted genomic DNA. They isolated 
fragments of DNA and via polymerase chain reaction and amplified them via cloning. 
They used sequencers to describe nucleotide components of the fragments, and they 
aligned the sequences from different adults on computers with an alignment program. To 
identify regulatory regions they used transfection assays, to locate regulatory binding 
sites on genes they used protein–DNA binding assays.  
The WGR team also used standard evolutionary genetics methods. To analyze the 
variation within genes across organisms, they calculated summary statistics and 
recombination parameters. Given descriptions of genetic variation, they assessed the 
impact of evolutionary forces on the population using evolutionary models or test 
statistics such as Tajima’s D, Fu and Li’s D, Fay and Wu’s H, and analogs of the 
McDonald-Kreitman and Hudson-Kreitman-Aguade tests. 
 For the second study (Runcie et al. 2012), for methods from developmental 
genetics and biology, the team raised different organisms in controlled environments, 
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they fixed some embryos and extracted RNA from them, they photographed some 
embryos to measure some of their features, and from other embryos they extracted large 
amounts of RNA, which they sequenced. They also used an assay to target RNA from 72 
genes in the gene regulatory network in the purple sea urchin that specifies 
endomesoderm.  
From evolutionary genetics, the team began with a North Carolina II breeding 
design, a standardized design used to determine the genetic variation among groups or 
individuals. They began with the eggs from four females and the sperm from four males, 
they mated each female to each male, creating 16 groups of organisms. They split the 
fertilized eggs from each group into rearing dishes, each of which they maintained at 
either 12°, 15°, or 18° C, for a total of 48 distinct cohorts (not counting controls). The 
team created two replicates of the above design. 
When the embryos gastrulated, the team extracted RNA from whole cohorts, not 
from individuals within the cohorts. After they identified the RNAs and measured their 
concentrations for each cohort, the WGR team studied the effects of temperature, genetic 
background, and paternal effects on gene expression levels. To quantify those effects, 
they developed a Bayesian model of expected effects, fit their data to it, and inferred how 
much of the variation came from expected effects, and how much came from the other 
effects. To study the impact of variation within endomesoderm network, they calculated 
correlation coefficients for expression levels on genes of known regulatory interactions, 
and for temperature and parental effects on gene expression variation they calculated 
Pearson correlations. And for temperature effects on spatial expression and skeletal 
development, they used ANOVA F-tests.  
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 For the third study (Garfield et al. 2013), the team used many of the same 
methods as in the previous study. But from developmental biology they also studied the 
urchins at 7 developmental stages, not one, and they measured the features of the juvenile 
skeletons of the urchins. From evolutionary genetics, the team carefully calculated gene 
expression variances across cohorts and analyzed those variances into components of 
additive genetic variance, non-additive genetic variance, and environmental variance. 
They estimated additive genetic variance for the cohorts and compared those variances 
across cohorts and across developmental stages. To aid those estimations, the team 
created a quantitative genetics model akin to, but distinct from, the one created in the 




 The WGR team used several different models throughout their project. I first 
describe those of their models about mechanisms of genes and gene regulatory networks 
(GRNs), and then I describe their models about evolutionary processes.  
 
Models of Mechanisms 
 In its first published research study, the WGR team studied how the regulatory 
regions of eight genes varied, based on their DNA structure, across individual sea urchins 
(Garfield et al. 2012). The team didn’t explicitly use a mechanistic model of any process. 
They did use a model that represented the structure of genes and their parts, which 
included regulatory regions, 5’ untranslated regions, start codons, exons, and neutral 
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regions (Figure 6.1). The model assumed the causal capacities of those parts and of the 
overall gene, with respect to producing molecules, especially RNA, and ultimately 
affecting higher-order phenotypes.  
 
 
Fig. 6.1. Gene Structure Model. Each line represents a distinct gene. The bent arrows 
represent the start of the reading frames. White bars to the right of the arrows represent 
untranslated regions, and grey bars are exons. Known regulatory regions are represented 
to the left of the bent arrows. (Reprinted with permission from (Garfield et al. 2012)). 
 
 But for the second study published in 2012, the team studied genes and their RNA 
products in the contexts of GRNs and the phenotypes produced by those GRNs (Runcie 
et al. 2012). They assumed the model in Fig. 6.1 to assess how 14,454 genes varied in the 
amount of RNA they produced across individuals and breeding groups of sea urchins.  
The WGR team next focused on 72 genes that partly comprise a GRN that 
produces the endomesoderm, ectoderm, and juvenile skeletons in early purple sea urchin 
embryos. The GRN was basically the one represented in Figure 6.2, with a few fewer 
genes. That GRN is a model that represents a mechanistic process, and though it abstracts 
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from many of the details of the physical interactions between the parts, it can still be 
explicated using the nomenclature of mechanisms.  
 
 
Fig. 6.2. GRN for Sea Urchin Development. The GRN represents the gene regulation 
that occurs in a sea urchin embryo from 10 hours after fertilization (top of model) to 90 
hours (bottom of model) after fertilization. The boxes shows those key interactions in 
those cells that differentiation into juvenile skeleton cells (red box), endomesoderm 
(yellow box), and ectoderm (purple box). (Open access image reprinted with minor 
modifications from (Garfield et al. 2012)). 
  
System: The system is a network of molecular pathways that span many cells in 
early sea urchin embryos. While the network abstractly represents many causal 
interactions, the result of those interactions is to produce and differentiate cells of three 
types: endomesoderm, ectoderm, and skeleton.  
 
 Parts: The parts of the systems include the molecules common to genetic and 
cellular phenomena. Explicitly, they include gene and gene products, especially 
transcription factor proteins. Implicitly, they include all the kinds of RNA, all the 
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transport molecules, and all the DNA regions of genes. The parts of the system also 
implicitly include the cells of early embryos, the materials and parts of those cells like 
cytoplasm, membranes, maternal proteins, etc.  
  
 Activities: In the GRN model, there are three main activities. First, genes produce 
products, generally transcription factor proteins. Second, those products move through 
the cells in which they were made, or outside of those cells into the extracellular matrix. 
Third, cells differentiate into endomesoderm, ectoderm, or skeleton cells. Each of those 
activities, however, could be the focus of further mechanistic description in terms of 
systems, parts, activities, and interactions.  
 
 Interactions: Explicitly, the GRN model represents two kinds of interactions. In 
both, the product from one gene binds to the regulatory region of another gene. In the 
first kind of interaction, the bind forestalls the second gene from producing its own 
product. In the second kind of interaction, the bind activates or promotes the second gene 
to produce its own protein. Abstracted from the model, though still implicit within it, are 
dozens of further kinds of molecular interactions that enable the first two kinds.  
 For its third published study, the team again used the GRN in Figure 6.2 (Garfield 
et al. 2013). The 2013 study used basically the same GRN as the one used in the previous 





Evolutionary Genetics Models    
 The WGR team began the project by using a standard set of evolutionary genetic 
test statistics, but by the end of the project, it had started to develop novel quantitative 
genetic models.  
 
Garfield et al. 2012 
 In its first study, the team studied, as many evolutionary geneticists do, the 
amount of variation in the DNA structures of genes (Garfield et al. 2012). Unlike more 
traditional studies, the team didn’t study variation in the structures of those regions of 
genes that code for proteins. Instead, they studied variation in the regulatory regions of 
genes, variation that Wray and others hypothesized to be the genetic source of much 
variation in phenotypes. Within regulatory regions, the team looked for different kinds of 
variation, and it looked for differences in variation between binding regions and neutral 
regions. Once they had measurements for all those variations, the team applied statistical 
tests to infer what kinds of evolutionary forces might be affected the regulatory regions of 
the genes. They applied the models to each of the eight genes studied, to the cis 
regulatory regions and to the proxy neutral regions of those eight genes. 
 To study genetic variation, the team used or created the following data models. 
The first two are standard models to study variation between nucleotide sequences across 
individual organisms. The first is π. Start with a population of organisms, and for a given 
gene common to all of those organisms, describe the nucleotide sequence of each 
individual’s alleles. Next, compare each allele sequence to every other allele sequence. 
For any two sequences, count the number of differences in nucleotides. That difference is 
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called the pairwise difference. Calculate each unique pairwise difference, and then sum 
the differences. The average of the summed pairwise differences is labeled π. To estimate 
π for a population from a sample, the WGR team used πn, such that  
 
(a)  !" = $%,'%('"("*+)/. 
 
where each di,j represents a single pairwise difference.        
 The second is θ, which is the π we would expect of a population of organisms if 
that population evolved only neutrally, and not due to any selective forces. Furthermore, 
θ represents the diversity in the alleles across a total population of organisms, which for 
diploid organisms is  
 
(b) / = 412 
 
such that N represents the effective population size and µ represents the neutral mutation 
rate.  
When studying samples of populations, researchers estimate θ with θW, which is a 
function on the number of nucleotide sites that differ across sequences of the same allele, 
called segregating sites, be those sequences from different chromosomes on the same 
locus within an individual organism, or from different organisms altogether. So 
 
(c) /3 = 4/	 1/7"*+89+  
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such that S is the number of segregating sites and n is the number of nucleotides in an 
allele.  
 The team also used a third model. While πn represents average estimated pairwise 
variation, and θW captures the pairwise variation we would expect if the sequences came 
from a neutrally evolving population, the two statistics don’t capture everything the 
WGR team wished to study about sequence variation. To compute those values, 
researchers must compare instances of alleles to each other, noting any differences in 
nucleotides across the two instances. Such comparisons detect some kinds of mutations, 
especially single nucleotide polymorphisms, but they falter when mutations result in 
major insertions or deletions of nucleotides into allele sequences. In an earlier paper, 
Wray and Jim Balhoff had developed a statistic to represent so called length variation, a 
statistic they called πi (Balhoff and Wray 2005). The WGR team employed it in this 
study. 
 To compare DNA sequences from different organisms, researchers display those 
sequences one on top of the next in computer programs, and then they align the 
sequences so the similar parts of the sequences are roughly on top of each other. To get 
the sequences to align, researchers may introduce gaps into one or more of the sequence 
representations. Across two sequences, a gap represents either that the allele with the gap 
lost, by mutation, a section of the sequence it should have, or that the allele without the 
cap gained, by mutation, a section of sequence that alleles from other individuals lack. 
Mutations of the first kind are called insertions, those of the last kind are called deletions, 
and together they are called indels.  
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 When calculating the value of πi for a population, Wray’s teams counted the 
number of gaps/indels, and they weighted, via natural logarithms, each indel by the 
length of the sequence deleted or added. Ultimately, πi represented the average weighted 
variation in indels across all sequences for an allele. The team also calculated the relative 
incidence of different kinds of length mutations, information not captured in πi. 
 Finally, the team also computed ρ, which estimated the amount of sequence 
divergence between alleles of the purple sea urchin and those for a similar locus from 
fragile pink sea urchins, a distinct species.4  
 To study selection, the team used five test statistics. The first was Tajima’s D, 
which starts with the π and subtracts θ. The result indicates whether or not the gene 
studied faces selection forces in the population studied. To estimate D, researchers 
substitute πn for π, θW for θ, and divides the result by the square root of the sampling 
variance of the two estimates.5  
 
(d)   : =	;<*=>?  
 
If the result is not significantly different from zero, then the gene faces no selection in the 
population studied, and evolves only neutrally. If the result is negative, then there is less 
variation in the population than we’d expect, indicating that the gene faces negative or 
purifying selection. If the result is positive, then the gene is more variable in structure 
																																																						
4 It should also be noted that the WGR team used correlational analysis to establish that πn positively 
correlated with πi and with ρ. 
 
5 The decomposition of √V is beyond the scope of this chapter, so for details see (Tajima 1989). 
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than we’d expect, indicating that the gene faces positive selection, perhaps through 
balancing selection.    
 The next two statistics are similar to Tajima’s D, but they estimate θ with 
information other than that captured by π or θW, and they enable researchers to compare 
data about a population to that from outgroups. For outgroups, the WGR team used DNA 
sequence data for orthologous genes from fragile pink sea urchins, from red sea urchins, 
and from green sea urchins. The second statistic is Fu and Li’s D, 
 
(e)  : =	 @*A<	BC?(@*A<	BC) 
 
such that S represents the number of segregating sites, an represents 
+8"*+89+ 		, and ηe 
represents the difference in the number of mutations, derived only once, between an 
ingroup population and an outgroup population.  
 The third statistic used by the WGR team was Fay and Wu’s H,  
 
(f)  /D = 	 ."("*+)	 7.E8"*+89+  
for which n represents the number of sequences, and E8 represents the number of times i 
that researchers detected mutation unique to the ingroup population, but within a gene 
shared with the outgroup.    
 The WGR team used Tajima’s D, Fu and Li’s D, and Fay and Wu’s H partly 
because the tests are sensitive to different kinds of information. Similar to the use of 
Tajima’s D, researchers interpret different kinds of selection from the signed results of Fu 
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and Li’s D and Fay and Wu’s H, but the latter two are more sensitive to selective sweeps. 
The WGR team established the significance of their results using community-standard 
techniques of repeated simulation of their data hundreds of thousands of times in a 
neutral model framework.  
 The WGR team used two final statistics, which also enabled them to compare 
their data to similar information from outgroup species. For seven of the genes studied, 
they used a McDonald-Kreitman test and a Hudson-Kreitman-Aguade test, both modified 
so that the team could apply them to cis regulatory regions.  
 The McDonald Kreitman test applies to the protein coding parts of genes, called 
exons, which decompose into three-nucleotide-long sets of DNA that, after transcription, 
code for amino acids and enable cells to collect those amino acids into polypeptide 
chains. Some exons are synonymous, or code for the same amino acid. A mutation to an 
exon changes the sequence, which becomes either synonymous with its non-mutated 
sister exons related by descent, or it becomes non-synonymous with the those sister exons 
and now codes for different amino acid.  
To do MK test, researchers count the number of mutations for a set of exons 
within a population of organisms, they count the mutations for that set of exons between 
the population and an outgroup population, and they separate each count into 
synonymous mutations and nonsynonymous mutations. Finally, they take the ratio of 
nonsynonymous to synonymous mutations between the population and outgroup (or 
between species), and they take the same ratio for mutations within the population. If the 
two ratios are equal, then the evolution between species is neutral. If the ratio for between 
species is significantly higher than that within species, then evolution is positive between 
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species. If the ratio between species is significantly lower than the ratio within species, 
then selection is negative between the two species.  
 
 









The WGR team modified the MK test to apply to binding sites in cis regulatory 
regions rather than to exons. To do so, they classified mutations to binding sites as either 
permitting binding or as not, following a strategy from Jenkins (Jenkins et al. 1995).   
 
(h)     
 
 
The WGR team also used a modified Hudson-Kreitman-Aguade test. Similar to 
the MK test, the HKA test compares data from an in group to that of an outgroup to infer 
deviations from neutral evolution. The test is a variant of a χ2 test. The WGR team 
admitted that the HKA test for cis regulatory regions lacked realism or meaning, and all 
of their analyses returned either nonsignificant or inapplicable results. Given as much, I 
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Runcie et al. 2012 
 In its second research report, the WGR team describes a novel evolutionary 
genetic model it created to analyze its data and infer additive genetic variance.6 In matrix 
format, the team created a model to capture the effects of genetic background, parental 
effects, and temperature on the measured gene expression levels for 73 genes. The model 
is: 
(i) y = XY FG  + E, 
 
(j) u = XUb + ZMa + ZFf + ZDd + H 
 
such that y represents the matrix of observed gene expression intensity values for each of 
the 73 genes in each of the cohorts of organisms, XY is a design matrix that relates those 
measured intensity values to the expected effects of measurement probes represented by µ 
and latent transcription represented by u. Next, ZM and ZF are random effect matrices 
that regress random effects of sires (M) and dams (F) on temperature and relate the 
regressions to u, while ZD does the same thing for parent interactions. The matrices b, a, 
f, and d, all represent fixed or expected effects of factors on observed data: b for 
temperature, a for male breeding values, f for female breeding values, and d for parental 
interactions. Finally, XU is a design matrix that relates fixed effects for temperature to 
developmental stages, and E and H are error terms.   
																																																						
6 In the supplementary materials for the research report, the team presents the model in two ways. The first 
is mostly in scalar format, and is too detailed for my purposes here. The second is in matrix format, and is 
presented above. Readers can suss out the details of the matrix format, details I omit here, by checking the 
supplementary materials of (Runcie et al. 2012) and seeing how the two presentations relate.  
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 To use the model, the team first assigned priors to fixed effects µ and b and to 
random effects a, f, and d.7 Next, they fit their data to the model using a Gibbs sampler, 
and they updated their priors into posteriors for the fixed effects, the random effects, and 
the expression variances. Depending on different probability density assumptions for 
each of those random variables, the team inferred how much each cause influenced the 
measured data by how much the posteriors differed from the priors. They established the 
significance of their results by simulating, via Markov Chain Monte Carlo, many 
different priors and sampled posteriors, and accepting only those results that showed 
substantial convergence.  
 
Garfield et al. 2013 
 The team estimated the additive genetic variances for traits across cohorts. For a 
given trait, that variance, when taken across individuals in proportion to their phenotypic 
variance, provides the narrow sense heritability (h2) of that trait, which indicates how 
much selection can change the mean value of the trait in future generations. Because the 
team compared cohorts, and not individuals, they couldn’t calculate heritabilities for 
traits. But they calculated additive genetic variances (I2A) to help them address the 
questions they posed, which were about variations in gene expression levels, their 
sources, and their relations to each other.  
 For a given trait or phenotype, the additive genetic variance composes part of the 
overall phenotypic variance (I2P) such that  
																																																						




(k) I2P = I2A + I2I + I2E 
 
and I2I represents non-additive genetic variance, or the variance due to interactions 
between maternal and paternal effects, and I2E represents variance due to environmental 
effects. To use the above model, the team needed to estimate all three values on the right 
side of the equation for every cohort and for every gene studied, and they needed to 
compare those results across cohorts and genes.  
 To estimate I2A, the WGR team relied on the breeding design of their experiment. 
They developed two ways to approximate I2A, one related to sires and the other to dams. 
The team used a North Carolina II breeding design, in which they mated six males each 
with six females, yielding 36 cohorts of offspring, with each cohort having hundreds of 
embryos.8 They indexed each cohort according to the cohorts’ sires and dams. Offspring 
within a cohort were full siblings (FS), while those in different cohorts but with the same 
dam were maternal half siblings (MHS), and those in different cohorts but with the same 
sire were paternal half siblings (PHS). Thus, when offspring are analyzed in relation to 
their sires, the variances in paternal effects on offspring phenotypes is the covariance of 
the phenotype values from the PHS,  
 
(l) 	I2m = cov(PHS) 
 
																																																						
8 Furthermore, the team completed the experiment in replicate, for a total of 72 cohorts.  
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and both of those terms estimate the additive genetic variance for the population  
 
(m) 	I2m = cov(PHS) 	I2A/4 
 
Roughly is same for dams, though for them there is the issue of non-genetic maternal 
effects.  
 
(n)  I2f = cov(MHS) 	I2A/4) + I2Mat 
such	that	I2Mat represents variance in maternal effects due either to maternal genetic or 
maternal environmental factors. That term is estimated by the remainder of  I2m  
subtracted from I2f. Each of I2m and I2f estimated about a quarter of I2A, and their sum 
estimated half.  
  
 
For I2I, the WGR team decomposed that term as 
 
(o) 	I2I = cov(FS) – (cov(PHS) – (cov(MHS)) 
 
Due to technical limitations, the WGR team used estimates that differed in structure from 
the above equations (l) through (o). They used estimates based on the expected mean 
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squares of paternal factors, maternal factors, and their interactions. Those estimates are 
based on the models above, but further explanation of them exceeds my aims here.  
 As for environmental variance, I2E, the team had two options. First, they could 
ignore it as uniform across all cohorts, given their research design. Or second, they could 
treat it as part of error variance. The team couldn’t estimate error variance as they did 
above, due to the structure of, and gaps in, their data.  Nor could they calculate 
significance values for the influences of paternal, maternal, or interaction variances on 
phenotypic variances. For those later two tasks, they employed a model and simulation 
technique similar to those used in (Runcie et al. 2012). This model was 
 
(p) yi, j, k = u + mi + fj + Ii, j + ei, j, k  
 
such that yi, j, k represents the phenotype within a specific cohort k, which was made by 
breeding male i and female j from the population of starting sea urchins. On the right side 
of the equation, u represents the mean value for all cohorts for the phenotype in question, 
mi represents the additive effects for the male parent i, and fi represents the additive 
effects for the female parent j, while Ii,j represents the interaction effects for the parents, 
and ei,j,k captures the error.  
 As in their previous study, the model was a Bayesian mixed-effects model. The 
team assigned distributions to the random variables, assigned priors, fit their model to the 
data, and calculated posterior probabilities over many simulated iterations until they 
could compute error terms and significance terms.  
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 Given all that statistical machinery, the team could compare additive genetic 
variances across cohorts, across genes, and across developmental stages. They quantified 
significant differences across cohorts and stages using standard statistical tests such as 
Kruskal-Wallace, Spearman Rho, Wilcoxan rank, χ2, and they could gesture at a co-
variance G matrix and the information it should contain if they had used an appropriately 
larger starting population of dams and sires.  
 
  
6.4- Epistemic Aims 
Open Coding 
Using open coding, I collected the following statements about epistemic goals 
from the team’s published papers. The quotes provide a (subjective) collection of 
sentences in which the WGR team explicitly mentions its epistemic goals. The quotes 
enable comparisons with the count data presented afterwards. In its published reports, the 
WGR team often explicitly says it aims to address the questions listed earlier. To avoid 
redundancy, I record below only statements in which the team doesn’t explicitly point to 
questions.  
 
Review Articles:  
From (Garfield and Wray 2009), one passage:  
“Discovering which view, or more likely which combination, best explains patterns of 
conservation and divergence in development is central to understanding the origins of 
animal diversity… The advent of genome-scale datasets provides an exciting new 
approach for evaluating these views” (65). 
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From (Garfield and Wray 2010), three passages: 
“In the remainder of this article, we will discuss how these new technologies can be 
used to understand the causes and consequences of changes in gene regulatory 
interactions” (17).  
 
“Microarrays have also been used in developmental biology studies aimed at inferring 
how genes interact during development” (17).  
 
“Detecting and characterizing each of these kinds of molecular interactions requires a 
different functional assay, which presents a significant practical challenge” (19).  
 
From (Wray 2013), ten passages:  
“Evolutionary genetics has entered an unprecedented era of discovery, catalyzed in 
large part by the development of technologies that provide information about genome 
sequence and function. An important benefit is the ability to move beyond a handful of 
model organisms in lab settings to identify the genetic basis for evolutionarily 
interesting traits in many organisms in natural settings. Other benefits are the abilities 
to identify causal mutations and validate their phenotypic consequences more readily 
and in many more species” (51).  
 
“The overarching objective—understanding the genetic basis for trait variation, 
adaptation, and speciation—remains much the same, but the kinds of empirical 
evidence, methods of analysis, and motivating questions are all changing in ways that 
few could have predicted even a decade ago. The operational goals of evolutionary 
genetics have grown substantially beyond characterizing genetic architecture” (52). 
 
    “In short, the goal has shifted from description to comprehension” (52). 
 
“The primary goal of quantitative genetics is to identify distinct regions in the genome 
known as quantitative trait loci (QTLs) that influence variation in a trait of interest” 
(52). 
 
“Surveying a genome sequence provides a simple way to find mutations of 
evolutionary interest” (54).  
 
“Genomic technologies can now reveal differences in many different aspects of 
molecular function throughout the genome” (54). 
 
“Functional genomics can reveal the genetic basis for specific differences in molecular 
function among individuals throughout the genome…” (58). 
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“Functional assays can reveal that different mutations affecting the function of the 
same gene can have distinct functional consequences, for instance, raising and 
lowering the level of expression…” (59). 
 
“This is an area where genomic technologies provide an enormous boost to our 
empirical understanding and allow theoretical predictions to be tested in some detail” 
(61). 
 
“One of the most profound changes in evolutionary genetics during the past decade is 
an emphasis on understanding not just which genetic changes influence phenotype but 
how they do so…” (62).  
 
 
Research Reports:  
From (Garfield et al. 2012), one passage:  
“In this study, we examine the population genetics of the core, upstream cis-regulatory 
regions of eight genes (AN, CyIIa, CyIIIa, Endo16, FoxB, HE, SM30 a, and SM50) that 
function during the early development of the purple sea urchin, Strongylocentrotus 
purpuratus” (152). 
 
From (Runcie et al. 2012), five passages: 
“We investigated how stress responses alter the contribution of additive genetic 
variation to gene expression during development of the purple sea urchin, 
Strongylocentrotus purpuratus, under increased temperatures that model realistic 
climate change scenarios” (4547). 
 
“Here, we investigated the response of S. purpuratus embryos to a stressful, but 
realistic temperature range (12–18 °C), and asked if such temperature variation 
exposed evolutionary relevant GEIs by perturbing developmental gene regulatory 
networks” (4548).  
 
“To explore cellular processes affected by temperature stress, we tested for enrichment 
of specific functionally related genes sets among the genes either up-regulated or 
down-regulated at 18 °C” (4552).  
 
“To explore how transcriptional regulatory networks influence GEIs, we investigated 
the transmission of temperature effects (an environmental perturbation) and genetic 
effects (a genetic perturbation) through the well-characterized endomesodermal and 
ectodermal gene regulatory network that controls cell type specification and 
development in sea urchin embryos” (4553).  
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“To quantify the effects of the environment (temperature treatment), genetic back- 
ground, and other parental differences on the expression of each of these genes, we de- 
signed a Bayesian hierarchical mixed effect model” (Supplementary Materials 9). 
 
From (Garfield et al. 2013), seven passages: 
“We investigated the relationship between robustness and evolvability within the gene 
regulatory network underlying development of the larval skeleton in the sea urchin 
Strongylocentrotus purpuratus” (1). 
 
“To better understand the relationship between these seemingly opposed properties of 
robustness and evolvability, we measured how natural variation in gene expression 
propagates across a network of interacting genes underlying early development in sea 
urchins” (1).  
 
“Key to understanding both buffering and adaptation is measuring how, and to what 
extent, variation in developmental gene function impacts downstream phenotypes…” 
(1).  
 
“…this is the first study we are aware of that has sought to quantify expression 
variation throughout an extensive gene regulatory network spanning development from 
embryogenesis to the production of organismal traits, and to relate variation in gene 
expression throughout a developmental network and across developmental stages to 
specific morphological trait consequences” (3).  
 
“In order to examine the extent and consequences of variation in gene expression 
within the gene regulatory network, we set up a 6×6 cross using outbred parents 
derived from the same wild population” (3).  
 
“In order to understand the impact that variation in the expression of regulatory genes 
has on downstream targets, we first examined correlation coefficients (r2) between 
pairs of genes for which there is experimental evidence of a direct regulatory 
interaction” (5).  
 
“The proportion of the total phenotypic variation within a population that can be 
explained, in a statistical sense, by genetic background-independent contributions of 
genetic variation is the additive genetic variance of a trait, and it is the size of this 
variance relative to overall phenotypic variance that puts bounds on the efficacy by 






 Below, I present three tables. Table 6.1 collects raw data from the content 
analysis. That data includes a lot of noise among the signal, so I checked every datum 
against its surrounding text and labeled noisy data as one of: infelicitous 
homonyms/cognate, metadiscourse/figure labelling, not describing project rational/ 
describing rationales of other teams. I class the data that remained as informative data, 
and I tabulate in the second table. Finally, to compare results across articles, in the third 
table I collect the relative ranks of different epistemic aims for each article.  
 
TABLE 6.1 




Goal Know Amalgam Control Describe Discover Explain Predict Cause 
2012a 35 33 6 9 50 14 8 18 86 
2012b 96 47 9 34 103 61 19 60 448 
2013b 226 48 22 42 202 90 39 122 468 
Reviews  
2009 8 9 0 6 8 6 9 5 52 
2010 34 35 6 14 52 19 25 7 261 
2013a 50 81 11 25 53 27 16 8 225 
 
 
Table 6.2 below has several interesting caveats. First, in the column labeled Goal, 
there are normal counts and counts in parentheses that include data associated with the 
search term ‘design*’. The team bred sea urchins in their lab using a breeding design 
called the North Carolina II breeding design, in which each dam is mated with each sire. 
The team often mentions the design in 2012b (Runcie et al. 2012) and 2013b (Garfield et 
al. 2013) research articles, and those mentions are exhausted by repeated use of ‘NCII 
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design’ and similar phrases. Those mentions are informative about the aims of the team, 




























2012a 5 9 1 0 31 8 7 18 86 
2012b 9 (20) 14 0 1 67 (29) 58 (2) 12 17 (55) 448 
2013b  7 (30) 16 0 0 137 (40) 77 (2) 23 12 (109) 468 
Reviews  
2009 1 9 0 0 3 6 8 4 52 
2010 10 19 0 0 29 14 (13) 13 7 261 
2013a 18 41 3 4 40 22 12 6 225 
 
 
compared to other possible goal terms. For instance, in the 2013b research report, data 
from instances of ‘design’ comprise 23 of the 30 data for Goal.  
 Second, the columns for Describe and Predict include normal counts and counts 
in parentheses related to the search term ‘correlat*’. For Describe, the parenthetical 
numbers exclude data for that search term, for ‘Predict’ they include that data. 
Correlations serve multiple aims in scientific projects. They describe relations between 
phenomena, in this case relations between variation in gene expression. But researchers 
often use correlations as bases for predictions about the future behavior of systems, even 
if they can’t specify the underlying causal system. Here I count instances of ‘correlat*’ as 
evidence of describing phenomena, but not for predicting phenomena. I do so for two 
reasons. First, the team lacked the correlations before the start of their project, and thus 
could not test them as predictions. Second, in the data from their review papers, in which 
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the team rarely discussed correlations, there remains a strong signal ranking the 
importance of describing phenomena over that of predicting phenomena. I argue that the 
aims of the review papers inform the aims reported in the research articles.  
 For a third caveat, the column for Discover includes normal counts and counts in 
parentheses that exclude data associated with the search term ‘probe*’. In almost every 
use of that term, the team described a bit of technology, not a specific aim. The team used 
the technology to measure the amounts of RNAs in their samples. Some may argue that 
the term ‘probe’ for those bits of technology doesn’t reflect the aims of the team, and that 
my data collection techniques would have ignored mentions of such tools had those tools 
another general name, for instance if some odd acronym like GWAS (for ‘genome wide 
association studies’) had become fixed in the research community as the name for what 
we call probes. I’m sensitive to such criticisms, but I’m ultimately unpersuaded by them. 
Probes are tools named for their functions, and while researchers could have baptized 
them differently according to the accidents of history, that’s no reason to ignore data 
about possible epistemic functions/aims when we have such data. That judgment is 
upheld for this case given the strong signal for Discover in the data for review articles. 
 Regardless of how one feels about my choices for the counts discussed above, I 
provide in parentheses what the counts would have been if I’d excluded or included 
potentially troublesome data. But with the counts in the parentheses above, readers can 
account for any worries they have and re-rank the aims for each paper. 
Table 6.3 below orders different goals according to their rank in overall count 
data for each article. In most articles, the epistemic aims of describing phenomena and 
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discovering new phenomena dwarf the importance of predicting phenomena or of 
explaining phenomena.  
TABLE 6.3 




Goal 1 Goal 2 Goal 3 Goal 4 
2012a Describe Predict Discover Explain 
2012b Describe Discover Predict Explain 
2013b Describe Discover Explain Predict 
Reviews     
2009 Explain Discover Predict Describe 
2010 Describe Discover Explain Predict 




6.5- Primary Conclusions of the Project 
Garfield et al. 2012. 
 For this study, the team described the DNA sequences of the regulatory regions 
and of select neutral regions for eight genes in several adult purple sea urchins. They 
calculated the amount of variation in those regions among the population, and then they 
compared the variation in regulatory regions to the variation in neutral regions, and then 
they compared both to that of related species. Those comparisons enabled them to use 
models that suggested the presence or absence of evolutionary forces on those regions. 
The team’s primary conclusions were: 
1. Within regulatory regions, variation in the length of the DNA sequences is a 
legitimate phenomenon, one not captured by most analyses of variation.  
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2. Summed across the genes, the variation within regulatory regions doesn’t 
significantly differ from the variation in neutral regions. Within regulatory 
regions, the variation in binding sites doesn’t significantly differ from non-
binding sites. 
3. D and H statistics and McDonald-Kreitman tests indicate that some of the 
regulatory regions are under directional selection, while others are not. Some face 
negative or purifying selection, while other face positive selection.  
4. D and H statistics also indicated that some putative neutral regions face selection, 
perhaps indicating that they contain undiscovered regulatory elements.  
 
Runcie et al 2012.  
 For this study, the team raised purple sea urchin embryos at different temperatures 
and assessed the impact of higher temperatures on the overall embryos and the 
expressions levels of genes, especially those within the endomesoderm specification 
GRN. For each of three temperatures, they measured the amounts of gene expression of 
thousands of genes in hundreds of embryos in distinct cohorts and at three different 
temperatures, and they calculated the variation in expression levels within and across 
temperatures. They also focused in genes in the endomesoderm GRN, measured their 
expression variation, and correlated such variation with variation in gastrula morphology. 
Those comparisons enabled them to make the following conclusions: 
1. The higher the temperature (12°, 15°, and 18°C), the more embryos developed 
abnormally, with slower growth rates, smaller embryos, abnormal blastocoels 
shapes, and higher expression amounts for two chaperone genes. While those 
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phenomena indicated stressed development under higher temperatures, urchins 
still developed through juvenile stages without deformities and without dying.  
2. The higher the temperature, the more gene expression levels changed (increased 
or decreased) for more than 2000 genes, more than half of which changed 
expression levels by at least half, and almost a quarter of which changed 
expression levels two-fold. These changes affected 4 different kinds of molecular 
functions.  
3. For 72 genes within the endomesoderm GRN, higher temperatures varied the 
expression amounts of 14 genes. However, for any two genes for which there was 
an established regulatory interaction, those variations in amounts didn’t correlate. 
That lack of correlation indicates that GRN sub-structure and sub-functions are 
buffered from environmental perturbations.  
4. While parents had strong hereditary effects (parental genetic and maternal) on the 
expression levels of their offspring, those effects didn’t interact with temperature 
effects.  
5. Given the previous two conclusions and projections about the extent of 
temperature/climate change in the purple sea urchins’ Pacific Ocean environment, 
forthcoming climate change is unlikely to reveal cryptic genetic variation in those 
urchins.  
 
Garfield et al. 2013.  
 For this study, the team raised purple sea urchins embryos, measured the 
expression amounts of 74 genes in the GRN that specifies the endomesoderm, ectoderm, 
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and juvenile skeletons in the developing organisms. They took measurements at seven 
temporal points in the process of development. They also measured the lengths of the 
juvenile skeletons at the seventh point of development. They calculated variations in 
expressions amounts in skeleton lengths, they compared those variations across cohorts to 
determine the effect of parental genes on the variations, and they calculated covariances 
in variations across expressions levels of different genes, across cohorts, and across 
expression levels and skeleton lengths. Those calculations enabled them to make the 
following conclusions:  
1. Parental effects had detectable and significant effects on the expression levels of 
the genes in the offspring, but those effects explained at most 15% of the variation 
in levels among the offspring. Furthermore, parental effects influenced such 
variation most strongly in early development.  
2. For any two genes in which researchers had already established a regulatory 
interaction, the variation in expression levels for those two genes correlated more 
strongly than did any two random genes, except for early in development.  
3. As development proceeded, the proportion of regulatory interactions that 
functioned like switches decreased, as the number of interaction that were 
sensitive to quantitative variations increased.  
4. For eight genes studied, variations in their expression levels correlated with 
variations in lengths of juvenile skeletons. Those genes functioned either at the 








 In this chapter, I analyze and compare the case studies about the Johnson, Porter, 
and Tulchinsky (JPT) project and about the Wray, Garfield, and Runcie (WGR) project. 
From them I infer some conclusions about the prospects for evolutionary genetic models 
with gene regulatory information built into them.  
 This chapter addresses the questions that drive this project. While the previous 
two chapters provide descriptions of the research projects I study and enable comparison, 
this chapter interprets those descriptions in relation to the driving questions. This chapter 
has four further main sections.  
 The second section introduces accounts of research systems and of complexity. In 
the third section I use those accounts to summarize and analyze the cases. In the fourth 
section I compare the cases to show how they are similar in their epistemic aims and in 
their implicit conception of gene. In the final section, I address the driving question: 







7.2- Research Systems and Complexity 
Research Systems  
I propose a concept research systems to help me analyze the two cases. The 
concept is similar to and inspired by Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s concept of experimental 
system (Rheinberger 1997). For Rheinberger, at least two kinds of elements compose 
experimental systems: epistemic things and technical objects. Roughly, for a specific 
experimental system, the epistemic thing is the object under study, often a process or a 
mechanism. Technical objects are the devises, materials, research skills, and other 
conditions that enable researchers to continually tinker on the epistemic thing to 
continually engender unexpected events from it. Experimental systems and their parts 
have histories.  
 While Rheinberger’s concept is suggestive and fruitful, I propose a slightly 
different concept for several reasons. His concept has many facets, and I’m not sure I can 
collect and organize all of them. As a result, I find the concept too imprecise to use as a 
tool for analysis. Furthermore, Rheinberger explicitly says that he aims to use the concept 
to draw attention to objects and experimental practices, and away from theories. That 
shift is valuable and important, but ultimately we can’t make sense of objects as 
epistemic things without relating them to theories, models, and other scientific products 
that have epistemic function in relation to those objects. Given those reasons, it would be 
misleading and unfair for me to use his term and concept. Regardless, research systems 
are much like experimental systems.   
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 A research system has three primary kinds of components. The first is the object 
or phenomenon in the world.1 Such phenomena can be items or processes. The second is 
a set of scientific products that have functional relations to the phenomena. Such products 
can include theories, models, representations of laws, etc. The functional relations 
include describing, predicting, explaining, discovering, etc., such that the at least one of 
the scientific products has at least one functional relationship to the phenomena. One 
product can have multiple functional relationships to a phenomenon, for instance, if a 
single model describes, explains, and predicts the effects of a process. Furthermore, 
different scientific products can have different functional relationships to a phenomenon, 
for instance when one theory describes it, another predicts it without explaining it, and 
still a third explains it.  
The third kind of component in a research system includes the artifacts and 
materials that researchers use to study the systems. These include devices used to control 
phenomena, instruments used to measure phenomena, equipment like computers, 
research space, etc.  
Research systems are historical objects, and a given system needn’t have all of the 
same components in all of their historical stages. Rheinberger is right that much research 
begins when researchers pick a system, not when they pick a theory to test. In many 
cases, as researchers develop a project, they develop the devises and strategies to control 
the phenomenon, to study it, to collect data about it, etc., all practices that focus and 
                                                
1 Here I treat phenomena and objects as the same kind of thing, though we might fruitfully distinguish 
them. We might take objects as the things in the world, and phenomena as representations of those things 
that we construct from data. I avoid that distinction here for ease of presentation, and to sidestep debates 
about distinctions between data and phenomena, and between objects and phenomena. That said, in 
general, I’m for such distinctions, though that position is irrelevant to my presentation of research systems.  
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constrain their studies. Researchers similarly develop theories, models, etc., to describe, 
predict, and explain that phenomenon. As a result, researcher often, but not always, better 
conceptualize and isolate the phenomenon as an object in the world. The parts of the 
system evolve, and as a result, so does the whole system.     
Researchers can use research systems in many different studies that comprise 
longer research projects. For a given study, a team uses a system, and they design their 
studies, and report their results, in rationales. The rationales evolve over time, and the one 
used to design a study may differ from the one used to report the results of the study. 
While researchers develop theories and models to be exportable to other phenomena and 
research systems, they also develop research systems to be exportable to other labs and 
research teams.  
A research system differs from a research project. The former admits of many 
possible theories, epistemic functional relations between theories and phenomenon, 
research teams, rationales, and investigative strategies. The latter, on the other hand, is a 
socio-epistemic unit in which a specific team in a specific place and time applies specific 
investigative strategies and specific theories for specific epistemic functional relations to 
the research system.  
From a given project, a team can export at least:  
1. scientific products (theories, models, etc.) 
2. data 
3. devices, instruments, equipment 
4. know-how in the form of skilled practitioners or in research protocols 
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5. the whole research system, either as a spatio-temporal object or as a schematic 
to develop copies of the spatio-temporal object elsewhere.2   
 
Complexity 
I use the above account of researcher systems to propose an account of complex 
phenomena. Many have recently discussed notions of complexity, and often they debate 
about how to identify complexity. Here, I distinguish complex phenomena from complex 
theories or explanatory structures. I propose two ways in which phenomena can be 
complex.  
The first notion of complex phenomena is inspired by Morton Beckner (Beckner 
1959). Beckner argued that phenomena are complex at least relative to the theories and 
concepts we use to analyze them. For instance, we use ‘flight from predator’ as a concept 
to describe the behavior of an antelope running in front of a puma. But if we aim to 
describe the behavior of a puma running in front of an antelope, then the concept ‘flight 
from predator’ won’t apply, the phenomenon will be complex relative to that concept, 
and we must search for another concept to describe that phenomenon. Similarly, if we 
aim to casually explain the movement of a molecule from the outer parts of a cell into the 
nucleus, we would use a mechanistic model of that shows how a chaperone molecule tugs 
the other molecule to the nucleus. But if we aim to explain how that first molecule was 
made, that phenomenon remains complex in relation to the mechanistic chaperone model.  
                                                
2 I don’t discuss research systems as outputs of research projects in earlier chapters. I only saw the 
difference between research systems and research projects, and the importance of the former, once I 
completed the case studies in the previous two chapters.  
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While Beckner provided little more than a few comments about complex 
phenomena, from his comments I propose a couple of accounts of complexity that we can 
fruitfully use to analyze research systems. The first account depends on the functional 
relations between phenomena and the scientific products we use to understand them. 
While Beckner focused on theories and laws, my account applies to scientific products 
more generally. Furthermore, while Beckner focused on aims of description and 
explanations, my account applies to epistemic aims more generally.  
 
A phenomenon is complex1 only  
1. relative to a scientific product (theory, model, law, etc.) or a set of such products 
2. relative to an epistemic aim or function (description, explanation, prediction, 
discovery, etc.) or set of such aims or functions 
3. if the specified scientific product(s) can’t achieve the specified aim(s) 
 
The above account provides necessary conditions for phenomena to be complex. I 
don’t claim that those conditions are jointly sufficient. Such claims are often false and 
often lead to fruitless disputes over counterexamples. I don’t aim to provide the true 
concept of complexity, but instead to propose concepts that will help analyze cases of 
research systems. By claiming only that the conditions are necessary, I focus discussion 
on the analytic functions of the concept, not on fruitless counterexamples. Furthermore, I 
propose another account of complex phenomena. To avoid confusion or issues with 
possible sufficiency, I label the two accounts of complexity as distinct, so I can ignore 
such issues. The account above is about complexity in the first sense, complexity1. The 
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next account is about complexity in the second sense, complexity2, also shown in Fig. 
7.1.  
 
A phenomenon is complex2 only if 
1. we can decompose it into parts 
2. for at least one part, at least one scientific product has at least one epistemic 
functional relation (describes, explains, predicts, etc.) to it 
3. at least two parts have epistemic functional relations to distinct scientific products 
4. no single scientific product achieves all of the epistemic functional relations 
achieved by the other distinct scientific products 
5. each scientific product employed to have an epistemic functional relation to a part 
is conceptually compatible with every other such product 
 
 While both senses describe different kinds of complex phenomena, they have 
different import for scientists.3 If a scientist determines that a phenomenon is complex1, 
that determination might motivate her to find epistemic aims or scientific products for 
which the phenomenon will no longer be complex1. The situation is different for 
complexity2. If scientists aim to alleviate the complexity1 of a phenomenon, after years of 
research, they can end up in a situation in which the phenomenon is comlex2. What 
should they do then? Insofar as the scientific products help them achieve their epistemic 
                                                
3 With the above two concepts, we can understand a few more concepts related to complexity. Simple 
phenomena are those that meet the first two conditions of complex1, but fail the third. Irreducibly complex 
phenomena are those that are complex1 for any theory and for any aim, and always fail the first condition of 
complex2 (perhaps due to our methods of conceptualizing phenomena). 
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ends, they can rationally rest content. Some, however, will aim to unify the scientific 
products so that they can understand the complex2 phenomenon with fewer products or 
with fewer partitions in the phenomenon.4 But they needn’t.  
 
 
Fig. 7.1. Graphical Representation of a Complex2 Phenomenon. The circle represents 
a complex2 phenomenon, which is decomposable into three parts: Phenomenon A, B, and 
C.  There are also three scientific products: Model 1, Model 2, and Theory 1. The 
products have epistemic functional relations (predicting, describing, and explaining) to 
distinct and parts. No scientific product has an epistemic functional relation to all parts.    
 
The Upshot 
In this chapter, I argue that when research teams combine evolutionary genetics 
and developmental genetics, they partly create research systems in which the phenomena 
studied are what I call complex2. In doing so, they use models in such a way that they are 
conceptually compatible, but not necessarily coextensive. Much of their work involves 
not creating overarching models or theories, but creating bridge concepts that enable 
                                                
4 One could argue that Newton lessened or eliminated the complexity2 of motion when he used his laws to 
describe, predict, and explain both terrestrial motion and extraterrestrial motion, which had previously been 
distinct parts of the overall phenomenon of motion, and had been epistemically related to distinct scientific 
products of Galileo’s laws and Kepler’s laws, respectively.  
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them to move from (or conceptually staple together) one part of a comlex2 phenomenon 
to another part.  
Furthermore, when people argue that scientific products from evolutionary 
genetics cannot be synthesized with those from developmental genetics, they sometimes 
intimate that researchers can’t lessen or eliminate what I call the complexity2 of their 
research systems. In other words, there will never be an overarching theory of the 
evolutionary genetics of gene regulatory networks. That may be true, though it’s an 
empirical question. More importantly, researchers needn’t take, and don’t currently take, 
the lessening of what I call complexity2 as a rational condition for epistemic success 
when they synthesize models from developmental genetics with those from evolutionary 
genetics. So some of the complaints of their critics are misplaced. On the contrary, 
researchers create research systems of complex2 phenomena.  
 To provide examples of complex research systems, and to understand the two 




7.3- Case Analysis 
 For both cases, I show how the teams created research systems about complex2 
phenomena. I describe the phenomena they studied, how they partitioned them, the 
models that had functional relationships to the parts, and the devices and strategies and 
equipment that the teams used to study the complex phenomena to engender new 
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 The Johnson, Porter, and Tulchinsky (JPT) team studied the process of speciation. 
They made the phenomenon of a speciation complex2 by cleaving it into at least six parts:  
1. Gene interactions within an individual organism, the production of a gene product 
(RNA or protein) as the terminal event of a GRN;  
2. Organism life cycle; 
3. Population of organisms, their breeding, and their generational turnover;  
4. Variation of phenotypes within population; 
5. Two distinct populations; 
6. Production of distinct species populations that yielded unfit hybrids;  
 
The JPT team used at least five different models, which had epistemic functional 
relations to the above phenomena. Based on their structures, I also categorize those 
models as either mechanistic, statistical, or other.  
A. Gene regulatory network model. As the project evolved, the team changed the 
model to capture bioenergetic interactions of transcription factors binding to DNA 
regulatory elements. (Mechanistic).   
B. Custom JPT evolutionary genetic models, which are sets of equations for 
calculating phenotype values and fitnesses. As the project evolved, the team 
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changed the equations for the phenotype values to capture bioenergetic processes 
of transcription factors binding to DNA regulatory elements. (Statistical) 
C. Model of organismal reproduction and generational turnover. (Mechanistic)  
D. Data models. (Statistical) 
E. Bateson, Dobzhansky, Muller (BDM) model of speciation. (Other) 
 
Based on the structural category into which each model falls, we’d expect the 
models to have the following epistemic functional relations to the six phenomena.  
• The GRN model describes, explains, and predicts phenomenon 1. 
• Taken as interpreted models, the custom evolutionary genetic models describe 
parts of phenomenon 1, calculating phenotype and fitness values. The amount of 
gene product counts as the phenotype value for the organism or its GRN.  
• The model of reproduction and generational turnover describes, explains, and 
predicts phenomenon 2, and describes and explains phenomenon 3. 
• The data models describe phenomenon 4.   
• The BDM model describes phenomena 5 and 6.  
• As a set, and taken purely theoretically, all four models predict the probability of 
speciation across many runs of evolving populations.  
 
The above functional relations are consistent with the content analysis results 
(Table 5.4) for JPT’s research reports. Table 5.4 ranked the prevalence of different 
epistemic aims explicitly or implicitly mentioned in those reports. The table showed that, 
by number of words/sentences related to each epistemic aim, description of phenomena 
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and prediction of phenomena were the teams most important aims, with explanation of 
phenomena a distant third. The above relations show that all the models employed 
described parts of the complex2 phenomenon (speciation), and that the theoretical system 
as a whole enabled predictions of speciation. Furthermore, while two models 
mechanistically explain phenomena, the team only appeals to the explanations 
accomplished by the GRN model. I collect most of the above information in Figure 7.2 
 
 
Fig. 7.2. The Complex Phenomenon of the JPT Research System. The figure shows 
the nested complex phenomenon studied by the JPT team in their project. The Center 
most grey box represents gene interactions within individual organisms. The white box 
outside of it represents individual life cycles, and the hexagon outside of it represents 
breeding and generational turnover in generations. The box outside of it represents 
variation in phenotype values at the population level, nested within a box representing 
two multiple distinct populations. The outermost box represents speciation. The various 
boxes outside the nested boxes represents scientific products, which relate to the 
phenomena via epistemic functional relations, represented as arrowed lines.  
 
 Figure 7.2 remains a hypothesis in need of further validation. While it is 
consistent with the content analysis results, I’ve yet to show that it’s confirmed or 
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disconfirmed by them. To do so, I’d need to examine each count datum, code them as 
related to a specific model, and tally the results. I leave that task for future research.  
 Finally, the complex2 phenomenon studied by JPT is part of a research system 
that enabled them to study that phenomenon over many years, and to tinker with it to 
simulate new events. To study their phenomenon, the team used equipment, devices, and 
instruments. The equipment they used included the computers on which they wrote their 
programs and ran their simulations. Those programs were devices to control and simulate 
phenomena and instruments to measure the simulated phenomena. The claim that the JPT 
team tinkered with their research system over time is confirmed by Table 5.1, which 
collects most of the manipulations the team conducted.  
 
WGR System 
 The Wray, Garfield, and Runcie (WGR) team studied variation in alleles and in 
gene expression across purple sea urchins. They made those phenomena complex2 by 
separating them into the following (hierarchical) parts.  
1. Within individual organisms, gene structures, gene productions, and gene 
interactions. 
2. Organismal growth and development. 
3. Population variation in gene structure, amount of gene products, degree of gene 
interactions, and other phenotypes such as shape of blastula and time to 
gastrulation. 
4. Evolution to structures of genes. 
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The WGR used a plethora of models to better understand all of those phenomena. 
A. Gene model. (Other) 
B. GRN model. (Mechanistic) 
C. Developmental stages tables. (Other) 
D. Data models such as π, θ, πi, ρ, and their related estimators. (Statistical) 
E. Covariance data models. (Statistical) 
F. Custom Bayesian models. (Statistical) 
G. Models of evolution: drift only, Tajima’s D, Fu and Li’s D, Fay and Wu’s H, 
modified McDonald-Kreitman, modified Hudson-Kreitman-Aguade. (Statistical) 
 
Based on the category of the models, we’d expect the above models to have the following 
functional relationships to the phenomena. 
• The gene model describes gene structures and products. 
• The GRN model describes gene interactions, and it predicts and describes their 
outcomes. It also partially predicts and explains organismal growth and 
development.  
• The developmental tables describe organismal growth and development.  
• Data models like π, θ, πi, ρ describe the variation in gene structures across the 
population.  
• Covariance data models describe some of the variation the amount of gene 
products or in the degree of gene interactions across the population.  
• The custom Bayesian models describe and partially explain the variation in the 
amount of gene products across organisms in the population.  
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• Standard data models/summary statistics describe the variation in other 
phenotypes across the population.  
• Models/statistical tests of evolution describe the evolution to the structures of 
genes.  
 
The above functional relations are consistent with the results from Table 6.3. of 
the WGR team’s publications, which ranks the relative importance of different functional 
relations for each publication. In that table, the highest ranked functional relation for all 
but one of the publications is that of describing phenomena, a relation included in all of 
the above bullet points. I summarize most of the information above into Figure 7.3, 
which remains a hypothesis in need of further validation just like Figure 7.2 and for the 
same reasons.  
But Table 6.3 is not fully captured by Figure 7.3. In the table, one of the primary 
aims of the WGR team is to discover phenomena, a category not included above. But in 
Table 6.3, the aim to discover new phenomena was the second most important aim for all 
but one of the publications. I suggest that the aim to discover new phenomena, while 
legitimate, is derivative on the aim of describing phenomena. The aim to discover a 
specific phenomenon is historically sensitive to a research community and to the body of 
knowledge at a time. Once achieved for a given phenomenon, research system, 
community, and body of knowledge, it cannot be achieved again. But researchers can still 
export the scientific products they used to discover that phenomenon to related 
phenomena, research systems, communities, and bodies of knowledge.  
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Figure 7.3 also shows that three kinds of models explain their target phenomena: 
the GRN model, the Bayesian model, and the evolution models. Explanation of  
 
Fig. 7.3. The Complex Phenomenon of the WGR research system. The figure shows 
the nested complex phenomenon studied by the WGR team over the course of their 
project. The center-most grey boxes represent three levels of phenomena within 
individual sea urchins: gene structures, products, and interactions. The white hexagon 
represents development and growth in individual sea urchins. The white oval represents 
the phenomena of individuals making offspring, and bridges the individual and 
population levels of phenomena. The four grey curved-corner rectangles represent 
different population-level phenomena of variations, while the two white square-cornered 
rectangles represent population-level phenomena of evolution. The boxes outside of the 
nested system represent scientific products, and the arrows between those boxes and the 
nested levels indicate the epistemic functional relations between scientific products and 




phenomena is the third highest ranked epistemic relation from Table 6.3. I discuss each of 
the above model/ phenomenon relations in order. 
  The GRN model is mechanistic, and as such it explains a phenomenon by 
describing the subsystem that achieves the phenomenon and the workings of the 
subsystem such that it achieves that phenomenon. The model decomposes part of 
organismal growth and development into gene networks, and it decomposes gene 
networks into genes and gene products. The activities and interactions in the GRN 
explain how genes make their products in their cellular contexts, and ultimately how cells 
differentiate and cause the organism o develop. The GRN is unique among the WGR 
research system as the only scientific product that bridges multiple levels of the complex2 
phenomenon to explain target phenomena, and to do so mechanistically.  
The Bayesian models explain, in a statistical sense, population variation in the 
amount of gene regulatory products. They do so via analysis of variance, by breaking the 
variance into parts and quantifying the sources of those parts.  
The models of evolution as statistical tests explain how populations are evolving 
by identifying the kind of selection operating on them. Such selection can be positive, 
negative, balancing, non-existent, etc. Such identifications, however, are tentative, what I 
call how-likely explanations. Those identifications provide working hypotheses that 
researchers can study either experimentally in in many kinds of extant populations, or via 
simulation for extinct species, dead generations, or difficult to study actual populations.  
In (Wray 2013), Wray explicitly discusses the evolving epistemic aims of 
evolutionary genetics. “The operational goals of evolutionary genetics have grown 
substantially beyond characterizing genetic architecture. In short, the goal has shifted 
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from description to comprehension” (Wray 2013, 52). While Wray discusses the ways 
researchers now get functional information about genes in relation to each other, he at 
best gestures at meanings for the quoted text. I use Figure 7.3 to explicate that quote. To 
comprehend evolutionary phenomena, Wray means that we must give descriptions of the 
links between the functions of genes and their effects on organisms’ development, and 
that we must causally explain the effects of those links. GRNs both describe the links 
between those levels of phenomena, and they explain the effects of those links. Such 
explanations provide one causal component of an analysis of variance on population-
level variation. Such an analysis is of genetic variance, which is to be combined with 
components for environmental variances, interaction variances, and error variances.   
 Finally, the WGR team used many devices and tools to develop its research 
systems.  In Figure. 7.3, no scientific product relates to the phenomenon of breeding. 
That said, this phenomenon was central to the WGR team. They controlled this 
phenomenon with the North Carolina II breeding design, and so that design, while not a 
scientific product in the normal sense, is a device central to the research system. 
Furthermore, the team used a plethora of devices to gather data about various levels of 
their complex2 phenomena, many computer programs to analyze that data, and further 







7.4- Cross-Case Comparisons 
The projects have three primary similarities as they relate to epistemology: the 
construction of research systems with complex2 phenomena, strong signals for non-
explanatory epistemic aims, and a shared gene concept. I discuss each in turn.  
 
Research Systems 
When philosophers and theorists talk about the outputs of evolutionary biology, 
they tend to focus on models, theories, conclusions, and data. All of those things are 
important products, and we can do much to better understand how research construct 
those items and how they diffuse through a research community. But another possible 
output is the research system, or at least the framework for recreating the system at other 
locations.  
A research system enables researchers to return to a relatively controlled 
phenomenon, to tinker with it, to ask new questions of it, to develop new scientific 
products to address it, and to evaluate different functional relationships between those 
products and the parts of the phenomenon. 
Both teams studied here constructed unique research systems. For the JPT team, 
their research system enabled them to tinker, for more than a decade, with the 
phenomenon they studied, simulating speciation with roughly the same set of models, but 
varying the number of genes and alleles, the kinds of selection, the strength of mutation, 
migration, and ultimately developing a model of gene regulation that was both 
bioenergetically realistic and tractable with fitness. For the WGR team, their research 
system enabled them to explore, for several years, the amount by which genes varied in 
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their expression, and how those variations correlated with variations in different 
embryonic phenotypes. 
 The research systems have two commonalities that indicate aspects of the theory 
of knowledge implicitly shared by the projects. First, the phenomena studied are 
complex2, for which the teams make no apologies. I infer, then, that the phenomena 
studied in this burgeoning field will in many cases be complex2.  
Second, and as a corollary, no single model or theory will have all desired 
functional epistemic relations to all parts of the phenomena. Rather, the systems of 
models used are piecemeal. The teams require no overarching theory to unite all the 
models. However, they do rely on a bridge concept of gene, discussed in further detail 
later, to at least ensure that GRN models and evolutionary genetic models pick out the 
same bits of the genome.  
 
Epistemic Aims 
 Both of the projects studied here deploy systems of models to meet myriad 
epistemic aims for the complex2 phenomena they study. As captured by figures 7.2 and 
7.3, the models are specific to one or two levels or parts of the phenomena, and some 
serve only one or two epistemic functions. For instance, with the WGR team, the data 
models π and θ describe the population variation in gene structure, but they don’t explain 
that variation, nor do they predict, describe, or explain the gene structures themselves.  
 From the content analyses, the research reports have strong signals for the relative 
importance of non-explanatory epistemic functions. Especially strong was the signal for 
the epistemic function of simply describing phenomena, the highest or second-highest 
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ranked epistemic function for all research reports. Also important were the epistemic 
aims of predicting phenomena (JPT team) and discovering new phenomena (WGR team), 
the latter of which I classified as a secondary form, subject to temporal indexing, of 
describing phenomena.  
 Nearly all who market evo-devo or devo-evo stress that the new disciplines will 
enable researchers to causally explain evolutionary phenomena with developmental 
mechanisms. Given the results from this dissertation, we might note two things. First, 
evolutionary geneticists often aim to give phenomenological models, or those that enable 
them to describe and predict phenomena, not necessarily to explain phenomena. Insofar 
as researcher study phenomena with models of developmental mechanisms and of 
evolutionary mechanisms, they might take care not to forsake other epistemic aims as 
without value. A system of models that enables us to explain an evolutionary 
phenomenon, but not to control it or predict it, may find less use than a system that 
enables us to do the latter, but not the former.  
Second, for complex2 phenomena, models of development mechanisms can at 
best be parts of causal stories for such phenomena, but they can’t explain all parts of 
those phenomena. With an account of complexity2, proponents of evo-devo and devo-evo 
can now better describe the explanatory role and scope of models of developmental 






Gene Concepts  
Both teams are somewhat cavalier with how they conceptualize genes. Neither 
project explicitly defines their gene concepts, but based on how they study genes, we can 
infer at least a couple of aspects implicit in a concept shared across the two projects.  
For both projects, a gene must have at least two features. First, an allele of that 
gene must be comprised of sections of chromosome (sections that needn’t be contiguous 
nor, nor perhaps even on the same chromosome) that produce a single kind of RNA. 
While there are one-one relations between alleles and kinds of RNAs, there needn’t be 
one-one relations between alleles and proteins, or between contiguous segments of DNA 
and kinds of RNA, but there can be such relations for specific alleles. In many cases, 
each allele will have a regulatory region on the 5ʹ side of the start codon for the allele’s 
most inclusive coding region, and that region will contain most of the binding site for 
regulatory molecules. That site will vary in length depending on the allele. A gene, and 
its alleles, that has the above feature can be represented in GRN models.  
Second, a gene that produces an RNA must satisfy the Mendelian laws of 
segregation, and its alleles must satisfy the Mendelian law of independent assortment. 
Insofar as those laws are met, researchers can use the models of evolutionary genetics to 
study how the frequency of that gene changes (or doesn’t) in populations. The JPT adopts 
these Mendelian assumptions throughout its project, and the WGR team assumes them 
for statistical tests of evolution in (Garfield et al. 2012), and for their breeding design in 
all their studies.  
Many have viewed those two aspects as at best in tension, and perhaps 
incompatible (Falk 2000; Falk 2010; Griffith and Neumann-Held 1999).  The first aspect 
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of the concept is one commonly associated with a gene concept that evolved, starting in 
the mid-twentieth century, in molecular biology, while the latter is one that evolved, 
starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, in studies of heredity and 
transmission of hereditary material from parents to offspring (Waters 1994; Weber 2005).   
One way to understand the tension between those aspects is to consider them as 
rules for isolating phenomena. Historically, many hoped to relate the two concepts to 
each other (Weber 2005). Their general strategy was something like this. Use each 
concept to pick out a set of phenomena. Insofar each set includes the same material 
entities, then we can establish relations between the concepts, perhaps conceptually 
reducing one to the other, or perhaps interpreting one with the other. But the strategy 
went astray at the first step. Each concept appeared to refer to different sets of entities. As 
the concepts pick out different, though overlapping, sets of referents, many concluded 
that the relations between the two concepts are at best unclear, and at worst opaque. 
The projects studied here overcome that tension in at least two interesting ways. 
First, for a given species, neither team considers all possible units that the first aspect of 
their gene concept might pick out, then all possible units that the second aspect might 
pick out, and then compare the two sets. Rather, they use GRNs to focus their searches. 
By starting with GRNs, the teams focus on a set of genes known to meet the first aspect 
of the definition. Next, they assume that those genes meet the second aspect of their gene 
concept. Given that assumption, the teams study the evolution of those genes within 
populations, and how that evolution affects speciation, developmental systems drift, 
phenotypic plasticity, etc. While teams like the JPT team can build that assumption into 
their models and simulation systems, teams like the WGR team, who study actual 
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organisms, must eventually substantiate the assumption with empirical work, or flag it for 
further research. In any case, the teams progressively narrow down the set of putative 
genes that they study, until they get to a set for which the elements meet both features of 
their gene concept. 
Second, the teams focus on gene products (RNAs and proteins) as the relevant 
phenotypes for both aspects of their gene concept. That tactic differs from those of earlier 
strategies to relate the two aspects.  
Traditionally for the transmission concept of gene, genes were distinguished from 
each other by their abilities to affect different adult phenotypes, such as petal color or 
pea-wrinkledness (Weber 2005, Chapter 7). Alleles were distinguished from each other 
by their abilities to alter the same adult phenotype, such as the colors of petals. 
Traditionally for the molecular concept of gene, genes were distinguished from each 
other by their ability to produce distinct proteins. Researchers assumed both concepts, 
insofar as they isolated genes, isolated hereditary material that was spatially contiguous. 
Those who refashioned the molecular concept abandoned that assumption (Waters 1994), 
and those who refashioned the transmission concept came to see that it was never 
necessarily part of their concept. But while those who refashioned the molecular concept 
came to distinguish genes by their ability to produce distinct kinds of RNAs, and maybe 
even by more precise functions, those who refashioned the transmission concept 
continued to focus on adult phenotypes, though they sometimes focused on juvenile and 
embryonic phenotypes related to an organisms physiology or anatomy.  
For the two projects studied here, and for both the molecular aspect and the 
transmission aspect, both teams distinguish genes by their functional relations to RNAs. 
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The JPT team defines its model of fitness for a GRN on the amount of product produced 
by the final gene in the network, such that the more product produced by one allele over 
the other, the more it will dominate the other and impact the developing organism. The 
WGR team, on the other hand describes the amount of RNA produced in (cohorts of) 
organisms, it calculates how much those amounts vary across (cohorts of) organisms, and 
it infers the sources of such variation, including genetic sources. Its GRNs, or at least 
gene batteries, that have functional relations to embryonic, juvenile, or adult, phenotypes.  
So both teams employ a gene concept that features aspects from concepts often 
thought in tension or incompatible. They do so by distinguishing one gene from another 
by the kinds of RNAs produced by those genes, and by focusing on genes from known 
GRNs, and then further focusing on those genes assumed to meet the Mendelian 
assumptions. For actual organisms, those assumptions are empirically testable. Some 
have lamented the abstractness of the transmission concept of the gene, but the 
abstractness here counts in its favor, enabling researchers to find ways to apply it to new 
systems of study.  
This implicit concept of gene is, for both teams, the most direct link between their 
mechanistic GRN models and their statistical evolutionary genetic models. It enables 
both teams to construct their complex2 phenomena in such a way that models often 
thought to be incompatible with each other can have distinct epistemic functional 





7.5- Research Agenda for Developmental Evolution (Devo-Evo) 
In this section I address the final driving question of this dissertation: What are 
the prospects for developmental evolution? I address this question in four different 
contexts: first as it applies to research projects like the ones studied in this dissertation; 
second as it applies to integration; third as it applies to debates about the structures and 
scope of synthesized theories in evo-devo and devo-evo; and finally as it applies to a 
specific conception of developmental evolution proposed here.      
 
The JPT and WGR Systems and Those Like Them 
What are the prospects for the JPT research system? There are reasons to think 
that the system developed by the JPT team will spread to other research teams. First, the 
team developed it purely theoretically, so experimentalists can interpret it to apply to 
empirical phenomena. Next, the team showed how their system could relate to many 
kinds of phenomena that evolutionary geneticists traditionally care about, such us 
speciation, migration, epistasis, and hybrid incompatibility. Furthermore, they showed 
how it relates to genetic systems that developmental geneticists increasingly care about, 
such as gene interactions (physically interpreted epistasis) and actual genetic structures. 
Finally, the JPT team increasingly specified their system to be empirically applicable in 
bioenergetic genetic systems.  
There are also reasons to think that JPT research system won’t spread to other 
teams. The system depends on researchers’ abilities to produce hundred and thousands of 
generations, or at least enough to present enough lineage evolution to enable hybrid 
incompatibilities. There are few actual organisms for which biologists have such control, 
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thus limiting the applicability of the system to organisms like yeast, bacteria, and maybe 
fruit flies, zebrafish and maybe some quickly germinating plants. Furthermore, research 
systems often travel to new labs via the migrations of graduated research students. The 
JPT team has had only one such student, Tulchinsky.   
Ultimately, if other teams pick up anything from the JPT team, it likely won’t be 
the whole research system, but just one or two of the models, especially their final model 
to calculate phenotypes from well-characterized genetic systems. Many researchers study 
gene structures of just of a few alleles and their interactions, so the JPT evolutionary 
genetic models likely have more exportability than the whole JPT system. The teams 
most likely to pick up the whole system are other simulators looking to extend the proof 
of concept (Servedio et al. 2014). 
What are the prospects for the WGR research system? Again, there are reasons for 
optimism. The JPT team used a lot of common or standardized tools, including the NC-II 
breeding design, the devices for detecting gene products, and purple sea urchins. As there 
are large research communities for all of those items, many other teams could adopt most 
of the WGR system. Furthermore, the Wray lab graduates a decent number of graduate 
students, who go on to research careers and could take the system with them.    
 But there are also reasons for pessimism. The system depends on a well-
documented GRN, and the best such system is that for sea urchins, which the WGR team 
already used. Furthermore, their custom Bayesian model, which they used to help 
estimate and establish the significance effects of different sources of gene expression 
variation, is complex and requires a research team who has a member trained in Bayesian 
statistics. Finally, their system relies on access to a facility that can do large scale gene 
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expression assays. The WGR team had access to one such facility at Duke, but many 
other research teams won’t have that luxury.  
 Ultimately, the WGR project’s results, but not the research system or the models, 
probably have the most likelihood of being exported. As drosophila GRNs become more 
accurately described, then the system may export to the drosophila research community. 
Furthermore, as the sea urchin GRN becomes better described for later developmental 
stages, and for more embryonic phenotypes, then researchers may again return to the 
system to study its microevolution. Other teams may also adopt the strategy from 
(Garfield et al. 2012) of applying statistical tests of selection to the cis-regulatory regions 
of genes, though current citations of the WGR articles indicate that other researchers are 
more interested in the team’s work on gene expression than on their work on selection of 
regulatory regions. The two WGR articles about gene expression each have three times 
more citations than the one about selection on regulatory regions.  
What are the prospects for further projects that develop systems that, like the JPT 
and WGR projects, use both models of evolutionary genetics and models of GRNs? I 
think the prospects are good. As a discipline, too many evolutionary biologists use 
evolutionary genetics for them to stop teaching or using it any time soon. But, as I discuss 
in the sections below, those biologists would be wise to abandon claims that evolutionary 
genetics comprises any kind of theoretical core to evolutionary biology. Most 
evolutionary phenomena are too complex to admit of a single theoretical core.  
But my above judgment has flaws. Many argue against the use of evolutionary 
genetics because of its supposed inability to help us understand most macro-evolutionary 
phenomena. They note that we understand those phenomena not when we use theories 
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and models of evolutionary genetics, but when we use models of developmental 
mechanisms like GRN models with comparative analyses across higher taxa. The most 
we can use evolutionary genetic models for, some argue, is to describe and predict the 
same old microevolutionary phenomena they’ve always described and explained, 
phenomena like the diffusion of petal colors through a population of geraniums.  
That argument, however, undersells the importance of developmental mechanisms 
and especially GRNs. Those who study macro-evolution may not need evolutionary 
genetics models, but as projects like the WGR and JPT projects show, those who study 
microevolution and speciation can use developmental mechanisms and GRNs to better 
understand microevolutionary phenomena.  
Some argue that evolutionary genetics has limited explanatory scope or power 
(Wagner 2000; Amundson 2005). They argue that the kinds of models deployed in evo-
devo or devo-evo, because they apply to higher taxa, have greater scope and therefore 
more explanatory power, and ultimately, are more valuable. That argument assumes that 
causal explanations of phenotypes are the only epistemic aims worth valuing, or at least 
are the most valuable. That assumption at the very least needs an argument to support it, 
but regardless, there are good reasons to argue against it. For the problems that face 
farmers, breeders, conservationists, zoos, and sustainability scientists, evolutionary 
genetics will continue to be highly valued, even if that field never provides a true causal 
explanation of the phenomena they study, but still enables them to ameliorate problems.  
 What are the prospects for the gene concept common to the WGR and JPT teams? 
I think the prospects for the concept are quite good. In many cases, it’s likely what many 
biologists have roughly in mind when they talk about genes. Furthermore, it enables 
 243 
researchers to connect evolutionary genes to phenotypes, even though those connections 
will be increasingly mediated between GRN and other developmental genetic models, 
rather than through traditional genotype-phenotype maps.  
 How might we interpret the materiality of the gene picked out by the gene 
concept? Researchers once thought of chromosomes as made of genes arranged in a 
bead-like manner. Sixty-five years of molecular genetics research destroyed that 
hypothesis. Perhaps a more fruitful way to think of genes is the reverse. Genes don’t 
comprise chromosomes, rather, genes are comprised of bits of chromosomes, bits that 
needn’t be contiguous. In this sense, chromosomes remain the material units of much of 
heredity, but genes are the functional units. If a chromosome mutates in such a way that 
the functional unit partly comprised by that chromosome doesn’t follow the laws of 
assortment and segregation, then that functional unit isn’t functional unit of heredity, 
even if it is a functional unit of development. If an offspring can’t inherit that gene, then 
it can’t spread, via descent, in the population. 
 
Integration 
 Many folks, from biologists to historians to philosophers, have discussed 
integration of evolutionary and developmental biology (Mitchell and Dietrich 2006; 
Brigandt 2010; Brigandt and Love 2010). What are the prospects for integrations, and for 
discussion of integration? I addressed the first part of that question in the previous 
section. Below, I address the later and indicate how we might fruitfully address the issue 
of integration.  
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Much of the discussion about integration has unclear aims. Some discuss how 
such integrations would be new in some sense (Burian 1986; Brigandt 2010; Wagner 
2010), others discuss how they would be retro in some sense (Morange 2011). Regardless 
of the answer, the theoretical or investigative aims of integration, let alone novel or retro 
integrations, remain unclear. Often, researchers use the topic of integration to wedge 
favored phenomena or scientists into emerging fields to legitimate those phenomena or 
scientists. As a result, evo-devo has increasingly come to mean just about anything to just 
about anyone.  
Those discussions about the newness or retro-ness of integrations in evo-devo 
have limited theoretical or investigative import. Researchers make broad claims about 
what questions such integrations will help us answer. But often they stop short of saying 
which non-intellectual problems they can solve, or what epistemic aims they will achieve, 
other than that of mechanistic explanation, implicitly taken as the only or best kind of 
understanding.  
Furthermore, insofar as those discussions focus on general questions, they suggest 
only the most lofty elements of research agendas (Love 2008) or of significance graphs 
(Kitcher 2001), which are structures of questions that researchers in a field pursue. In 
research agendas and significance graphs, the most general questions motivate the field, 
and they imply or otherwise indicate increasingly specific questions, which ultimately 
motivate specific research projects. Significance graphs form tree or bush-like structures 
or networks, in which the questions are nodes and the relations between them are edges. 
But while those in the debate propose an ever increasing list of general research 
questions, rarely do they provide strategies for inferring experimentally tractable 
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questions, or of connecting actual experimental or empirical  questions their proposed 
general nodes in a significance graph network. 
One source of that shortcoming is that those discussions have become debates in 
of themselves, divorced from research of recent scientific projects. As such, those debates 
often operate as vacuum chambers in which folks argue about what questions scientists 
can or cannot address, rather than what questions they actually aim to address, have 
addressed, or have attempted to address but have failed.  
But if we study actual research projects in depth, we find articles like Greg 
Wray’s 2013 review (Wray 2013). In it, he details no fewer than 15 questions, tying some 
to proposed general aims for the field, and tying most others to actual research projects 
and the specific questions they pursued. That review article, and others like it that 
similarly draw from the aims and conclusions of actual projects, provide excellent 
sources for those who wish to describe and debate the research agendas for fields that 
integrate evolutionary biology and developmental biology. They provide the questions 
actually pursued, and a next step would be to structure those questions into significance 
graphs, evaluate how well individual questions have been addressed or not, explore why 
groups of related questions have been addressed while other groups have been ignored or 
have resisted being answered, and indicate which areas of the significance graph are 
conspicuously sparse.         
A second source of the shortcoming, I suggest, is that many folks focus on 
theories or concepts as the items integrated, and they do so in an unsystematic way. 
Insofar as they do so, they focus on general questions that they take theories to address, 
and not on the specific questions pursued at the leading edge of research. Ron Amundson, 
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who focused on theories and concepts, acknowledges the limitations of that focus. After 
arguing that evo-devo is a distinct field (both novel and retro) because its fundamental 
concepts are incompatible with those of population-focused evolutionary biology, he 
concludes: “If both evo-devo and population genetics continue to be successful, a way 
will somehow be found to see them as consistent,” (Amundson 2005, 257).  
My case studies indicate that, for ongoing projects, there are many kinds of pieces 
that researchers must integrate to pursue their aims. Those pieces include theories, 
models, and concepts; but also methods or practices or protocols to prepare phenomena, 
collect data, and analyze it; problems, questions, values, and epistemic aims; research 
teams and research locations; communication channels, etc. To understand how 
researchers integrate theories and other scientific products, which is ultimately an 
empirical issue, we must systematically study how they integrate all of the above pieces 
in their research projects.  
More importantly, and as I indicated earlier, a fruitful unit by which to study 
integration is at the level of emerging research systems. Such systems incorporate many 
of the kinds of pieces listed above. I suggest that study of these units provides more 
insight into the evolution of ongoing science than do scientific products taken generally 
and abstractly. At the leading edge of fields that integrate developmental and 
evolutionary biology, the products are under constant revision, and as Amundson 
recognized, claims about the possibility or impossibility of integrations between those 
products face ever changing goal posts.  
Ultimately, we can’t evaluate such claims without attending to actual scientific 
projects, their research systems, and their rationales. I suggest that the theories that 
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survive scientific scrutiny won’t be those that we can first integrate and then apply to a 
range of phenomena. Rather, much of the competition is between research systems, and 
the theories or models that survive will be those that perform at least one epistemic 
function in relation to the complex phenomena that partly comprise the objects of those 
systems. While some scientists and philosophers work to integrate developmental and 
evolutionary biology at the level of theories, perhaps a more prevalent strategy among 
scientists is to construct complex2 phenomena in research systems. For them, theories, 
models, and other scientific products need only be non-contradictory with each other, 
apply to at least one aspect or component of a complex phenomenon, and perform at least 
one epistemic function (explanation, descriptions, prediction, etc.) in regards to that 
aspect.   
So how might those of us who study the integration of evolutionary biology and 
developmental biology fruitfully study integration? First, we should focus on research 
systems with complex phenomena and multiple scientific products, not just on scientific 
products. Second, we should study actual research projects, especially at the leading edge 
of research. But we can also fruitfully address research agendas by identifying and 
explicating the evolution of significance graphs, not just of questions, but also if non-
intellectual problems and epistemic aims. We can identify and explicate practices and 
methods and the integration of investigative protocols and strategies. And we can address 
the social phenomena of how scientists integrate research teams, funding streams, and 
communication channels. If we study those topics empirically, we can describe and 
explain how scientists actually integrate different aspects of developmental and 
evolutionary biology.  
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Structure of Evo-Devo 
 Many philosophers and theoreticians argue with each other about the structure of 
evo-devo and of devo-evo in comparison to traditional evolutionary theory as developed 
in the modern synthesis. Some competing positions argue that evo-devo is:  
1. an interfield theory, or a collections of such theories: discussed hypothetically 
by several authors in (Bechtel 1986).  
2. an extension to the modern synthesis: (Müller 2007; Pigliucci 2008; Pigliucci 
and Müller 2010; Laland et al. 2014; Laland et al. 2015) 
3. a theoretical framework distinct from the modern synthesis (in good ways): 
(Amundson 2005; Craig 2009; Craig 2010; Craig 2011; Craig 2015). 
4. a theoretical framework distinct from the modern synthesis and from devo-
evo, the last of which is more fruitful: (Hall 2000; Davidson 2011; Laubichler 
2010; Wagner 2000; Wagner et al. 2001; Wagner 2014). 
5. not distinct from traditional evolutionary theory, and insofar as it is described 
as such, the descriptions are confused: (Hoekstra and Coyne 2007; Lynch 
2007; Wray et al. 2014). 
 
What are the prospects for the above debate? In terms of the debate continuing, 
there is much grist for the mill, and so the prospects are good. In terms of settling the 
debate, the prospects are bad. Regardless of the intended aims of the above authors, none 
of the above claims has been shown to be accurate representations about the theories in 
the developing field(s). That’s not to say that one or more of them can’t be true. Rather, 
the issue is an empirical one, not a purely conceptual one. To address it, we need to better 
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describe the epistemological structures of fields. While many above discuss supposed 
relations between theories and models, my conclusions above indicate that, if we want 
accurate descriptions, we should also look at other kinds of items. Those items include 
the research systems constructed by those in the field, the complex2 phenomena that party 
comprise those systems, and the specific epistemic functional relations between different 
models (and kinds of models) and parts of those complex2 phenomena (and kinds of 
phenomena).  
Rather than continuing the above debate, there is another path when examining 
models and theories. Love has noted that theorists at the intersection of developmental 
biology and evolutionary biology offer theories he calls material inference structures 
(MISs) (Love 2013). These are collections of abstract generalizations that, depending on 
the research goals of research teams at a given time, lead the teams to develop tools to 
understand phenomena, tools that might be inconsistent with each other across research 
projects. I disagree with many of the details of Love’s account, but I agree with the 
overall thrust.5  
More is to be gained by following Love’s strategy. Love highlights the set of 
generalizations proposed by (Carroll 2008). But other theorists have proposed distinct 
sets of generalizations. Eric Davidson proposed a set of generalizations specific GRNs 
(Davidson 2011), and a group of scientists and philosophers proposed one for evo-devo 
more broadly (Laland et al. 2015). Rather than debating the amount of difference these 
systems have in relation to the modern synthesis, theorists and philosophers can improve 
                                                
5 I think Love’s account of MISs and their relations to models is a special case of the theory-model 
relationship described in (Krakauer et al. 2011). 
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the study of nature by focusing on these sets of generalizations, clarifying them, and 
showing that they function (or don’t) in successful research.     
 
Developmental Evolution 
What are the prospects for developmental evolution (devo-evo)? I conclude this 
dissertation by arguing that the prospects are quite good, given the account of 
developmental evolution proposed below. For now, when I talk about developmental 
evolution, I assume only that it is an emerging field at the interface of developmental 
biology and evolutionary biology, and that it substantially differs, and will continue to 
differ, from the other primary field developing at that interface, evo-devo, and from the 
modern synthesis. By the end of this section, I propose a more specific account of devo-
evo.  
For its primary proponents, giving an account of developmental evolution has 
proven tricky. Brian Hall asserted that devo-evo was a distinct field, but said little about 
how (Hall 2000). Afterwards, proponents distinguished devo-evo from other fields via 
two related strategies. They focused on kinds of phenomena to be explained, or they 
focused on the kinds of questions to be answered.  
Folks focused on kinds of phenomena, most commonly on evolutionary novelties, 
especially of morphology (Wagner 2000; Love 2008; Brigandt and Love 2010). Such 
novelties include the tetrapod limb and avian feathers. Such phenomena occur above the 
species level of taxonomy, and so their evolution is called macroevolution. Researchers 
proposed to classify those kinds of phenomena as developmental types (Amundson 
2005), a concept that made it easier to conceptualize morphological homologies above 
 251 
the species level also as products of evolution, and to add those to the explanatory agenda 
of devo-evo (Wagner 2014). Over the years, folks have posed myriad questions that 
could be collected into a research agenda for devo-evo (Amundson 2005; Love 2008; 
Laubichler 2010; Davidson 2011). 
From that work, we might characterize devo-evo as: 
a field in which researchers use developmental mechanisms to explain the 
evolution of developmental types, a class of phenomena that includes 
morphological novelties and homologies.  
 
The prospects for the field characterized above are good, but proponents of devo-
evo should aim for more. Those proponents argue that devo-evo has the potential to 
significantly differ from evo-devo and from traditional evolutionary biology. Insofar as 
they set a different research agenda from those fields, as they currently do, then they will 
ensure that the fields do differ. But in their bolder moments, those proponents argue that 
devo-evo has the potential to obviate evo-devo and to supplant traditional evolutionary 
biology (Laubichler 2010; Davidson 2011). How might we reframe the research agenda 
of devo-evo so that it can do so?  
Evo-devo faces some epistemological issues. Many folks want it to be a 
theoretical system that fits everyone’s needs, from research to education to healthcare 
(Moczek et al. 2015). Partly as a result, there is a diminished focus on evolution, both 
empirically and theoretically, in leading-edge evo-devo research, as many researchers 
focus increasingly on developmental genetics (Diogo 2016). Perhaps the best route 
forward for evo-devo is as a trading zone that permits researchers to exchange epistemic 
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tools, research systems, and the like (Winther 2015). But for evo-devo, it seems no 
unique theory of knowledge is in the offing. The case is different for devo-evo.   
To supplant traditional evolutionary biology, devo-evo proponents might pursue 
the following tactic. In addition to their agreed agenda about developmental types and 
macroevolution, they might adopt as much of the agenda of traditional evolutionary 
biology as possible, and show that the epistemic tools and strategies of devo-evo achieve 
that agenda better than do those of the traditional field. That is, even for 
microevolutionary phenomena, when we use models of developmental mechanisms, like 
GRN models, we understand that phenomena better than if we hadn’t used those models.  
That tactic has the potential to unite researchers from the five camps listed in the 
previous section. Some devo-evo proponents are already proposing epistemic tools and 
strategies that adopt this tactic (Atchley and Hall 1991; Stern 2010; Pavlicev and Wagner 
2012). The two projects studied in this dissertation also adopt it. While the JPT team 
would likely endorse the revolutionary aspect of devo-evo, Wray of the WGR team 
explicitly refutes it (Wray et al. 2014). But both pursue the same strategy of using 
developmental mechanisms to better understand microevolutionary phenomena.  
Those who promote devo-evo have severely criticized evolutionary genetic theory 
and models. As a group, they argue that genetic evolution is a poor proxy for phenotypic 
evolution, that we can’t use those models to understand macroevolutionary phenomena 
besides speciation, that those models can’t capture the number of genes found in GRNs, 
and that they can’t capture evolution to genes that causes those genes to change their 
structure and functions. Therefore, they argue, those theories and models can’t provide 
the foundation for a general theory of evolution. Fair enough.  
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Those arguments show that we shouldn’t privilege evolutionary genetic models 
and microevolutionary phenomena as the core of evolutionary biology, not that we 
shouldn’t value them at all. Talk of theoretical cores for evolution led to the debate 
discussed in the previous section. To understand complex evolutionary phenomena, 
researchers could look to assemble unified or synthetized theories, but for now they’re 
doing what they always do: using whatever theoretical tools they can get to help them 
understand the phenomena they study.  
To take over the research agenda of traditional evolutionary biology, devo-evo 
proponents can avoid talk of theoretical cores entirely. They can instead focus on the 
theories that work, that help us understand phenomena, theories that are distinct from 
each other for different parts of complex evolutionary phenomena. When it comes to 
integrating or synthesizing models for such phenomena, those scientific products need 
only be consistent with each other in relation to their specific phenomena.  
Proponets of devo-evo needlessly limit the scope of their field, which decreases 
the likelihood that devo-evo supplants traditional evolutionary biology. They do so by 
privileging the epistemic aim of mechanistic explanation. They also do so by focusing as 
much as they do on macroevolutionary phenomena. Finally, they do so by building their 
research questions and agendas around that aim and those phenomena.  
In the long run, if devo-evo adopts the research agenda of evolutionary genetics, it 
sets itself up to develop a more general theory of genetic inheritance. For such a theory, 
phenomena once understood by models that assumed Mendel’s laws would become 
special cases of the more general theory. Evolutionary genetics can do little with 
macroevolutionary phenomena. But it also struggles with a wide range of transmission 
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phenomena at the microevlotuionary scale. The time is ripe to develop a theory that can 
account for those phenomena, and for Mendelian phenomena as a special case.  
 I conclude that devo-evo should broaden its horizons. For epistemic aims, it 
should countenance projects that pursue many distinct aims, such as discovery, 
description, prediction, in addition to explanation. Second, for phenomena, it should 
countenance projects that study macroevolutionary and microevolutionary phenomena, 
complex or not. And for research agendas, it should countenance as many research 
problems and research questions as its practitioners can make precise and address.  
Given those claims, I characterize developmental evolution as: 
a field in which researchers use scientific products about (at least) 
developmental mechanisms to understand evolutionary phenomena.  
 
Described as such, devo-evo researchers can absorb many theories and many research 
agendas from traditional evolutionary biology, and use them in a broad field without a 
single theoretical core.  
 It is according to this characterization of devo-evo, which succinctly captures the 
inclusive spirit of (Wagner et al. 2001), that I think the prospects for a revolutionary 
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Goal: If you follow this protocol, you will have an electronic file that represents a 
population of research projects related to a topic. The protocol assumes the concept of 
and operationalization of “research project” in Chapter 2. The protocol relies on the Web 
of Science Database and on the programs Tethne (Peirson et al 2015) and Cytoscape 
(Kilcoyne et al. 2009; http://www.cytoscape.org/). The protocol has eleven steps.   
 
1. Develop a set of known cases. Use informal methods to list a small collection of 
research projects (4–8) related to the theme of interest.  
 
2. Form a topic or a collection of papers about a common theme. 
a. The theme is captured by the questions or problem that motivates your 
project. 
b. Specify a multi-year time period on which to focus the theme.  
c. Develop a list of keywords relevant to that theme.  
d. On a web browser, go to the Web of Science (WoS) database. It will 
require access through a paying subscriber, such as a library.  
e. In the Wos database, input your keywords and collect your results.  
f. Refine your results to include documents only from the time period 
specified in step (2.b).  
g. Refine your results to exclude document types, such as letters to the editor, 
that aren’t wanted in the final collection of papers. This step may take 
several iterations and refinements.  
h. Export final WoS results for use in Tethne by following the protocol: 
http://diging.github.io/tethne/doc/0.6.1-beta/tutorial.getting_data.html  
i. For WoS data, you can only download information about 500 papers at a 
time. If your WoS collection of papers is greater than 500, download the 
data in files of 500 papers or less. Once you have all of those files, copy 
and past the data from each of them into a single large text file. Store all of 
these files in a manageable folder on your computer. 
 
3. For any any two papers, compare the authors, and place the papers that 
share an author in a common pile or folder (ORP-4). 
a. Install Tethne on your computer. Use the following installation guide. 
http://diging.github.io/tethne/doc/0.6.1-beta/installation.html  
b. Load the WoS data into Tethne according to the following instructions. 
http://diging.github.io/tethne/doc/0.6.1-beta/tethne.readers.wos.html#module-
tethne.readers.wos 
c. Analyze the WoS data such that Tethne creates author coupling networks, in 
which papers are nodes and edges between the papers represent shared 
authors. http://diging.github.io/tethne/doc/0.6.1-
beta/tethne.networks.papers.html#tethne.networks.papers.author_coupling 
d. Export the networks into a GraphML file for use in Cytoscape. Follow the 
directions for ‘Reading WoS Data’, ‘Building a Static Network’, and ‘Export 
to GraphML’, but in the instructions, ‘bibliographic_coupling()’ with 




4. From the papers in each pile or folder, infer the team members (ORP-3) and 
the temporal period of the project (ORP-5). 
a. (This step is easier after the next step. Complete this step on a separate piece 
of or from a printout of the Cytoscape visualization.)  
 
5. List each putative research project, its members, and its time period. Each 
pile or folder represents a putative research project. The collection of piles or 
folders represents a population of research projects. 
a. Install Cytoscape 3.1 on your computer. 
http://www.cytoscape.org/download.php  
b. Load your GraphML file into Cytoscape. 
http://diging.github.io/tethne/doc/0.6.1-
beta/tutorial.bibliocoupling.html#import 
c. Visualize the network and play around with it using the tips described here. 
http://diging.github.io/tethne/doc/0.6.1-beta/tutorial.coauthors.html#visualize-
the-static-graph 
d. Save the network as a .csv file that can be loaded in Cytoscape for later study.  
e. Save the network as an image file to be used in reports.  
 
6. Check for false negatives in the population of cases. Use the set of known cases 
from step (1). Compare the population to that set, and if the population lacks 
many of those cases, begin again at step (1). Use a new method to collect papers 
for step (2).  
 
7. Check for false positives. Focus on putative projects with many more papers or 
members, or with much longer temporal periods, than other putative projects in 
the population. Those putative projects may represent several research projects. 
To distinguish those projects from each other, use inference methods (V-ORP-6 
through V-ORP-9). Furthermore, check that authors with the same name are in 
fact the same person.  
 
8. Check further for false positives. If step six doesn’t resolve large putative 
projects into distinct smaller projects, use V-ORP-10 on the abstracts of the 
papers.   
 
9. Check still further for false positives. For each project, search for other papers 
by the same authors in roughly the same time period about the same theme. 
Additional papers further support the existence of that project.  
 
10. Check once again for false positives. For each project, search for other kinds of 
documents that could be outputs of the project. Such documents include grant 
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applications or reports, white papers or institutional documents, outreach pieces, 
etc. Additional documents further support the existence of that project.  
 
11. Validate the results. For each project, if possible, contact the members of the 
team. Ask them if, given the concept of research project, they would classify the 
papers listed as outputs of the same project. Assent provides further evidence for 
the existence of the project. Dissent provides evidence against the existence of the 
project, and perhaps a need to modify the set of papers, the relevant team 
members, or with enough dissent, the concept of research project.  
 
 
Notes on the Protocol 
 As each network represents a putative research project, the collection of such 
networks represents the putative population of research projects related to a topic. The 
putative population is an approximation to the actual population of projects related to a 
topic. The above protocols bias the putative population in at least two ways. First, they 
reconstruct only those projects that had research papers as outputs. Second, they 
reconstruct only those projects that published papers in journals indexed and sorted by 
the academic database used, Web of Science in this case. Furthermore, much depends on 
the sets and structures of keywords used to generate a corpus in the databases, and those 
who use the protocols will have to tinker with those sets and structures before they get 
usable results.  
 Next, there is a trade-off between the specificity of a theme and the size of the 
population of research projects. The more specific the theme, as represented by the 
structure of the intersections and unions of the search results of many keywords, the 
smaller will be the population. The less specific the theme, the larger the population. If 
the population is small, we face issues of how to select projects for individual case study 
without biasing our results. I address this issue in Chapter 2. Also, if the population is 
large, many of the networks will represent clusters of many research projects, and a case 
study researcher will spend much time distinguishing distinct projects.  
 Finally, if we study in-depth a research project or projects identified by the above 
protocol, the results of those studies generalize to the population from which they were 
selected. Thus, the concept of research project and the protocols enable us to specify an 
answer to the question raised in the introduction. That case is a case of what, exactly? If 
we use the concept and the protocols, we can answer: That case x is a case of research 
projects RP related to topic T. Each individual answer must specify a single case x, a 
population of cases RP, and T.  
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Goal: If you follow this protocol, you will have a case description of a research project. 
That description will be in a standard format so that you can systematically compare 
cases to each other. That description will have five primary sections: 
 
Section 1: Research Team 
Section 2: Research Project and Rationale 
Section 3: Models 
Section 4: Epistemic Aims 
Section 5: Primary Conclusions/ Results 
 
The protocol below has eight primary steps. Step 1 must be completed first, and steps 7 
and 8 must be completed last. Steps 2 through 6, however, can be completed in any order 
you find most agreeable.  
 
1. Collect all of the research papers from which you will construct the 
description.  
a. Select a research project as per the protocols in Appendix A.  
b. Collect all of the papers identified as outputs of that project.  
c. Of those papers, focus on ones that share the most common authors, 
phenomena studied, methods, and scientific products.  
d. Get rid of papers that erroneously identified by the computer program as 
outputs of the same project.  
e. For the remaining papers, list the co-authors. List the earliest publication 
date and the latest publication date. Create a timeframe that goes from the 
five years prior to the earliest date to five years after the latest date.  
f. For each author, collect every paper published in the timeframe. To find 
all such papers, use at least Google Scholar, Web of Science, and look for 
the personal or laboratory webpages of each author and their lists of 
publications. 
i. For Google Scholar, search by: author:“[first name or initial] [last 
name]”  
ii. Use the Custom Range tool on the left to select the time period.  
iii. Google Scholar: https://scholar.google.com   
iv. Use similar criteria in Web of Science: 
https:/webofknowledge.com      
g. Read the abstract of each paper collected. Separate those that seem to be 
outputs of the common project according to step c, and discard the rest.  
h. Of the remaining papers, read them and see if they cite earlier papers in 
the project, and see if later papers from the project cite them. Also, ensure 
that the papers meet the aspects listed in step c. If a paper meets many of 
the above criteria, include it as an output of the project. Otherwise, discard 
it.   
i. As you add papers, two things will evolve: the cast of team members and 
the timeframe of the project. repeat steps e–h as necessary as you add new 
team members to the project and potentially additional years. Do so until 
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the cast is stable, as is the time frame, and there are no more papers to 
review.  
j. For the final cast, get the dissertations, or at least the dissertation 
metadata, for each team member who has completed one by the time of 
your study.  
i. Use the Proquest Dissertations and Theses digital database: 
http://www.proquest.com/products-services/pqdtglobal.html 
ii. The archive has many full text dissertations, especially those 
published in the US since 2000, and those documents have lots of 
information about academic lineage and often short 
autobiographies. 
iii. Even when the archive lacks full text documents, it has metadata 
for nearly all dissertations published in the US since the 1950s.  
k. Separate those dissertations that were outputs of the research project, and 
add them to the collection of project outputs.  
l. Of the documents in the final collection for the project, separate them into 
at least the following categories: research reports; review papers; 
dissertations.  
m. For the final cast of members, count how many documents each (co-
)authored, and rank the members according to that number, with the 
highest number at the top of the list and the lowest at the bottom.   
 
2. Write the following subsections of Section 2: Research Project and Rationale. 
a. Name of Project: Name the project and team. For instance, for the team in 
which Wray is the most prominent member, followed by Garfield and then 
by Runcie, name the project the WGR Project and the team the WGR 
team.  
b. Published Outputs of Project: List the items from step 1.l above. Have 
subsections for each category of research report, review articles, and 
dissertations. For each subsection, list the title of the document and the 
authors. Within the subsections, list the documents in chronological order 
by publication date.  
c. Type of Population Studied: List the kind of populations studied: wild, 
laboratory, wild/laboratory, or simulated. Also, list the species studied.  
 
3. Write all of the subsections for Section 1: Research Team. 
a. Time period and location of the team and project: Answer the following 
questions:  
i. When did the team form? 
ii. When did it end? 
iii. Where did it exist? Was the project one of several from a common 
lab or network of labs? If so, what are the names of the labs? In 
what city, state, and country did the lab or project exist? At what 
institution? 
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iv. How does the project differ from similar projects pursued by the 
team or by the lab? 
b. Team Members: List each member of the team. List them in order 
according to the rank from step 1.m above. For each person, provide as 
much of the following information as possible.  
i. Name 
ii. Position in the lab (primary investigator, lab manager, graduate 
researcher, outside expert, undergraduate researcher, etc.) Look to 
lab websites for help on this issue.  
iii. Position in the project (designer, data analyzer, materials provider, 
etc.) For guidance here, look to the author contribution sections of 
research reports.  
iv. Official position at the institution (professor, graduate student, etc.) 
Look to lab websites for help here.  
v. When, where, and in what field the person received her highest 
degree, and what kind of degree it is. If it’s a terminal degree, list 
the advisor.  
vi. Birth date and age when the person joined the team.  
vii. Beginning and end dates during which the person was a member of 
the team.  
viii. How many of the project documents the person (co-)authored.  
ix. Where the person is now and what position she has.  
c. Revise any of the previously written sections as needed.  
 
4. Finish Section 2: Research Project and Rationale. Focus on the subsection 
Research Rational, which should have the following subsections.  
a. Primary Phenomena of Study: Focus on the research reports, but also 
consult the review papers as needed.  
i. Focus on the abstract, introductions, and conclusions.  
ii. Underline text that helps you address the following questions: 
1. What process and items of individual organisms did the 
team study? 
2. What processes and items of populations did the team 
study?  
iii. Use that underlined text to write a few short paragraphs that 
summarizes the primary phenomena studied by the team, that 
phenomena about which they addressed question.  
b. Research Problems:  
i. Rely on the account of problems provided in (Elliott 2016), 
according to which problems are states of affairs in which 
something valued is harmed or obstructed from flourishing.  
ii. Read each document and underline in a distinct color each passage 
that indicates a problem that motivates the team to pursue the 
project, or against which they evaluate the significance or success 
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of the project. Focus especially on abstracts, introductions, and 
conclusions.  
iii. Quote each of these passages on your description document. 
iv. If possible, use multiple people to do the above three steps, and 
compare their results. Discuss different results, and make a 
consensus list across readers.  
v. Group the final quotes by kind of publication, if necessary. If 
necessary or helpful, group the quotes into the kinds of problems 
they indicate: intellectual problems, research difficulties, other, etc. 
Within all groupings, list the quotes chronologically by date of 
publication. 
vi. Summarize common themes from the quotes in a short paragraph 
after the categorized list.  
c. Research Questions: 
i. Rely on the account of questions provided in (Elliott 2016), 
according to which questions are abstract objects represented by 
interrogative statements, with which people indicate a search for 
information they lack.  
ii. Read each document and in a distinct color underline each passage 
that indicates a question that motivates the team to pursue the 
project, or against which they evaluate the significance or success 
of the project. Focus especially on abstracts, introductions, and 
conclusions. 
iii. Quote each of these passages on your description document. 
iv. If possible, use multiple people to do the above three steps, and 
compare their results. Discuss different results, and make a 
consensus list across readers.  
v. Group the final quotes by kind of publication, if necessary. If 
necessary or helpful, group the quotes into the kinds of problems 
they indicate: intellectual problems, research difficulties, other, etc. 
Within all groupings, list the quotes chronologically by date of 
publication. 
vi. Summarize common themes from the quotes in a short paragraph 
after the categorized list.  
vii. Revise any of the previously written sections as needed.  
d. Methods:  
i. Focus on the research reports, and especially on the methods 
sections therein. But also skim the abstract, introduction, and 
results sections for relevant information. 
ii. In a distinct color, highlight each passage that indicates the 
methods the team used. 
iii. To summarize the team’s methods in a few paragraphs on your 
description document, refer to the underlined sections to address as 
many of the following questions as you can: 
1. What physical models (if any) did the team use?  
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2. What devices?  
3. What items in the object of study did the team manipulate?  
4. What processes in the object of study did the team 
manipulate?  
5. What named methods did the team use (GWAS, Western 
Blot, NCII, etc.)? 
6. What methods did they use to control their object of study? 
7. What methods did they use to collect data?  
8. What methods did they use to refine or clean their data? 
9. What methods did they use to analyze their data?  
10. How did they tie their data to scientific products like 
theories, models, hypotheses, etc.?  
iv. If possible, use multiple people to do the above three steps, and 
compare their results. Discuss different results, and make a 
consensus summaries across readers.  
v. Revise any of the previously written sections as needed.  
 
5. Write Section 3: Models. 
a. Focus only on the research reports (and dissertations, if analyzed).  
b. Reread the discussion of models in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
c. Focus first on mechanistic models.  
i. In a distinct color, highlight each passage in each report that 
indicates the mechanistic models the team used. From those 
highlighted passages: 
ii. List all the mechanistic models used.  
iii. For each model, list the mechanism’s parts, activities, and 
interactions. Also, list the mechanisms supraphenomenon, that 
phenomenon that the mechanism as a whole brings about.  
iv. If possible, use multiple people to do the above three steps, and 
compare their results. Discuss different results, and make a 
consensus summaries across readers.  
v. Summarize the results on your description document.  
d. Focus on statistical and mathematical models. In a distinct color, highlight 
each passage in each report that indicates the statistical or mathematical 
models the team used. From those highlighted passages: 
i. Focus first on data models. List all of the data models used, and 
explain how they’re to be interpreted.  
ii. Focus next on statistical tests. List all such tests used, and explain 
how they’re to be interpreted.  
iii. Focus next on any other mathematical models, advanced functions, 
etc. Rewrite the models and explain how they’re to be interpreted.  
iv. For the above steps, you may need to learn more about the models. 
Look to the works cited pages of the research reports, see which 
books are cited there, get and read the relevant sections from those 
texts. Use other texts and online sources as necessary.  
  284 
v. If possible, use multiple people to do the above four steps, and 
compare their results. Discuss different results, and make a 
consensus summaries across readers.  
vi. Summarize the results on your description document.  
e. As much as possible, organize your summaries chronologically according 
to the publication date of individual papers within the project.  
f. Revise any of the previously written sections as needed.  
 
6. Write Section 4: Epistemic Aims.  
a. Write the following subsections.  
b. Open Coding Results: 
i. Rely on the account of epistemic aims provided in Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation. 
ii. Read each document and underline in a distinct color each passage 
that indicates an epistemic aim that motivates the team to pursue 
the project, or against which they evaluate the significance or 
success of the project. Focus especially on abstracts, introductions, 
and conclusions. 
iii. Quote each of these passages on your description document. 
iv. If possible, use multiple people to do the above three steps, and 
compare their results. Discuss different results, and make a 
consensus list across readers.  
v. Group the final quotes by kind of publication, if necessary. Within 
all groupings, list the quotes chronologically by date of 
publication. 
vi. Summarize common themes from the quotes in a short paragraph 
after the categorized list.  
c. Count Data: 
i. Use the protocol in Appendix C for doing computerized content 
analysis. 
ii. Provide tables for Raw Data, Cleaned/Informative Data, and 
Ranked Aims/Goals. 
d. Revise any of the previously written sections as needed.  
 
7.  Write Section 5: Primary Conclusions of the Project.  
a. Focus only on research reports (and dissertations, if analyzed). Create a 
subsection on your description document for each report. 
b. For each report, focus especially on the results section, and the section 
titles therein. Also look to the ends of the abstract, conclusion, and 
discussion sections.  
c. Using a distinct color, underline each passage that indicates a primary 
result.  
d. From those underlined passages, provide a summary of the report as 
follows:  
i. One paragraph to review what the team did 
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ii. Bulleted list of primary results, which generally includes 3 to 8 
items.  
e. If possible, use multiple people to do the above three steps, and compare 
their results. Discuss different results, and make a consensus list across 
readers.  
f. On the description document, list the summaries in chronological order by 
date of publication.  
g. Revise any of the previously written sections as needed.  
 
8. Tidy the Description Document.  
a. Reread the document, and correct for typos, style, and inconsistencies.  
b. Revise any of the previously written sections as needed.  
c. If possible, use multiple people to do the above two steps, and to list 
sections that need substantive changes or revisions. Discuss different 
results, and make a consensus description across readers.  
 
9. Validate the Description Document. 
a. If possible, have one or more of the team members review the report and 
send feedback. Prepare a questionnaire for those reviewers to read that has 
them focus especially on the descriptions sections about models and 
epistemic aims.  
b. Once you receive feedback, revise the document as needed. For suggested 
revisions you choose not to address, create a second document in which 
you list the comment and explain why you don’t address it.  
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Goal: If you follow this protocol, you will have a database and tabulated results. Those 
results will count the number of times words associated with distinct epistemic goals are 
used in single texts or a collection of texts.  
 
There are four primary stages, all of them to be done on a computer. The second stage is 
specific to a single program, Wordsmith Tools. The second stage may be completely 
replaced by instructions specific to another program. The third stage is specific to data 
output by that program, but will still function for many other programs.  
 
Stage 1: Prepare texts for content analyses  
Stage 2: Prepare texts for, and use, Wordsmith Tools program to get raw data  
Stage 3: Inspect and clean data  
Stage 4: Tabulate results  
 
Stage 1: Prepare texts for content analysis 
Goal: At the end of this stage, you will have a collection of documents in .txt format and 
organized in a set of folders. They will be in .txt format so that you can load them in any 
number of content analysis programs. They will be organized in a nested set of folders so 
that you can retrieve them easily 
 
1. Create a folder and name it something like: Case1 
a. Open the folder and create three sub folders.  
b. Name them: 1Documents; 2Codebooks; 3Data  
 
2. The first folder, 1Document, will house all the documents you want to code 
a. Open 1Documents 
b. Create a subfolder for all the files in their original file formats.  
i. Name it something like: OriginalFormatDocuments 
ii. Put all the original documents into that folder. 
iii. If necessary or helpful, rename the documents so that they share a 
common name format. For example, year of publication, and 
article title: (2015)AnInquiryintoMacroevolution.pdf 
iv. For journal articles that have substantial supplemental text 
documents, save those files here also.  
c. Create a second subfolder for versions of all those documents in plain text 
format, such that the file names end with the extension: .txt      You can 
edit those files in programs like: 
i. TextWrangler http://www.barebones.com/products/TextWrangler/  
ii. NotePad++ https://notepad-plus-plus.org/  
d. Name the folder something like: RawTexts 
e. For each of the documents in the first folder, make a text version. Use the 
following methods, ranked in order of ease and quality of text.  
i. Look for the document in html version on the internet. for 
example, if the document is a recent journal article, go to the 
journal’s website and look for a version of the article you can read 
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in your internet browser without opening a PDF reader. Copy the 
text, and paste it into a new .txt file.  
ii. For documents in PDF format, use some program that does optical 
character recognition (OCR). 
1. Adobe Acrobat Pro 
https://acrobat.adobe.com/us/en/acrobat/how-to/pdf-to-
word-doc-converter.html  
2. ABBYY FineReader https://www.abbyy.com/en-
us/finereader/  
3. PDF to Text http://pdftotext.com/  
4. Paper Machines plugin on Zotero http://papermachines.org/  
iii. For each new .txt file, save it and name it with the same filename 
as it’s associated source document.  
1. For instance, if you created a text file from 
(2015)AnInquiryintoMacroevolution.pdf 
2. then rename the text file: 
(2015)AnInquiryintoMacroevolutionRaw.txt 
3. The ‘Raw’ indicates that file is the direct output of an OCR 
program. 
iv. It may seem pointless to save the raw outputs, but doing so can 
save you much time if you need to re-do any of the later stages. 
f. Create a third subfolder for cleaned versions of the .txt files.  
i. Name it something like: CleanedTextstoCode 
ii. Copy all the documents from the RawTexts folder and paste them 
into this folder. 
iii. For each new .txt file, comb through each line of text, compare it 
to the original PDF file, and check for errors. Fix every error in the 
text file as needed.  
iv. For each new .txt file, ensure that it has all and only the content 
required by your content analysis scheme for unitizing texts, 
inference methods, and operational definitions for theoretical 
concepts/constructs. For instance, if your strategy requires you to 
code article titles, ensure that the title of the article is somewhere 
in the .txt file.  
1. For a journal article that has a substantial supplemental text 
document, copy, paste, and clean that text into the overall 
.txt file for the document, but at the end of the document.  
v. Consult your content analysis scheme for unitizing texts. For every 
item that is a different unit, start it on a new line, and separate it 
from the end of the previous unit by at least two lines.  
1. For this project, units are paragraphs, and the following 
things each count as distinct paragraphs:  
 
journal name with article citation data 
title with researcher names 





numbered indents (math equations) 
whole sidebars 
 
vi. Slightly rename each file to indicate that its contents have been 
cleaned to indicate.  
1. For instance, if the file name for the raw file was 
(2015)AnInquiryintoMacroevolutionRAW.txt 
2. Then rename the new file 
(2015)AnInquiryintoMacroevolutionCLEAN.txt 
vii. Clean and rename each file in this folder.  
 
3. Open the folder named 2Codebooks  
a. In it, paste the codebooks with which you will analyze the documents in 
1Documents.  
b. For this project, there are 9 codebooks, each collected in Appendix D. 
Each is a collection of words associated with a concept. For each 
codebook, make a .txt file with only the words associated with the 











4. Save all the files and the folder structure, and back up the folder on a cloud-based 
tool like Dropbox. 
 
 
Stage 2: Prepare texts for, and use, Wordsmith Tools program to get raw data 
Goal: At the end of this stage, you will have a collection of spreadsheets that have raw 
data, and a collection of spreadsheets that have data specific to each document analyzed. 
On each sheet, each row of data will indicate a word from one of the codebooks, the 
sentence or surrounding text in which it’s situated, the document from which the word 
and sentence came from, the sentence’s number, and the paragraph number, and the date 
of analysis. This stage may be replaced by similar instructions for other programs, as long 
as those programs return data with the above information.   
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1. Prepare texts for Wordsmith Tools.  
a. Open the first document in the CleanedTextstoCode folder.  
b. You need to indicate the units in the text, which are paragraphs as detailed 
in the unitizing scheme.  
c. For each unit, find the beginning of the unit, and just before it type: <p> 
d. For each unit, find the end of the unit, and just after it, type: </p> 
e. So label each unit in the text, and save the text with the current filename. 
f. Note: You could also label the sections and subsections for analysis in 
Wordsmith Tools, but we don’t for this project.  
g. Complete the above steps for each document in the folder.  
 
2. Use a computer that already has Wordsmith Tools installed, or install it on your 
PC. It won’t run on a Mac. http://www.lexically.net/wordsmith/  
 
3. Open Wordsmith Tools. Use mostly the default setting.  
 
4. Prepare the program to recognize paragraphs in the texts.  
a. In the left-side menu, click on the button Language Settings.  
b. In the text format boxes associated to paragraphs, code as follows 
i. To mark the start of paragraphs: <p> 
ii. To mark the end of paragraphs: </p> 
c. One could repeat these steps for sections, though such isn’t done for this 
project.  
 
5. Prepare the program to recognize sentences and specific words.  
a. In the left side menu, click on the Index button 
b. For clusters, change each to 25.  
c. Select the check box for ‘Stop at sentence break’ 
d. Ensure that a word is to show in the results if it’s frequency is at least 1.  
 
6. Load the codebooks.  
a. Click on the Concord button.  
b. Click on the Search Word tab. 
c. Select the upload function under the words ‘Ge Search Words from File’.  
d. Select a single codebook.  
i. Navigate to the 2Codebooks folder.  
ii. Select the topmost codebook that has yet to be used. 
e. Click the Load button.  
f. Check that the correct words populate the text box on the right side of the 
screen. 
 
7. Load texts to be analyzed.  
a. If still in the same Concord session, click on the Texts button.  
b. If starting a new session, click on the Concord button and load the 
appropriate codebook as in the previous step. Click on the Texts button  
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c. Click the Change Selection button. A window opens.  
d. In the left side of the window, navigate to the folder with texts to code, 
here named CleanedTextstoCode. 
e. In the left side, select all the texts in the folder, and click and drag them to 
the right side of the window. Remove any other files from the right side of 
the window.  
f. Click the OK button in the top right corner.  
 
8. Save the data.  
a. A new window opens with the data.  
b. Ensure that the sentences and paragraphs are being numbered correctly. If 
not, look for problems in the paragraph codes in the texts, or in the 
Wordsmith Tools settings from steps 4 and 5 above.  
c. If the sentence and paragraph numbers look ok, save the file as an excel 
spreadsheet. 
i. In the box that lets you select the number of characters to save, 
select some number over 150. 
ii. Name the excel file after the codebook used to analyze the texts.  
iii. Open the file. Sort the rows in the following order 
1. From lowest to highest by sentence number. 
2. From lowest to highest by paragraph number.  
3. From A to Z by article name.  
 
9. Repeat steps 6 through 8 for each codebook.  
 
10. Store the raw data.  
a. Create a folder and name it RawData.  
b. Put all the spreadsheets into that folder.    
c. Put it into the 3Data folder.  
d. In the 3Data folder, create a second folder named RawArticleData 
 
11. Create spreadsheets specific not to codebooks, but to the texts/articles be studied.  
a. Open a new Excel workbook.  
b. Name it for the first article in the folder CleanedTextstoCode.  
i. For instance: (2015)AnInquiryintoMacroevolution.xlsx 
c. Open the first Excel spreadsheet in the RawData folder.  
i. For instance: 1Goal.xlsx 
d. Select all the rows that have data for the relevant article from step b, along 
with the row that has the column names  
e. Copy those rows, and paste them into the new spreadsheet.  
i. i.e. into (2015)AnInquiryintoMacroevolution.xlsx 
f. In a separate row above the column names, indicate the source of the data 
to follow. 
i. For instance: Goal 
g. Repeat steps c through e for each spreadsheet in the RawData folder.  
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h. Save the file and put it in the RawArticleData folder.  
 
12. Repeat step 11 for each article in the CleanedTextstoCode folder.  
 
13. In the 3Data folder, create a new folder and name it CleanedArticleData.  
a. Copy all the files in the RawArticleData folder, and past them into the 
CleanedArticleData folder.  
 
14. Get rid of unnecessary data.  
a. Open the first file in the CleanedArticleData folder.  









c. To the right of the remaining columns, make new columns and name 
them: 





d. Ensure that all the column names are repeated above each of the chunks of 
data specific to a common codebook.  
e. Save the file, renaming it slightly.  
i. For instance: (2015)AnInquiryintoMacroevolutionCLEAN.xlsx 
 
15. Repeat step 14 for all files in the folder CleanedArticleData. 
 
  
Stage 3: Inspect and clean data 
Goal: At the end of this stage, you will have a collection of spreadsheets for which each 
of the rows have data have been vetted. The vetting techniques are common to qualitative 
content analysis studies.  
 
1. Navigate to the CleanedArticleData folder and select a data file.  
a. For instance: (2015)AnInquiryintoMacroevolutionCLEAN.xlsx 
b. Copy the file and save it under a slightly different name.  
i. For instance: (2015)AnInquiryintoMacroevolutionCLEAN1.xlsx 
 
2. Open the new file and check each datum.  
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a. Starting with the first row, read the relevant Concept (‘Know’, ‘Goal’, 
‘Explain’, etc.) and the word picked out for that concept, marked under the 
Set column.  
b. Read the surrounding sentence(s) for the word, marked under the 
Concordance column.   
c. Judge if the datum is irrelevant or infelicitous to the Concept.  
i. If so, code the datum as exhibiting at least one of the following 
issues, as appropriate.  
1. Infelicitous homonym 
2. Infelicitous cognate 
3. Metadiscourse 
4. Describes phenomena, not project rationale 
5. Describes layout of graphics 
6. Describes research of other teams 
ii. List the reason under the column Reason for to Exclude.  
iii. Move on to the next row 
 
d. If the datum is relevant to the concept, move on to the next row. 
e. Repeat for each datum and for each Concept.  
 
3. Repeat the above two steps for every data file.  
 
4. Take a break of at least a week from the files.  
 
5. Repeat steps 1–4 for all data files.  
a. Name each file slightly differently. For instance: 
(2015)AnInquiryintoMacroevolutionCLEAN2.xlsx  
 
6. Make consensus files.  
a. For a given article, open the two cleaned data files.  




b. For the topmost datum/ row, compare the codes for irrelevancy across the 
two data files.  
c. If the rows agree on the assignment of code, or on the lack thereof, move 
to the next row.  
d. If the data files disagree about the (ir)relevancy of the topmost row for the 
Concept, settle on a single code. 
e. Copy the uncoded data file and save it as a new file.  
i. For instance:  
(2015)AnInquiryintoMacroevolutionCLEAN3Consensus.xlsx 
f. On the new file, enter a consensus code into the Reason to Exclude 
column.  
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g. Repeat the steps a–f for all rows and all concepts for a given article. Save 
the file regularly 
h. Repeat the steps a–g for all articles.   
 
7. If possible, repeat steps 1–6 with other researchers as coders.  
a. Make consensus files across coders according as in Step 6.  
 
8. Tabulate the results.  
a. For a given article, open the consensus data file.  
b. For the first Concept, count the rows of all data. List that number under 
the Total Cells column.  
i. Use Excel function =CountA(range), for which the range is the 
columnar list of words collected under the Set column for the 
concept.  
c. For the first Concept, count the rows of irrelevant or infelicitous data. List 
that number under the Noisy Cells column.  
i. Use Excel function =CountA(range), for which the range is the 
columnar list of words collected under the Reason to Exclude 
column for the Concept. 
d. For the first Concept, count the rows of relevant data. List that number 
under the Clean Cells column.  
i. Use Excel function =Cell1 - Cell2, for which Cell1 is the cell that 
lists number of Total Cells, and Cell2 is the cell that lists the 
number of Noisy Cells.  
e. Repeat steps a–d for all Concepts.  
f. Repeat steps a–e for all articles.   
 
 
Stage 4: Tabulate results 
Goal: At the end of this stage, you will have a collection of tables that summarize the 
results from the previous stages.  
 
1. Copy Table A.1 and paste it into your document.  
 
2. Under the Paper column, rename ‘Article 1’ to be about the first article in the 
case.  
 
3. For that first article, enter the counts from the corresponding consensus cleaned 
data files. You can create a table for:  
a. Uncleaned or raw counts. 










Paper Goal Know Amalgam Control Describe Discover Explain Predict Cause 
Research 
Reports 
         
Article 1          
Article 2          
…          
Review  
Papers 
         
Article a          
Article b          
…          
 
 
4. Repeat step 3 for all articles in the case.  
 
5. Copy Table A.2 and paste it into your document.  
 
6. For the first article, and based on the results tabulated above, list the goal with the 
highest counts under the Goal 1 column.  
a. Consider only: Amalgam, Control, Describe, Discover, Explain, Predict 
 
7. Repeat step 6 for the counts second, third, and fourth highest ranked goals, and 
list them under the respective columns of Goal 2, Goal 3, and Goal 4.  
 





RELATIVE RANKS OF EPISTEMIC GOALS 
 
Research Reports Goal 1 Goal 2 Goal 3 Goal 4 
Article 1     
Article 2     
…     
Other Papers     
Article a     
Article b     
…     
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APPENDIX D  
CODEBOOKS FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 















































































































































































































































































































































































































  300 
APPENDIX E  
PERMISSIONS 
  301 




Fig. 3.1. Page 85. Krippendorff, Klaus. 2013.Figure 4.2: Components of 
Content Analysis. In Content Analysis: An Introduction 
to Its Methodology. 3rd edition. Los Angeles: Sage 
Publishing, 2013.  
 
Publisher: Sage College 
License: 3998910298681 
  
Fig. 5.1. Page 137. Johnson, Norman A., and Adam H. Porter. 2000.Fig. 2. 
In Rapid Speciation via Parallel, Directional Selection on 
Regulatory Genetic Pathways. Journal of Theoretical 





Fig. 5.2. Page 140. Tulchinsky, Alexander, et al. 2014. Figure 1. In              
Hybrid Incompatibility Arises in a SequenceBased 
Bioenergetic Model of Transcription Factor Binding.
Genetics 198:  1155–66. Page 1157.  
 
Publisher: Genetics Society of America 
License: 3995490893335 
  
Fig. 6.1. Page 188. Garfield, David A., et al. 2012. Figure 1. In                
Population genetics of cisregulatory sequences that 
operate during embryonic development in the sea urchin 
Strongylocentrotus purpuratus.Evolution and 
Development 14:152–167. Page 153.  
 
Publisher: John Wiley and Sons 
License: 3995461118550 
 
 
 
